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I
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, teachers of taxation have classed problems concern-
ing "when is it income?" as of no less importance than those relating
to "is it income?" The "when" of income is significant because of
various factors, e.g., tax rate changes, rate progressivity, statutes of limi-
tation, and alteration in the substantive law. As sound as this lesson
may be, tax accounting problems have long been neglected in the
periodicals and shunted aside by lawyers, presumably to be left to
their brethren in accountancy, who are, after all, certified to compre-
hend the special mystique of clearly reflecting income. Recently, how-
ever, lawyers have increasingly tackled these unfamiliar problems. The
1964 spin-off of a new Committee on Tax Accounting Problems from
the General Income Tax Committee of the Section of Taxation of the
American Bar Association probably reflects more than a mere realign-
ment of the Section's committee structure.1 The dilemmas surrounding
deferred compensation arrangements, prepaid income, and reserves for
estimated expenses (which recently have generated a spate of high-level
judicial pronouncements) and the wide scope of problems caused by
the existence of an annual accounting period2 have been sufficiently
important to attract the attention of most tax practitioners. But con-
ceptions involved in analyzing and resolving these problems are not
generally handled with facility by lawyers, even though the disputes
arise and are dealt with in a familiar context.
Although the statutory provisions relevant to these questions are
generally terse,3 in one area Congress has specifically provided ma-
1 ABA TAXATION SECTION ANN. REP. 54-35 (1964).
2 E.g., the inclusion of disputed and unliquidated items, and the amorphous scope
of the tax benefit doctrine.
3 "The general answer to most of these when questions is furnished by sections
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chinery that can control the time of income from certain types of sales
transactions. The reporting of income from qualifying installment
sales, controlled as it is by statute,4 should not be alien terrain for the
lawyer. Legislative and administrative pronouncements are tools with
which he can work with facility. The rise in comprehension level is
due in part, no doubt, to the fact that the installment method of re-
porting is not an accounting method at all.5 If the period over which
payment is to be made is relatively short and there exists little possi-
bility of nonperformance by the buyer (or loss, in the case of reposses-
sion), the method cannot be considered in conformance with general
accounting principles. If employed for financial statement purposes,
it would likely cause distortion. That the method is relevant only to
taxation enables the tax practitioner to approach problems arising
thereunder with a minimum of awe.
Like much of tax law, the installment method of reporting income
owes its existence to the legislative penchant for encrusting the statute
with all manner of filigree designed to alleviate specific hardships. Be-
cause of its versatility, the installment method is not particularly con-
troversial. The proper categorization of the installment method in tax
syntax is, however, a necessary prelude to the discussion of its use and
effect. Essentially it is an income deferral technique and does not
affect established concepts of income realization and recognition. 7 As
441(c), 446, 451(a) and 461(a) in terms of the method of accounting regularly employed
by the taxpayer in his business or record keeping." S. SURREY & W. WARREN, FEDERaL
INCOmE TAxATiON 430 (1962) (emphasis in original).
4 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453.
5 It is not a "method" for purposes of INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 446(e), which re-
quires consent for changes in accounting method. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-8 (1958), as amended,
T.D. 6682, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 206.
6 J. ACCOUNTANCY, July, 1958, at 79.
7 Cf. Wallace Huntington, 15 B.T.A. 851, 858-59 (1929). The early regulations were
framed in a manner that denied, with regard to qualifying sales, that the buyer's obli-
gations had the equivalence of cash. Treas. Reg. 45, § 213, art. 45 (1921). It is far better
to view the statute as not affecting general principles of realization but as simply consti-
tuting an optional method for income deferral. In re Rogers' Estate, 143 F.2d 695 (2d
Cir. 1944). See also Rev. Rul. 65-99, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 242; Ivan Irwin, Jr., 45 T.C. 544,
550 (1966). In Rev. Rul. 60-68, 1960-1 CUar. BULL. 151, the Commissioner authorized the
use of § 453 in reporting gain from the sale of the stock of a collapsible corporation,
but concluded that receipt of an installment after the end of the 3-year period during
which § 341 is applicable would not affect the ordinary income treatment provided by
that section. Note that a corporation, reporting income under § 453, "shall," with respect
to such transactions, use that method in the computation of its earnings and profits.
Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6(a) (1955). In Municipal Bond Corp., 41 T.C. 20, 32 (1963), rev'd on
other grounds, 341 F.2d 683, 691 (8th Cir. 1965), the Commissioner was held not to be
estopped from treating as ordinary income payments received on sales made in closed
years, because he was simply determining "petitioner's tax liability on income received
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such it possesses a marked kinship with other authorizations for the
deferral or spreading of income. The complex network in authoriza-
tion of a spread-back of income which is found in the income averaging
provisions of the code is analogous, but different in important respects.8
Income averaging mitigates the hardship imposed by the progressive
rate structure upon greatly uneven income levels of different years,
whereas the installment method recognizes that adversity would often
result if the taxpayer were compelled to account for income not yet
received. Both situations, however, represent a violation of general
tax accounting concepts and of the segmentation of income into fixed
one-year time periods.9
As with any body of principles that are inconsistent with the con-
cepts normally applied, it is essential to know with reasonable certainty
which situations are within its scope. Thus, much of the discussion of
the installment method must be aimed at establishing the perimeter
of the statutory authorization. Then, of course, attention must be
directed to the effect of the method once it is properly chosen.
II
DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF THE
STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION
A. The Need for the Enactment and a Comparison with Other
Principles
Ever since the Revenue Act of 1916, federal tax laws have provided
that income can be returned in accordance with the method of ac-
counting used by the taxpayer, as long as the method clearly reflects
income.'0 This authorization manifestly incorporates the cash and
accrual methods. It has long been understood that, for gain determi-
during the taxable years now under consideration." Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1(d)(3) (1957)
makes it dear that installment payments received during the year are to be considered
in netting § 1231 transactions for that year even though the sale generating the payment
occurred in a prior year.
8 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1301-05.
9 Postponement of present income is also available through the vehicle of qualified
pension and profit sharing plans. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 401-04. Administrative in-
roads on general concepts are also found both in the regulation permitting the use of
the percentage-of-completion method in long-term construction contracts, which allows
a spread-out of income that might otherwise be bunched if traditional concepts were
employed, Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3 (1957), and in the Commissioner's authorization of de-
ferred compensation arrangements outside the explicit statutory framework. Rev. Rul.
60-31, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 174.
10 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 8(g), 13(d), 39 Stat. 756 (now INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 446).
[Vol. 53:181
1.968] INSTALLMENT REPORTING
nation purposes, property received in a form other than cash, but
having a cash equivalent, will be. treated as an amount realized -by a
cash basis taxpayer in the year of receipt" Thus, a promissory note is
property and may be assigned a present value even though the terms
of the obligation specifically provide that the payments are to be
deferred and made on specific future dates well after the close of the
year in which the sale transaction occurred. 2 No doubt this principle
goes some way toward the obliteration of the fundamental distinctions
between the cash receipts and accrual methods.'3
This long-established principle of realization stands completely
apart from the doctrine of constructive receipt. If the property (whether
cash or its equivalent) forming a part of the sale price is placed beyond
the seller's dominion, then it is not regarded as realized by the seller
for gain or loss realization purposes. Usually, property that takes the
form of an obligation to make deferred payments is clearly within
the taxpayer's dominion even though the payments themselves are
deferred.' 4 Another distinct problem arises when the value of the prop-
erty received by the selling taxpayer cannot be determined. Because of
11 The statute itself seems to compel this result. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1001(b).
12 The obligation may have a value less than face, in which event the amounts in
excess of such value shall be treated as income when received. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6
(1958). See generally Note, Taxation of Deferred Payment Sales of Realty and Casual
Sales of Personality, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 195. Some evidence of indebtedness (e.g., notes,
bonds, etc.) other than a pnere contractual promise to pay may be prerequisite to a
finding that a "cash equivalent" has been received by the taxpayer. 2 J. MERTENS, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION § 11.05 (1961). Situations in which the buyer's promise does not
constitute a cash equivalent offer deferral to a cash basis taxpayer, because the seller is
allowed to recover his cost prior to returning income. Estate of Coid Hurlburt, 25 T.C.
1286 (1956), not acquiesced in, 1956-2 Cum. BuLL. 10; Nina J. Ennis, 17 T.C. 465 (1951).
Such deferral is not available to accrual basis taxpayers, who are treated as realizing the
face value of the buyer's obligation. First Say. & Loan Ass'n, 40 T.C. 474, 487 (1963);
George L. Castner Co., 30 T.C. 1061 (1958); cf. C.W. Titus, Inc., 33 B.T.A. 928 (1936).
The installment method, however, is equally available to cash and accrual basis taxpayers.
Rhombar Co., 47 T.C. 75 (1966). The fact that the buyer's promise to pay does not rise
to the dignity of a cash equivalent should not alter the selling taxpayer's right to com-
pute and return the income from a property disposition under § 453. Thus, "evidences
of indebtedness," as used in § 453(b)(2)(A)(ii), cannot be taken as necessarily referring
to an obligation having a cash equivalent.
13 Since different principles are at work, however, the accrual method, premised upon
the unconditional right of payment, may often result in a greater amount realized than
the cash receipts method, which treats the obligation of the buyer (discounted for valu-
ation) as the equivalent of cash. S. SuRREY & W. WArREN, supra note 3, at 653. Merchants
generally accrue obligations at face value, using a bad debt reserve or a specific deduction
as individual accounts prove uncollectible.
14 Some of the confusion that has existed between the doctrines of cash equivalence
and constructive receipt is chronicled in Comment, Receipt of Deferred Payment Con-
tracts as Income to the Cash Basis Taxpayer, 58 Nw. U.L. Rav. 278 (1964).
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the valuation problem, selling taxpayers may recover the basis of dis-
posed property prior to reporting gain. The area is probably just as
indefinable as it was after the Supreme Court spoke in Burnet v.
Logan.'5 All consideration of so-called "open" transactions is ominously
pervaded by the Commissioner's position that "only in rare and
extraordinary cases will property be considered to have no fair market
value."'8 Property that takes the form of an obligation to pay a specific
amount in deferred payments is almost always readily susceptible to
valuation. Thus, absent administrative concession or legislative author-
ization, cash basis taxpayers selling property in transactions that call
for deferred payment would be subject to taxation in the year of sale,
pursuant to relatively ancient principles of realization.
The considerations that compelled administrative, and subse-
quently legislative, recognition of the installment method are fairly
clear. When a seller receives only a small part of the selling price at
the time of sale, it is not always fair to hold him responsible for
the contemporaneous payment of the full tax liability generated by the
sale. Use of the installment method of reporting income usually has
the coincidental advantage of making it unnecessary to value the buyer's
obligation at the time of sale.17
B. Form of the Enactment
Prior to their enactment as part of the Revenue Act of 1926, the
statutory provisions governing the installment method of reporting
contained a rather ambiguous reference to installment dispositions,
stating simply that the statute should not be construed to prevent
15 283 U.S. 404 (1931). The taxpayer sold shares of stock in a mining company in
return for a present payment of cash and a promise of future payments contingent upon
the amount of ore produced each year. The Court held that, until the receipts by the
taxpayer equalled the basis of her shares, the payments were return of capital and not
taxable as income. The transaction was not closed, since the taxpayer might never recover
her capital investment from payments received under the conditional promise, which
was in no proper sense the equivalent of cash.
16 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1957). Articulating an identical warning are Treas.
Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(2) (1958) and Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 15.
17 Obviously, the opportunity for deferral in a Burnet v. Logan situation (no income
realization until the recovery of basis) is greater than under § 453, where a portion of
each installment is treated as income. Analogously, if the obligation of the buyer has no
fair market value, a sale treated as a deferred payment sale not on the installment plan will
allow the seller fully to recover his basis prior to reporting gain, and may thus be
superior to the installment method, which provides for a pro rata return of capital and
of income. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(2) (1958).
A seller's effort to render a potentially "open" transaction eligible under § 453 will,
of course, involve some effort to value what the seller is to receive in order to determine
the "total contract price."
[Vol. 53:181
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"taxation of that portion of any installment payment representing gain
or profit in the year in which such payment is received."' 8 The state-
ment took on meaning only when placed against the background of a
prior administrative authorization to use the installment method of
reporting income. 9 This vagueness set a surprising stage for the
judicial action that ensued.
The administrative approval of installment reporting was shaken
by early decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals which found that the
method did not accurately reflect income.20 The Board was disturbed
by what it felt to be the distortive effect of the income drop-off that
resulted when a taxpayer changed from the accrual to the installment
method.21 The judicial abrogation of the Commissioner's grant induced
the more explicit legislative statement contained in the Revenue Act
of 1926.2 This permitted use of the installment method by persons
who regularly dispose of personal property and also with regard to
18 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(f), 42 Stat. 231. This same statutory language is
now codified in INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1001(d), where it apparently serves to coordinate
the general realization provisions with § 453. Its presence prior to the enactment of the
statutory authorization of the installment method is curious.
19 The installment method first appeared in regulations issued in 1918 in a form
that strongly resembles the present statute:
In the case of a contract to sell real property or other property on the
installment plan, title remaining in the vendor until the property is fully paid
for, the income to be returned by the vendor will be that proportion of each
installment payment which the gross profit to be realized when the property is
paid for bears to the gross contract price.
Treas. Reg. 33, art. 117 (rev. 1918). Strangely, the administrative authorization seemed
to call for mandatory rather than elective use of the method if the sale was within its
scope. In 1919 expanded regulations deleted the requirement that title be retained by the
vendor, and allowed use of the method as long as the seller employed one of a number
of other techniques to preserve his interest, e.g., a mortgage executed by the vendee, or
property subject to a lien for unpaid amounts.
20 B.B. Todd, Inc., 1 B.T.A. 762 (1925). See also A.R. Dennis, 2 B.T.A. 977 (1925);
The Hoover-Bond Co., 1 B.T.A. 929 (1925); H.B. Graves Co., 1 B.T.A. 859 (1925).
21 To report... upon a basis which considers only the profit upon the business
entered into during a year which is actually reduced to possession in cash, and
to exclude all business of prior years reduced to possession in cash, at the same
time deducting as expenses all accrued obligations, is to destroy all relationship
between the true net income and the income reported for taxation.
B.B. Todd, Inc., 1 B.T.A. 762, 766 (1925).
22 Ch. 27, § 212(d), 44 Stat. 9, 23. The legislative authorization was made retroactive
to years covered by prior revenue enactments. Id. § 1208, at 130. Some of the vagaries
that marked the Commissioner's administration of the prior regulations with regard to
what constituted a qualifying installment sale are described in Hearings on Revenue
Revision for 1925 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 880-82
(1925). Also persisting is the opening language ("under regulations prescribed by the Com-
missioner with the approval of the Secretary'), which serves to render the Commissioner's
regulations almost impregnable. E.g., Burnet v. S. & L. Bldg. Corp., 288 U.S. 406, 415
(1933).
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casual sales of personalty for more than $1,000 and sales of real prop-
erty "if in either case the initial payments do not exceed one-fourth of
the purchase price." The three-part form of the statute has persisted
to this day. The accompanying committee reports clearly indicate
that a failure to come within the provision would result in taxation of
the gain to the selling taxpayer in the year of sale, with obligations
owed to cash basis taxpayers being assigned a cash equivalence in deter-
mining the amount realized.2
In 1928 the essential form of the installment sale authorization
was retained except for an increase, from twenty-five percent to forty
percent of the selling price, in the ceiling on year-of-sale receipts in
sales of realty and casual sales of personalty.2 4 The ceiling on the amount
that can be received by the seller in the year of sale helps to insure
that the disposition is one in which the imposition of a full tax in the
year of sale would cause hardship.2 5 As will be seen later, this threshold
23 S. RFt. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1926). By indicating that "deferred-
payment contracts other than installment contracts" were not affected by the statute, the
Committee adopted a confusing nomenclature. Presumably any property disposition in
which the seller does not receive the entire payment in cash (or other property in a
form other than evidences of indebtedness) in the year of sale, but receives the buyer's
promise to pay some or all of the consideration at a later date, constitutes a deferred
payment sale. The installment method authorized by § 453 represents one manner in
which such sales can be reported. The deferred payment method, handled administra-
tively with regard to sales of realty (Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6 (1958)) and judicially with
regard to sales of personalty, and the return of capital method pronounced in Burnet v.
Logan, constitute the other available techniques. The deferred payment method, insofar
as it authorizes the valuation of the purchaser's obligations at less than face and the
computation of gain on that basis, seems available only to cash basis and not to accrual
taxpayers, the latter being compelled to treat the obligation as having accrued at face.
After the cash or cash equivalent has been reported by a cash basis taxpayer pursuant
to this method, deferral of the amount by which the face value of the obligation exceeds
its fair market value is available. Note, supra note 12, at 198.
24 Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 44(b), 45 Stat. 791, 805.
25 The regulations preceding statutory authorization bestowed potential installment
method treatment on transactions where "the initial payment is relatively small." Treas.
Reg. 45, arts. 44, 45 (rev. 1919). If the payment in the year of sale is "large," the seller
is better able to pay a tax contemporaneous with the sale, and the likelihood of full
performance by the buyer is greater. Thus, principles of cash equivalence may properly
control. There has been some difficulty, however, in properly drawing the line. During
hearings on revenue revision in 1928, representatives of the real estate industry (largely
developers) made a plea that a ceiling on year-of-sale payments in dispositions of realty
by dealers be removed entirely and that such transactions be grouped with those made
by dealers in personalty. They asserted that, in order to insure qualification, property
would have to be sold for an initial payment of 10% down lest monthly payments in the
year of sale would result in disqualification. Since sales on this basis were unsound for
business reasons, it was urged that real estate dealers were treated unfairly vis-b.-vis dealers
in personalty. Hearings on Revenue Revision for 1927-1928 Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 70th Cong., Ist Sess., 162-63, 224-30, 246-50 (1927). Although these pleas
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qualification has produced a sizeable portion of the litigation arising
under the statute.
The Revenue Act of 1928, however, added a curious form of
double taxation in order to prevent a drop-off to a "seriously subnormal
amount of income" 2 in transition years following the taxpayer's (lim-
ited to dealers in personal property) decision to change from the accrual
to the installment method. The provision required the changing tax-
payer, in years subsequent to the decision to change, to report amounts
received on account of sales made prior to the change and previously
reported pursuant to the accrual method. Thus, if a dealer in person-
alty had sold property with an aggregate basis of $20,000 for a total
selling price of $100,000, according to the accrual method he would
have reported a gain of $80,000. If for the next tax accounting period
he adopted the installment method, there would be a considerable
drop-off in the level of his taxable income, even assuming a similar
sales volume. Subsequent receipts on account of prior sales presumably
would be received tax-free, the profit from them having been pre-
viously included in income pursuant to the accrual method, and
amounts received for current sales would be reported pursuant to the
newly-adopted installmeht method, allowing the taxpayer to spread
the profit over the years during which the payments were received.
This subnormality in income level would continue for a period of
years, depending on for how long the taxpayer's business generally
extended credit, until the profits of prior years includible in income
pursuant to the installment method come in closer relationship with
the profits being deferred by use of the method. The drop-off in income
level, especially in periods of rising tax rates, was apparently too bitter
a pill for a concerned Treasury and a responsive Congress. The response
fashioned was a legislative abrogation of general accrual concepts,
taking the form of a mandate that subsequent receipts on account of
prior sales (the profit on which had already been included in income
according to the taxpayer's prior accrual method) "shall not be ex-
cluded." This double-tax potion was only initially unappetizing to the
Congress; 27 when informed of the reward awaiting the taxpayer who
were unsuccessful, the arguments presented may well have resulted in the increase of the
ceiling to 40%. H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1927). The Revenue Act of 1934,
ch. 277, § 44, 48 Stat. 680, 694, decreased the ceiling to 30% (at which it has since
remained) for the reason that a higher level caused "an unreasonable postponement of
tax in cases where such tax can well be paid in the year of the sale." H.R. REP. No. 704,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1934).
20 H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1927).
27 The "double tax" rule presents one of the strangest situations I have ever
1968]
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exercised the "advantageous option" 2as of changing from the accrual
to the installment method, the statutory remedy became palatable.
The host of problems touching the disposition of installment
obligations, not dealt with in prior enactments, was taken up in the
1928 Act.29 Presumably the sale of an installment obligation, even
absent a statutory directive, would yield income to the seller equal to
the excess of the amount realized over the basis of the installment obli-
gation in the hands of the seller, the latter being determined according
to fairly well recognized basis allocation concepts. There existed, how-
ever, situations in which the disposition of installment obligations
would not necessarily produce gain to the transmitting party but would
leave the obligation in the hands of the recipient at a higher or stepped-
up basis, thus removing from the tax the income which had been de-
ferred by reason of the decision to adopt the installment method on
the original sale. For example, corporate disposition of an installment
obligation, by way of a liquidating or nonliquidating distribution,
would not be a recognizing event to the distributing corporation and
would leave the obligation in the hands of the distributee at a fair
market value basis. The transmission of an installment obligation by
death would not be a realizing event to the decedent or his estate; it
would result in assigning the obligation a fair market value basis in the
hands of the beneficiary or other distributee, thus, again, removing the
gain deferred by reason of the installment method election from the
grasp of the income tax. Although the transfer of an installment obliga-
tion by gift would not have the same potential for revenue loss, since
the donee would preserve the transferor's basis in the property given,
witnessed. Everyone upon hearing the matter discussed for the first time becomes
almost enraged at the thought of taxing the same income twice. After a further
study, however, the first reaction suffers a complete reversal.
69 CONG. Mac. 7707 (1928) (remarks of Senator Smoot). The change now codified in
§ 453(c)(2) (allowing an adjustment of the tax as a result of the double inclusion) does
not reflect such firm convictions. Almost all of those giving testimony were adamantly
opposed to legislative acceptance of the Commissioner's double tax position. E.g., Hearings
on Revenue Revision for 1927-1928 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 70th
Cong., 1st Sess. 221-24, 283-99 (1927). The uncertainty of this position prior to the 1928
enactment is fully chronicled in Willcuts v. Gradwohl, 58 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1932), and
Hoover-Bond Co. v. Denman, 59 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1932). The sole witness in support of
the course eventually taken was hardly convincing:
When you let a man go into the installment business you are giving him some-
thing and you have a right to prescribe conditions. The complaint is that there
is double taxation. Even if there is double taxation the installment people are
getting away with the best of it, and you have a right to prescribe the condi-
tions upon which a man should go on the installment basis if you want to.
Hearings on HIR. 1 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1928).
28 H.R. RaP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1927).
29 Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 44(d), 45 Stat. 791, 806.
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the assignment itself would not constitute a realizing event to the
donor, thus opening, it might be felt, a small opportunity for avoidance
through the assignment of income. Operating upon the theory that the
deferral of income through election of the installment method was a
privilege personal to the taxpayer originally making the decision to so
defer income, the Congress provided that a disposition of the obligation
by him (by any one of a number of means) compelled the recognition of
the deferred income at the time of transfer. Thus, a personalizing of the
use of the method evolved through a desire to prevent abuses in which
the transferee took the obligation at an increased basis and the trans-
feror generally realized no gain. The rough hewn tool that Congress
fashioned in 1928 has frequently been amended. These provisions, now
contained in section 453(d), are complex and, since they concern a
separable segment of the larger area under discussion, are more prop-
erly dealt with in a subsequent article.30
Surprisingly, the statute authorizing the method's use has, except
for some minor changes, persisted very close to its original form. The
categorization of eligible sales wrought by the statute itself constitutes
an appropriate format for its discussion.
III
SALES OF REALTY AND CASUAL SALES OF PERSONALTY
The statutory separation of sales of personalty by a dealer from ca-
sual sales of personalty and sales of real property appears to be rational.
The varying treatment accorded dealers and nondealers in sales of per-
sonalty is no doubt necessitated by the manner in which dealers report
income from property sales and by a desire to bestow the deferral benefit
offered by the statute only upon relatively sizeable sales of personalty.
Real property, whether sold by a dealer or not, was more properly
paired with casual sales of personalty; because of the myriad forms such
transactions can take, each sale properly constitutes a separate elective
opportunity, calling for a separate computation of gain. Because of this
categorization, many of the problems involving casual sales of personalty
may be treated together with those involving sales of real property.
A. Qualifying Sales-Generally
1. The Need To Have an "Installment Plan"
Eligibility for income deferral appears to require classification of
the transaction as a sale on the installment plan. Curiously, neither the
30 The author is presently preparing an article dealing with the disposition of in-
stallment obligations.
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statute nor the administrative material thereunder define an installment
plan sale. Although precise definitional matter appears in the regula-
tiQns dealing with sales of personal property by dealers,31 the form in
which the statute is cast makes it logical to assume that the definition
there employed may not properly apply to casual sales of personalty and
sales of realty falling within section 453(b). Early decisions of the Board
of Tax Appeals struggled for a workable notion of what constituted an
installment sale.32 In one case, a dictionary definition of an installment
as a partial payment on an amount due led the Board to conclude that
transactions involving a single payment, though due in the future,
could not qualify under the statute.33 In James McCutcheon & Co.,3 4 a
1928 contract for the sale of securities provided for payment "on or be-
fore October 21, 1932 with interest thereon" and stated that the divi-
dends paid on the stock, being held by the seller, were to be applied
toward the purchase price. The Board determined that the transaction
was not an installment sale, because the contract made no reference to
the dates upon which dividends were to be paid, or to the amount
thereof. The "sole unconditional obligation" was to make full payment
before October 1932.35 In failing to consider that the dividends yielded
by the stock during the year of sale constituted an initial payment, the
Board apparently held that the existence of a specific and definite con-
tractual obligation to make installment payments that are certain in
amount is essential to the existence of an installment sale.30
A closer reading of the statute soon yielded a softer administrative
position. The statute simply provides that income from the casual sale
of personalty (where the selling price exceeds $1,000) and from the sale
of realty may be returned in the same manner as that afforded electing
dealers in personalty if the amount paid in the taxable year of sale does
not exceed a specified percentage of the selling price.37 Thus, the Com-
missioner determined that the "sole test" in determining qualification
"is whether the initial payments ... do not exceed [the specified per-
centage] of the selling price."38 This conclusion, eschewing considera-
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(b), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 Cu. BULL. 198.
32 James McCutcheon & Co., 30 B.T.A. 1177 (1934); Walnut Realty Trust, 23 B.TA.
850 (1931); Thomas F. Prendergast, Ex'r, 22 B.TA. 1259 (1931).
33 Thomas F. Prendergast, Ex'r, 22 B.TA. 1259 (1931).
34 30 B.TA. 1177 (1934).
35 Id. at 1182.
36 The idea that a transaction is an installment sale only if the contract specifically
provides for the making of installment payments also appears, albeit confusingly, in
Walnut Realty Trust, 23 B.T.A. 850 (1931).
37 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 453(b).
38 I.T. 2691, XII-1 Cum. BuLL. 52 (1933).
[T]here is no express requirement in [the statute] that casual sales of real prop-
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tion of what the contract called for, presumably would have compelled a
different result in James McCutcheon & Co.31 Thus, for example, when
a contract calls for full payment "on or before" a date within three
years, the sale would qualify under section 453(b) if the seller does not
in fact receive more than thirty percent of the selling price in the tax-
able year of sale. It is irrelevant whether the transaction seeking qualifi-
cation under section 453(b) is a sale on the installment plan in the sense
used with regard to sales by dealers in personalty.4° If the initial pay-
ments do not exceed the limitation imposed on taxable year-of-sale pay-
ments, the sale obviously becomes one in which the purchase price is to
be paid in installments41 whether expressly so provided in the contract
or not.
2. Payments in the Year of Sale-Open Transactions
In early litigation the Commissioner was successful in denying
qualification to sales in which there was no initial payment and the bal-
ance was to be paid in a lump sum in a year following the sale.42 He also
ruled that the statute "fairly implies" that an initial payment of some
size is necessary, even when the contract calls for payment in regular in-
stallments in subsequent years.43 In the Commissioner's view the statu-
tory statement that the initial payment "not exceed 30 percent of the
selling price" 44 implied that there must be some initial payment. Thus,
erty must constitute what are commonly known as "installment sales" in order to
permit the return of income on the installment basis, the only requirement ...
being that the "initial payments" must not exceed [the specified percentage] of
the selling price.
G.C.M. 12148, XII-2 Cum. BuLL. 58 (1933).
89 30 B.T.A. 1177 (1934). In a subsequent decision, also involving a sale of securities,
certain dividends declared were to be applied toward the purchase price. The Board
found that the transaction was eligible under the installment method. E.M. Funsten, 44
B.T.A. 1166 (1941). McCutcheon was distinguished as concerned with a sale of personalty
by a dealer. In noting this distinction, the Board must have concluded that only sales of
personalty by dealers need be on the "installment plan," and that casual sales of personalty
and sales of realty qualify simply through compliance with the ceiling on year-of-sale
payments. See also Rev. Rul. 56-153, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 166.
40 INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 453(a)(1).
41 Although what actually occurs, and not what the agreement provides or the par-
ties contemplate, should control in determining eligibility under § 453(b), an amount
received by the seller cannot be treated as a "payment" unless it appears that the parties
"contemplated" that such amount be in partial satisfaction of the selling price. Cf. Frank
H. Gilbert, 25 T.C. 81, 87 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 241 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1957),
where dividends received by a seller of stock were held not to be payments in the year
of sale. See also Lewis M. Ludlow, 36 T.C. 102, 108 (1961).
42 Thomas F. Prendergast, Ex'r, 22 B.T.A. 1259 (1931).
43 G.C.M. 12148, XII-2 Cum. BULL. 57, 59 (1933).
44 INT. RPv. CODE Of 1939, ch. 1, § 44(b), 53 Stat. 25 (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 453(b)(2)(A)(ii)).
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a merely nominal payment in the taxable year of sale could have the
drastic effect of allowing income to be returned on the installment ba-
sis.45
Judicial dissatisfaction with the "intrinsic unreasonableness" 46
of this position induced a statutory change in 1954. The House pro-
posed that amounts received during the first year in which payment is
made could not exceed thirty percent of the selling price.47 This could
leave the status of a transaction uncertain for a number of years after it
is consummated and could require significant alteration of the election
process. A requirement that election be made contemporaneously with
the sale presumably functions far better when qualification can be deter-
mined with certainty at that time; but this circumstance often would
not have existed under the House proposal. As changed by the Senate,
and as finally enacted, the Commissioner's previous administrative stand
was abrogated simply by making it clear that qualification would result
if there was no payment or if the payment did not exceed thirty percent
of the selling price.48 If the agreement provides for no payment in the
year of sale and for the payment of the purchase price in two equal pay-
ments in the two following years-a situation found not to qualify un-
der the prior law49-- the transaction would clearly be eligible. Also, if an
agreement to sell property provides that the purchase price is to be paid
on or before a certain date within three years after the sale, the transac-
tion would qualify, assuming there is no payment in the year of sale.
If this form of transaction does qualify, however, the selling tax-
payer may obtain deferral, even if the buyer pays the selling price in a
lump sum on or before the due date. Although this result does not in-
volve the payment of the price in installments, it should not be regarded
as shocking, since it falls within the areas in which Congress sought to
offer relief through the statute first enacted in 1926. An electing seller
should not be charged with payment of a tax liability arising from a
property disposition until he has received the consideration with which
he can satisfy it. The thrust of the statute, then, is not to require that the
contract be of true installment nature, but rather simply that if the pay-
45 G.C.M. 12148, XII-2 GuM. BULL. 57, 58 (1933).
46 Gilbert v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 491, 493 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'g 25 T.C. 81
(1955). See also Louis L. Gowans, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 912 (1957), on remand from
Gowans v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1957).
47 H.R. 8300, § 453(b), 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 49, A160 (1954).
48 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453(b)(2)(A).
49 G.C.M. 12148, XII-2 Cum. BULL. 57, 59 (1983).
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ments received in the year of sale are not in excess of thirty percent of
the selling price, the tax liability may be returned in the manner set out
in section 45 3(a)(1).
It is frequently stated that a taxpayer cannot claim the benefit of
section 453 simply because payment on the sale is deferred until a subse-
quent year.50 But this thought has been applied to disqualify transac-
tions only in situations that are not apposite, because they relate to sales
by dealers in personalty, with respect to which the statute requires a sale
on the installment plan. In one situation the taxpayer, a manufacturer
of farm machinery, sold to retail dealers under contracts that provided
for payment of the purchase price on the date of sale but not later than a
specific date following consignment to the retailer. Finding the transac-
tion ineligible for return under section 453, the Commissioner ruled
that an installment plan sale referred to a "transaction by which por-
tions of the same debt are made payable at stated intervals" and not to a
situation in which the terms call for "payment at different dates contin-
gent upon later events."' This administrative judgment-which is
questionable even as it relates to sales by dealers in personalty-must be
regarded as having no effect upon the qualification of sales under sec-
tion 453(b), since in the latter case there is no requirement that the sale
in question be made upon the installment plan.
Viewing the ceiling on year-of-sale payments as the sole require-
ment produces difficulties, because it brings "open" transactions of a
Burnet v. Logan type within the statute.52 With regard to such open
transactions the statute becomes unworkable. It is not possible to deter-
mine either the components of the fraction that spells the quantum of
income inclusion (gross profit + total contract price), or the selling price,
the latter being essential to learning whether the thirty percent ceiling
on year-of-sale payments has been violated. Thus, although the contract
apparently need not provide for payments at stated intervals, the very
operation of the statute requires knowledge of the total consideration to
be paid by the buyer. Although an open-ended transaction may fall
50 S. RiEP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1926), accompanying enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1926.
51 Rev. Rul. 56-587, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 303, 804. Similarly loose language is used in
Louis Greenspon, 23 T.C. 138, 155 (1954), modified, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956), although
the case involved a sale by a dealer in personalty:
Inherent in this position is the inference that every sale made on the credit of
the purchaser evidenced by obligations payable periodically is an installment
sale. We do not think so. A present sale can be consummated with provision for
deferred payment of the consideration and such a transaction is not an install-
ment sale and cannot be reported on the installment basis.
52 See note 15 supra.
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literally within section 453(b), it must be regarded as implicitly outside
the section's scope. 53
If the transaction is truly open-ended, of course, the seller will al-
most always prefer to recover his basis in the property sold (even though
the payments thereafter will be entirely includible) rather than obtain
ihe more even deferral offered by the installment method. The taxpayer
may not have to make this choice in the year of sale. If the Commis-
sioner is subsequently successful in his usual quest to place a value upon
the "property" received, it may not be too late for the taxpayer to elect
the installment method, assuming the transaction qualifies under sec-
tion 453(b). Arguably, he has not made an inconsistent election.54 Oper-
ationally, it is necessary for the total consideration to be known (either
as a result of specific statement or through the application of valuation
principles) at the time of the transaction with respect to all sales under
section 453. It is not necessary, however, nor does the statute require,
that the payments be fixed with respect to either time or size of pay-
ment.55
53 The situations discussed are distinct from those in which payments (in time,
amount, etc.) are contingent, but the overall selling price is determinable. Thus, the
Commissioner's challenge in Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965) (a "bootstrap"
property disposition wherein the selling price was to be paid from the profits of the busi-
ness sold), was aimed at the capital gain treatment sought by the taxpayers and not their
claimed eligibility under § 453. See generally Emory & Goldstein, Federal Income Taxa-
tion, 1965 ANNUAL SURVEY AM. L. 209, 213-16.
There should be no doubt, however, that a specific reference to a total consideration
is unnecessary and that valuation of the amount realized (as called for in the Commis-
sioner's admonitory statement in Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1957)) can be utilized to
effectively "dose" the transaction for § 453 purposes.
54 See pp. 215-31 infra.
55 This conclusion is almost inescapable in light of the fact that payments not re-
quired by the contract must be considered in determining the level of the initial pay-
ment. E.M. Funsten, 44 B.T.A. 1166 (1941); Wagegro Corp., 38 B.T.A. 1225 (1938). See
Lewis M. Ludlow, 36 T.C. 102, 108 (1961):
It is not necessary for the sale to conform to the popular conception of an in-
stallment sale with a contract calling for the payment of the purchase price in
fixed installments, for the casual seller to return income on the installment basis.
See also G.C.M. 1162, VI-1 Cum. BULL. 22, 23 (1927). The Commissioner apparently takes
the position that a sale will not be eligible under § 453(b) if the seller can receive the
balance owed upon demand. Rev. Rul. 55-694, 1955-2 Cuat. BULL. 299. A contrary result
would unreasonably hinder the application of constructive receipt principles. However,
a right to receive all cash that falls short of being a part of the agreement between the
parties, but that takes the form of an offer by the buyer to pay the entire amount in
cash, should not prevent qualification under § 453, if the transaction is subsequently
consummated (even at the seller's request), under circumstances in which the seller re-
ceives less than 30% cash in the year of sale. Charles A. Collins, 48 T.C. 45 (1967); Lewis
M. Ludlow, 36 T.C. 102, 107 (1961); cf. Rev. Rul. 56-20, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 197. Although
an agreed withholding of amounts by the buyer in an effort to effect qualification under
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3. Sale of Appreciated Property in Return for an Annuity
The Commissioner takes the position that a sale of appreciated
property to a corporation or foundation in return for a private annuity
constitutes a gain-realizing event in the year the transfer is made, with
the amount realized being the present value of the payments to be made
under the annuity contract.56 Thus, taxpayers naturally are quite wil-
ling to trade contemporaneous recognition under section 1001 for defer-
ral under section 453. Yet, the Commissioner reportedly takes the posi-
tion that the transferring taxpayer cannot employ section 453, because
the statute contemplates that a fixed amount be received. 57 It seems
strange that the Commissioner is so willing to use valuation principles
to determine gain realization under section 1001 but that this value can-
not be employed to find the total contract price under section 453. In a
potentially "open" transaction that is "closed" by reason of the success-
ful valuation of the amount realized, income deferral through the use
of section 453 should be available.
The Commissioner's position may be justified, however, because of
certain unique features in the private annuity situation. If the annuity
is for the lifetime of the transferor and without a survivorship feature,
his early death may result in the escape from taxation of a large part of
the appreciation that contemporaneous recognition and inclusion in in-
come would have caught. Unlike the usual sale of property in which the
obligor is bound to make payments after the decedent's death (and in
which section 1014(c) prevents a basis step-up obliterating the deferred
gain), the consideration in the annuity situation is snuffed out upon the
§ 453 will probably be valid, the use of an escrow as a depository for the balance can
result in constructive receipt, if the amounts are unconditionally paid by the buyer
and there is some evidence to show that the amounts were paid into escrow at the re-
quest of the seller. Williams v. United States, 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955); Rhodes v.
United States, 243 F. Supp. 894 (W.D.S.C. 1965); Williams v. United States, 185 F. Supp.
615 (D. Mont. 1960). An expansive application of the doctrine of constructive receipt
compelled a surprising disqualification of an installment sale in Everett Pozzi, P-H TAX
CT. RFP. & MEm. DEC. 49.14 (1967). But cf. Rebbecca J. Murray, 28 B.T.A. 624 (1933)
(receipt of the escrow funds was conditioned upon the taxpayer refraining from entering a
competing business for a stated period of time); Wilson & Fields, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
1189 (1962), where the circumstances of the escrow were also such that constructive receipt
was not found. The Wilson & Fields court found the intention of the parties was to treat
the preferred stock in buyer corporation, which was placed in escrow, as mere security for
the price remaining unpaid. The escrow requirements placed on the stock by the com-
missioner of Corporations limited the market for those securities and negated their
equivalence to cash.
56 Rev. Rul. 62-136, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 12.
57 I.R.S. Says Installment Rule Not Applicable to Annuity, 27 J. TAXATION 63 (1967);
cf. Installment Sale Possibilities in Gifts to Charity, 26 J. TAXATION 127 (1967); Install-
ment Sale as Annuity in Gifts to Charity, 26 J. TAXATION 254 (1967).
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decedent's death. Under such circumstances use of section 453 could
leave only part of the realized gain taxable. The situation also presents
the problem of meshing the deferral of the pre-transfer appreciation un-
der section 453 with the inclusion of the post-transfer income generated
by the annuity under section 72.
B. Is the Transaction a "Sale or Other Disposition"?
Besides the need for an installment feature, a transaction must con-
stitute a "sale or other disposition," and, in the case of personalty, a "cas-
ual" 58 sale or disposition, in order to qualify under section 453(b). For-
tunately, this is familiar phraseology and has frequently been the sub-
ject of judicial scrutiny.59
State law technicalities, which might bear upon the existence of a
"sale," may become irrelevant in seeking uniform construction of a fed-
eral statute.60 Lease or purchase transactions, which must be labeled for
tax purposes when the transaction occurs, have produced much contro-
versy in other contexts. 61 Naturally, eligibility for the installment
method must await a determination of whether the transaction consti-
tutes a taxable disposition at all.62 Thus, a taxpayer who receives cash
58 With regard to what constitutes a casual sale of personalty, see pp. 265-67 infra.
59 E.g., Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1965):
A "sale" . . . is a common event in the non-tax world; and since it is used in
the Code without limiting definition and without legislative history indicating
a contrary result, its common and ordinary meaning should at least be persua-
sive of its meaning as used in the Internal Revenue Code.
60 Locally created relationships are, of course, the focus of the federal income tax;
but when it is found that the transaction entered into is of the type Congress intended
to tax, it is of no consequence that local law calls for a varying classification. See gen-
erally Stephens & Freeland, The Role of Local Law and Local Adjudications in Federal
Tax Controversies, 46 MINN. L. REv. 223, 224-26 (1961).
61 See Comment, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Equipment Lease-or-Purchase
Agreement, 52 VA. L. Riv. 1336 (1966).
62 Of course, a finding that the transaction is a lease rather than a purchase pro-
hibits utilization of the installment method. Rev. Rul. 58-281, 1958-1 Cum. BuLL. 235;
Rev. Rul. 56-498, 1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 300; I.T. 1819, 11-2 Cum. BULL. 73 (1923).
It was recognized early that title passage is not an essential ingredient of a sale or
disposition qualifying under § 453. In Charles J. Derbes, 24 B.T.A. 276, 283 (1931), the
Board stated:
Those provisions do not require that title pass when the initial payments are
made. In most installment sales, title does not pass with the initial payments
... . Of course, title must pass eventually in order to have a sale or other
disposition, but there is nothing to indicate that title did not pass eventually
[here]. . . . If a sale falls through after some income has been reported, some
adjustment becomes necessary . ...
The regulations manifestly permit title retention as a security device. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-
2(a), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 198; Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(a) (1958). Though the Com-
missioner views income from construction contracts as ineligible for return under § 453,
Rev. Rul. 59-345, 1959-2 Cum. BuLL. 136, analogous deferral of income is available through
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and notes in a transaction involving the assignment of drilling rights on
oil and gas properties cannot obtain deferral of the contemporaneous
tax impact if the arrangement between the parties is found to be a
lease. 63 This result follows, of course, regardless of whether the amounts
to be received take the form of royalties or of oil payments.
But what if the taxpayer sells the right to the royalties or oil pay-
ments? If the entire right to the royalties or oil payments is sold, the
transaction presumably would qualify not only as a sale, but also for cap-
ital gain treatment. 4 But suppose only a fixed amount is carved out in
dollars from the royalties or oil payments and only that part is sold. De-
spite the Commissioner's contention that the transmittal of such an in-
terest constitutes an anticipatory assignment of income (and thus that
the entire amount received by the transferring party was ordinary in-
come), a court of appeals has found that the transaction was in fact a
sale and, since less than thirty percent of the selling price was received
in the taxable year of sale, eligible for return under section 453.15
What effect has the subsequent decision of Commissioner v. P. G.
Lake, Inc.,66 which drastically altered the landscape of the capital gains
and assignment of income areas, upon the disposition of property inter-
ests that, had the sale or disposition not taken place, admittedly would
have produced ordinary income to the transferor? The Court in Lake
found the lump sum consideration received by the transferor to be
ordinary income, because it was simply "a substitute for what would
otherwise be received at a future time as ordinary income." 67 But the
decision proceeded on the basis "that oil payments are interests in
land."68 Thus, as viewed by the Court, the problem in Lake stemmed
from the inadequacy of the capital gain definition in the statute and not
from whether the transfer was a gain-realizing event. The Court con-
cluded that since the interest conveyed was "fruit" (utilizing the "fruit-
tree" metaphor), it could not be classed as "property" for capital gains
purposes. 69 This manipulation of the "property" concept was felt neces-
use of the administratively authorized percentage-of-completion and completed-contract
methods. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3 (1957).
63 Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961); Harry Leland Barnsley, 31
T.C. 1260 (1959). A cash basis taxpayer may thus be taxed, in the year of the agree-
ment's execution, on the fair market value of the amounts received, including notes
that may call for payment over a period of many years subsequent to the agreement.
64 I.T. 4003, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 10; Rev. Rul. 55-526, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 574.
65 Caldwell v. Campbell, 218 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955).
66 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
67 Id. at 265.
68 Id. at 264.
69 Id. at 266-67. See generally Del Cotto, "Property" in the Capital Asset Definition:
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sary to protect the integrity of the capital gains statute. It should not be
regarded as relevant to questions arising under section 453.
If the transfer of such interests is classed as a "sale or other disposi-
tion" of property, the resulting eligibility to use section 453 will not re-
sult in preferential treatment of the selling taxpayer. If the taxpayer re-
tained the oil payments, amounts received pursuant to the agreement
would be ordinary income when received (or when accrued, if the tax-
payer employs the accrual method). If a payment carved out of a larger
interest is sold pursuant to an agreement calling for periodic payments
of the selling price, the deferral resulting from election of the install-
ment method will place the taxpayer (insofar as the timing of his income
is concerned) in precisely the same posture as if the oil payment had
been retained. Of course, even though the Commissioner would have
difficulty denying that the transfer of such an interest constitutes a sale
or other disposition within section 453(a), he may seek to label the trans-
action as a disposal of an "income" and not of a "property" right. Al-
though this distinction has been employed successfully, 0 it has been
used to deny capital gains treatment to contract rights that would have
produced ordinary income if retained.7 1
Although the "property status" question is relevant to the attain-
ment of the legislative goals that prompted enactment of the capital
gains provisions, such nice distinctions have no place in the considera-
tion of section 453. Surely, the contractual interests in question, though
productive of ordinary income, constitute property in the legal sense. It
is this error of reasoning into which the Tax Court fell in Charles E. So-
rensen.72 The taxpayer sold options to purchase stock in his employer,
which he had received as compensation at the time of his employment
agreement. The court held that the proceeds realized from the sale pro-
Influence of "Fruit and Tree," 15 Burg. L. REv. 1 (1965); Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of
Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. RIxv. 293 (1962).
70 Del Cotto, supra note 69, at 33-59; see Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and
Assignment of Income-The Ferrer Case, 20 TAx L. Rav. 1 (1964).
71 In situations involving the cancellation or termination of a contractual arrange-
ment, the Commissioner (and some courts) have found the "sale or exchange" requisite
lacking, thus rendering the capital gains provisions inapplicable. Del Cotto, supra note
69, at 42-46. Although the better reasoned opinions seem to decide the sale or exchange
issue in the taxpayer's favor, e.g., Commissioner v. Ferrer, 804 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962),
even contrary judicial sentiment should not form a basis for denying the transferring
taxpayer the opportunity to utilize § 453 in similar situations. While it is at least argu-
able that "sale" treatment should be denied, since the extinguishment of the transferor's
rights leaves nothing in the hands of the transferee, the transaction seems to constitute
a "disposition" and thus falls within the larger group of property disposals potentially
eligible under § 453.
72 22 T.C. 321 (1954).
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duced ordinary income rather than capital gain. In rejecting the tax-
payer's contention that the proceeds were eligible for treatment under
section 453, the court muddied the waters.
Since the sales of the options operated to compensate petitioner
for his services, what he received in the form of both cash and
notes was income by way of compensation. The provisions of sec-
tion 44 [now section 453] relate only to the reporting of income
arising from the sale of property on the installment basis. Those
provisions do not in anywise purport to relate to the reporting
of income arising by way of compensation for services. 73
To deny that the options sold by the taxpayer constituted property
seems unsound. Ordinary income-into which the proceeds of this trans-
action were converted by principles more eloquently expressed in the
later decision of Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc.-is equally eligible
for the deferral allowed by the installment method. Only by stripping
the contract interest of the "property" label and placing in its stead
the "compensation" tag was the court able to reach this dubious re-
sult.74
73 Id. at 342.
74 The Tax Court has made the same error elsewhere. In Leonard Hyatt, 30 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1789, 1806 (1961), the court, using a "substitute for future income" ra-
tionale, found that the assignment of an insurance agency management contract pro-
duced ordinary income. It then jumped to the conclusion that "[i]nasmuch as the . . .
amount was a substitute for compensation . . . it is clear that the installment sales
provisions ... are inapplicable." Id. See also Gerald B. O'Neill, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 7
(1964). To the extent that Rev. Rul. 55-374, 1955-1 GuM. BULL. 370, hints that eligibility
under § 453 with regard to sale of a distributorship agreement is somehow tied to the
conclusion that the property disposed of is a capital asset, it should be disregarded.
In Estate of Scharf v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 1963), the court found
that ordinary income resulted from the sale (to third parties) of membership certificates
in a charitable hospital by doctor-members, and that it served as a basis for denying
§ 453 eligibility, because there was no "sale or other disposition." The error here (and
in Charles E. Sorensen) indicates a judicial reluctance to recognize that the installment
method has possible application to any event that is gain realizing within § 1001.
Prior to the 1954 Code, and with the growth of the entity concept, the conclusion
that the sale of a partnership interest was eligible for return under the installment
method was easy to reach. B.P. Bailey, 18 B.T.A. 105 (1929). With the codification of
this concept in INT. RaV. CODE of 1954, § 741, one could properly assume that the sale
of such an interest would continue to qualify as a casual sale of personalty within § 453(b).
Woolsey v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 325 (S.D. Tex. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 326
F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1963). The fragmentation of the selling price compelled by §§ 741 and
751 is designed to prevent the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain and should
not be viewed as triggering the application of § 453(b)(1)(B), which has the effect of pro-
hibiting qualification of inventory as the subject matter of a casual sale of personalty.
Presumably, an award for the involuntary conversion of property is potentially eli-
gible for return under § 453, though it may constitute ordinary income. Commissioner
v. Gillette Motor Transport, Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960). The opposite result is obtained,
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Although former President Truman was unable to obtain capital
gain treatment upon the sale of his manuscript (unlike former President
Eisenhower, who was more fortunate),' 5 the Commissioner ruled that
the transaction constituted a sale and was eligible for return under sec-
tion 453.76 He properly concluded that the manuscript was "property"
(even though it could have produced ordinary income if not sold out-
right) and eligible for return under section 453 upon its disposition,
even though section 1221(3) required that the gain be treated as ordi-
nary income. This represents a proper approach. The property-income
rights dichotomy, evolved by the judiciary to meet the inadequacy
of the capital gains definition, should not be allowed to becloud
the entirely separable question whether the transaction is eligible under
section 453.77
C. Utilization When Complete or Partial Nonrecognition Is Available
With regard to transactions that are clearly sales, the existence of a
provision allowing complete or partial nonrecognition should not pro-
hibit the application of another provision that provides for deferral of
realized gain. Thus, if a taxpayer sells his residence (basis, $25,000) for
$30,000 and acquires a new residence for $28,000 within the time pro-
vided in section 1034, the realized gain of $5,000 is insulated by the non-
recognition effect of the statute, with the result that only $2,000 is pres-
ently recognized. If the selling taxpayer does not receive more than
thirty percent of the selling price of the old house in the taxable year of
sale, the gain recognized as a result of section 1034 should be eligible for
however, with respect to proceeds from use and occupancy insurance that are treated
not as the proceeds of an involuntary conversion, Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(8) (1957),
but rather as profits allocable to, and deemed accrued in, the period during which the
loss was sustained. Cappel House Furnishing Co. v. United States, 244 F.2d 525 (6th Cir.
1957).
75 B. BirrrER, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 416-17 (3d ed. 1964).
76 Rev. Rul. 284, 1958-2 GuM. BULL. 29. The ruling refers to the fact that the tax-
payer was not an "author by profession," but does not seem to rely on this fact in
support of its conclusion. It remains an open question whether professional authors
would be prohibited from using § 458(b) on the grounds that they are regularly engaged
in selling property of this nature.
77 Although unharvested crops are presently eligible for capital gains treatment
under certain circumstances, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1281(b)(4), a finding, under prior
law, that their disposition produced ordinary income did not prohibit the attainment of
§ 453 eligibility. Ann Edwards Trust, 20 T.C. 615, 618 (1958), aff'd per curiam, 217 F.2d
952 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 849 U.S. 905 (1955). If the property is of an inventory nature
and if the taxpayer is not engaged in selling on the installment plan within § 458(a), he
may be forced to take the position that it is realty. The Edwards court refused to classify
unharvested crops as personalty or realty, finding qualification under § 458(b) in either
event.
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optional deferral under section 453. Thus, if the sales agreement pro-
vided for the payment of $5,000 in the year of sale, and an equal amount
in each of the five succeeding years, the taxpayer would report $333.33
as income in the year in which the transaction occurred ($5,000 x $2,000
$30,000).78
This result is not exactly clear from the statute itself, since section
453(a) speaks of gross profit to be "realized" on the transaction without
specifically referring to the possibility that some or all of the realized
gain may not be recognized. Taking the statute literally in such situa-
tions, however, would render the various nonrecognition provisions in-
effective whenever the taxpayer seeks to defer his gain through use of
the installment method. Surely such ill effects were never meant to flow
from the method's use. Consequently, if a taxpayer qualifies for nonrec-
ognition through an exchange of business property for property of like
kind 79 any gain recognized as a result of the receipt of recognition prop-
erty (e.g., cash) is eligible for return under section 453,80 provided, of
course, the seller does not receive more than thirty percent of the selling
price (exclusive of evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser) in the
year of the sale or disposition.
Many "like-kind" exchanges, which also involve the receipt of rec-
ognition property, will not be eligible for return under section 453,
since the receipt of the nonrecognition property must also be con-
sidered as payment within section 453(b)(2)(A).81 Thus, if a taxpayer
transfers property (basis $10,000) to a corporation in return for stock
worth $50,000, a note calling for the payment of $10,000 in each of
the four succeeding years, and for cash of $10,000, he will be in a
position to obtain nonrecognition for a portion of his realized gain
of $90,000, assuming he complies with the control requirement. 2 As-
suming the note issued by the corporation does not qualify as "stock or
securities," the recognized gain will be limited to $50,000. It will be sub-
ject to full return in the year of sale, however, because the taxpayer re-
ceived, in stock and cash, more than thirty percent of the selling price.
If, instead, the taxpayer had received stock worth $15,000, cash in the
amount of $5,000, and an installment note calling for the payment of
$20,000 annually for the four years succeeding the year of sale, the rec-
ognized gain of $85,000 would be eligible for return under section 453.
78 Rev. Rul. 75, 1953-1 CuM. BuLL. 83.
79 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1031.
80 Rev. Rul. 65-155, 1965-1 CuM. BuLL. 356.
81 The value of the like-kind property is used in computing the "selling price" and
treated as a payment in the year of sale. Clinton H. Mitchell, 42 T.C. 953, 965 (1964).
82 INT. RFv. CODE of 1954, §§ 351(a), 368(c).
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Thus, a proper election under that section would defer until succeeding
years all but $17,000 of the gain recognized on the transaction ($20,000
x $85,000-- $100,000).
D. Use in Transactions Involving a Corporation-Shareholder Relation-
ship
A prolonged inquiry into whether a transfer to a controlled corpo-
ration that qualifies for nonrecognition under section 351 constitutes a
"sale" is unnecessary, since it certainly qualifies as a property "disposi-
tion."83 The same is true of property transferred pursuant to a corporate
reorganization. It is not mere coincidence that both section 1001 and
section 453 employ language such as "sale or other disposition." Con-
gress may be viewed as intending to grant potential eligibility under
section 453 to all transactions that are gain-generating under section
1001. Section 1002 provides that the separately operating nonrecogni-
tion provisions are superimposed upon the general realization princi-
ples. The terminology "sale or exchange" in sections 1001(c) and 1002
has its roots, no doubt, in the reorganization provisions, and presently
evinces a Congressional intent to bestow nonrecognition upon a smaller
circle of transactions than are generally considered gain (or loss) produc-
ing under section 1001(b). 84 Thus, any exchange qualifying for nonrec-
ognition is a fortiori within the phrase "sale or other disposition." Al-
though they are far more complex, the reorganization provisions "are
an analogue or extension of section 1081. " 5 The Commissioner has spe-
cifically approved application of the installment method under section
1031 86 Suppose, therefore, that in a Type "D" reorganization 7 the tax-
83 Some commentators believe that the installment method may not be available
with respect to gain recognized in a § 351 transfer. Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to
Shareholders: "Thin Capitalization" and Related Problems, 16 TAX. L. REv. 1, 53-54
(1960); Paul & Kalish, Transition from a Partnership to a Corporation, N.Y.U. 18H INST.
ON FED. TAX. 639, 650 (1960). But see Harry F. Shannon, 29 T.C. 702, 719 (1958), where
the taxpayer's belated effort to qualify the transaction under § 351, in an attempt to
avoid the application of § 453(d), was rejected by a finding that the transfer was a "sale."
The court indicated, however, that § 453 may well have been applicable even in a § 351
situation.
Although it seems far more reasonable to assume that § 351 transactions are eligible
for return under § 453, nonapplicability of § 351 does not insure that the transaction
is a "sale"; the transaction may in reality be a contribution to capital, with a simultaneous
nonliquidating distribution. B. BirrKER & J. EusricE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 103-04 (2d ed. 1966).
84 See Note, The Elements of a Section 117 "Sale or Exchange," 53 COLum. L. REv.
976, 977 (1953).
85 B. Brrmax & J. EusricE, supra note 83, at 498.
86 Rev. Rul. 65-155, 1965-1 Cum. BuLL. 356.
87 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 368(a)(1)(D).
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payer, a ten percent shareholder in the transferor corporation, receives
a five-year installment note instead of stock in the transferee corpora-
tion. If the other shareholders receive stock instead of "other property,"
thereby supplying the necessary continuity of interest, gain realized un-
der section 1001 would be subject to recognition by operation of section
356(a)(1), and to possible treatment as a dividend under section 356(a)
(2). There is no apparent reason, however, why the opportunity for de-
ferral of the recognized gain under section 453 should not be avail-
able.8 Qualification under section 453 will not occur frequently, be-
cause satisfaction of the continuity-of-interest requirement will most
often result in the taxpayer's receipt of "payment" (i.e., stock in the ac-
quiring corporation) in excess of the thirty percent requirement of sec-
tion 453(b)(2)(A)(ii). Nevertheless, it is error to suggest that gain recog-
nized in a corporate reorganization should not at least initially be eligi-
ble for the deferral provided by the statute.8 9
Obviously, therefore, gain recognized to a taxpayer as a result of a
partial liquidation 0 or a redemption of stock9' should be similarly en-
dowed with potential eligibility under section 453. The statute provides
nondividend treatment for certain qualifying corporate distributions
through the description of such payments as being "in exchange for the
stock."' 12 The philosophy behind this legislative mutation is that such
transactions more nearly resemble a "sale" than a "dividend." Thus, if a
taxpayer's interest in a corporation is terminated through a redemption
of stock that qualifies under section 302(b)(3), he should be able to re-
port the recognized gain by the installment method, assuming he does
not receive more than thirty percent of the "selling price" (exclusive of
88 Conceptually, such transactions should be treated as qualifying dispositions within
§ 453, though in the instance posed the Commissioner may argue that the obligation
received by the distributee shareholder is not "of the purchaser" within § 453(b)(2)(A)(ii).
Cf. Mercedes Frances Freeman Trust, 36 T.C. 779 (1961), aff'd, 803 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.
1962).
89 Frances M. Averill, 37 B.T.A. 485, 491-93 (1938), rev'd on other grounds, 101 F.2d
644 (1st Cir. 1939); BNA TAx MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO 48-2D, INSTALLMENT SALES, at A-22
(1966); Frost & Bums, Current Tax Problems While Operating as a Corporation, U. So.
CAL. 1958 TAX INST. 117, 145-46. But. cf. Leake, Problems in Corporate Acquisitions, 13
TAx L. REv. 67, 84 (1957).
90 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 346.
91 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 802.
92 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 302(a), 331(a)(2). The presence of express administra-
tive authorization to employ § 453 in reporting the ordinary income generated (as a
result of § 1248) through a liquidation of a controlled foreign corporation or the redemp-
tion of its stock supports the conclusion that the method is applicable in similar situations
involving domestic corporations. Treas. Reg. § 1.1248-1(f (1964). Its absence in the older
regulations under §§ 302 and 331 can be attributed to a recently burgeoning indulgence
in "administrativese."
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evidences of indebtedness) in the taxable year of sale. 93 If the distribu-
tion is not within one of the safe redemption corridors, however, the in-
stallment method is unavailable. In such instances the statute deprives
the transaction of its exchange status and treats it as a distribution, a tax
event plainly not within the phrase "sale or other disposition." 94 So cate-
gorized, the fair market value of property distributed (including eviden-
ces of indebtedness) is taxable as ordinary income in the year of distribu-
tion to the extent of earnings and profitsY5 Again, if a corporation
completely liquidates, qualifying under section 337, and the distribu-
tion of the assets of the corporation (e.g., cash and unsold property) is ac-
complished during a twelve-month period that straddles two taxable pe-
riods of the shareholder, the gain recognized on the transaction, and
given exchange treatment by section 331, would be eligible for deferral
under section 453, assuming its requirements are satisfied.
Assume now that a corporation, seeking qualification under section
337(a), sells its assets to another corporation primarily in return for
notes. Pursuant to a plan of liquidation, the selling corporation dis-
tributes these notes and its remaining assets to its shareholders, who
will be subject to section 331(a)(1), which imposes "exchange" treat-
ment upon the transaction.96 Thus, the shareholders will be subject
93 See Jolley v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 533 (D. Nev. 1965), involving an acqui-
sition by a corporation of its own shares. Apparently the transaction fell within a safe
redemption corridor; the parties stipulated that the only issue was whether the taxpayer
had made a proper election under § 453. See ABA TAXATION SECTION ANN. REP. 32
(1960). There also seems to be some latitude concerning the form of evidences of indebted-
ness received by the shareholders, with bonds constituting a useful and apparently
proper form. Cf. Thomas F. Prendergast, Ex'r, 22 B.T.A. 1259 (1931), where the install-
ment method was rejected because the bonds called for a single payment, and not be-
cause of the form of payment. Although a lump sum amount paid in a year subsequent
to the year of sale would seem to fall literally within § 453(b), caution probably dictates
that the indebtedness be paid in more than one installment.
Reportedly, the Commissioner has ruled privately that convertible debentures are
not "evidences of indebtedness" within § 435(b)(2)(A)(ii), but he did not bar the way
for a change of position after further study. BNA, TAx MANAGEMENT MEMo 67-12,
RESTORATION OF INvESTMENT CREDIT AND ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION (1967).
94 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 302(d) provides that a redemption of stock that fails
to come within one of the safe redemption corridors "shall be treated as a distribution
of property to which § 301 applies." Although the redeemed shareholder apparently has
"disposed" of his stock, the distribution treatment called for by § 302(d) still cannot be
ignored. Thus, any distribution of property made by a corporation to a shareholder with
respect to its stock probably will be ineligible for § 453 treatment unless it is given
"exchange" treatment by another section of the statute. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§
301(a), (c).
95 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 301(c)(1), 316(a).
96 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 453(d)(4)(B) provides generally that the distribution of
the installment obligations will not be a gain recognizing event.
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to a tax in the year of distribution upon an amount equal to the differ-
ence between the basis in their stock and the fair market value of the
property received in the liquidation distribution. Note, however, that
if the tax is imposed in the year of distribution the shareholders will be
without resources from the distribution itself to pay the tax, their
chief possession being the notes of the buying group. This situation
is strikingly close to what compelled the enactment of section 453. Are
the taxpayers able to defer the tax impact until the receipt of property
with which to satisfy the obligation? Although it was concluded above
that the property is received by the distributee shareholders in a
transaction that is a "sale or other disposition,"9 7 another facet of the
statute prohibits deferral under section 453. While evidences of indebt-
edness are not considered payment within the taxable year of sale for
the purpose of applying the thirty percent test in section 453(b)(2)(A)(ii),
the statute specifically states that only the indebtedness "of the pur-
chaser" is so excluded. Since section 331 bestows exchange treatment
upon the liquidating distribution, the "purchaser" is the liquidating
corporation, not the obligor on the evidences of indebtedness. The
result is that the indebtedness must be considered "payment," and
therefore section 453(b)(2)(A)(ii) cannot be satisfied. Thus, whereas
business advantages may accrue to the buyer as a result of an asset
acquisition on the installment basis, there appear to be possible tax dis-
advantages to the shareholders of the selling corporation.98
!97 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 331(a)(1).
98 The Court Holding doctrine continues to present problems outside of § 337, con-
cerning corporate liquidations designed to place the assets in the hands of the share-
holders at a fair market value basis (INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 334(a)) and thereby to
effect an installment sale to the buying group. B. BrrrKER & J. Eus~ncE, supra note 83, at
386-92. The use of a one-month liquidation (INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 333) providing for
nonrecognition upon liquidation, except to the extent of accumulated earnings and
profits, may be one way to make the installment method available to the selling group.
A.B.A. TAXATION SECTON ANN. REP. 30 (1957). This is not a panacea, since § 337 has no
application; thus, the shareholders, lest a corporate tax be imposed upon the asset
disposition, will be forced to walk the tightrope between the Court Holding and the
Cumberland Public Service doctrine. B. BIrrKER &c J. EusricE, supra note 83, at 407.
Under certain circumstances an election under Subchapter S (INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§§ 1371-78) can preserve the installment method for the recipient shareholders. An asset
sale by the electing corporation on the installment method wil allow the computation
of the corporation's income on that basis and the pass-through of the privilege to the
shareholders. Rev. Rul. 65-292, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 319. It must be assumed, however,
that the election has been in effect for 3 years; otherwise a partial tax on capital gains
would be imposed at the corporate level, generating a dual tax effect that might be less
desirable than a liquidation qualifying under § 337. Also, if the assets sold produce
ordinary income, § 337 may be a more advantageous route, providing nonrecognition at
the corporate level and capital gain treatment for the shareholders, while Subchapter S
would cause a pass-through of such ordinary items.
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When, with a swift stroke, the Tax Court reached this result in
Mercedes Frances Freeman Trust,99 legislative change clearly became
the only means for securing a reasonable equality-with respect to the
timing of the tax impact on the shareholders-between the sale of
assets qualifying under section 337 and a sale of stock by the share-
holders. If the shareholders dispose of their stock in return for notes
of the purchaser, the notes are not considered payment in the year
of sale, and the way is opened for income deferral under section 453.
Further, if the purchaser is a corporation, a liquidation of the acquired
corporation that qualifies under section 334(b)(2) will give the pur-
chaser a cost basis in the assets received equal to the purchase price
of the stock.
The Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association has
responded with a proposed amendment to section 331 designed to
meet the problem.1 0 The proposal would enable shareholders to elect
the installment method with respect to the third-party obligations that
they receive as a result of the liquidation of the selling corporation. The
problem present in Freeman Trust is removed by a proposed statutory
declaration that the evidences of indebtedness received by the share-
holders shall be treated as being the obligation of one person-to accom-
modate the situation where the assets are sold to more than one buyer
-and that the one person shall be treated as the purchaser of the
stock. With these fictions, the proposed statute throws the transaction
into section 453(b). If it passes muster there,10 1 the desired deferral is
obtained. The proposal does not, however, treat all the assets distrib-
uted by the liquidating corporation as potentially eligible for return
under section 453. In effect, it carves out a portion of the assets received
by the distributee shareholder as a separable asset package which can
be applied against the framework of section 453(b). The protective
mantle is placed only on evidences of indebtedness that are received
pursuant to a sale qualifying for nonrecognition within section 337(a),
and only if all the assets required to be distributed by 337(a) are in fact
distributed by the liquidating corporation within one taxable year of
the distributee shareholder. Thus, the distribution of evidences of in-
debtedness that were acquired in a sale of assets prior to the adoption
99 36 T.C. 779 (1961), aff'd, 303 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1962). See also Leonard S. Krause,
P-H Tax Ct. Rep. g: Mem. Dec. 67,068 (1967).
100 ABA TAXATION SECTION ANN. REP. 50-54 (1967).
101 I.e., if the property (other than the evidences of indebtedness of the "purchaser')
received by each shareholder in the taxable year of sale does not exceed 30% of the
selling price of his stock.
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of the plan of liquidation"2 would be considered payment for the pur-
poses of the thirty percent rule of section 453(b)(2)(A)(ii), and could
possibly disqualify the entire transaction under section 453.
The installment method is made available to the shareholder only
if the section 337(a) distribution, including evidences of indebtedness,
is accomplished within a single taxable year of the shareholder. 10 3 This
time limit, which is distinct from the mandate at the corporate level
requiring complete distribution within a twelve-month period, is
thought necessary to allow an effective decision concerning whether the
assets received during that period are eligible under section 453(b). If
the corporation's twelve-month distribution period straddles two tax-
able periods of the shareholder, he would presumably not be able to
conclude with certainty whether the amounts received in his taxable
year of sale were within the thirty percent ceiling. Although the Com-
missioner has announced a policy requiring the valuation of property
received in the year of sale, "open" liquidations are relatively com-
mon.10 4 The taxpayer's contention that the liquidation is "open" may
indicate his choice of deferral technique, but the isolation of the
assets eligible for return under section 453 into one taxable period of
the shareholder appears to be an orderly manner in which to make the
installment method available. If the twelve-month distribution period
required by section 337(a) straddles two taxable periods of the share-
holder, the actual distribution of the property in the second taxable
period can result in a larger asset group potentially eligible under
section 453(b). 1 5 Thus, a subsequent distribution from a reserve per-
missibly retained under section 337(a)(2) for the payment of claims
will be ineligible for section 453 treatment and therefore taxable when
received.106
If a liquidating distribution consists of a substantial portion of
unsold assets or cash, the distributee shareholders will not be able to
meet the requirements of section 453(b). Unless the fair market value
of the liquidation distribution made during the shareholder's taxable
102 For example, a corporation may do this to obtain loss recognition from a sale of a
portion of its assets prior to the commencement of the nonrecognition period.
103 ABA TAXATION SECTION ANN. REP. 50-54 (1967).
104 B. BiBnrR a& J. EusTicE, supra note 83, at 345-46.
105 Also, where the 12-month period under § 337 overlaps two taxable years of
the shareholder, this provision is thought desirable to prevent attempted circum-
vention of the 30% down payment ceiling by distributing evidences of indebted-
ness in one year and cash in another year when the cash would exceed 30% of
the total.
ABA TAXATION SECTON ANN. REP. 53 (1967).
106 See example, id. at 54.
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year consists of evidences of indebtedness that have a value of at least
seventy percent of the total amount distributed, the distributee share-
holder will find the installment method unavailable even though a
significant portion of the property received by him is not readily avail-
able as a source from which to pay the tax. This may limit the useful-
ness of the proposal, but if carefully employed it can remove many of
the inequities that result from the present statutory pattern.
E. Ersatz Capital Gains
The installment method should be available in any transaction
that is gain-realizing within section 1001.107 A fortiori, this should in-
clude the instances in which Congress, having succumbed to the con-
stant quest for preferential treatment, has granted ersatz capital gains
treatment. A common device has been to confer the "sale or exchange"
mantle by statute upon certain "ambiguous transactions."' 8 Thus, a
gain recognized from the involuntary conversion of section 1231 prop-
erty should be eligible for return under section 453, if the requisites of
that section are met. 19 The same can be said with respect to the retire-
ment of certain bonds and evidences of indebtedness".0 and with
respect to situations within the so-called "Louis B. Mayer provision,"
which bestows capital gain treatment upon certain amounts received
by employees on termination of long term employment contracts."'
Certain instances within the network of ersatz capital gains prob-
ably are not eligible under the installment method. For example, an
election under section 631(a) has the effect of treating the cutting of
107 The statute itself, stating that "income" may be returned on the installment
method, seems to preclude the return of losses on installment sales by this method.
There is ample and long-standing judicial authority to support this reading. Sacks v.
Burnet, 66 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Martin v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1932),
cert. denied, 289 U.S. 737 (1933). See also I.T. 2063, 111-2 Cut. BULL. 108 (1924). Thus,
determinable losses are deductible only in the year of sale.
108 Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 250 (1941).
109 However, in netting § 1231 transactions, only the amount recognized in the tax-
able year as a result of the election to use § 453 (i.e., the income portion of the payment
received during that year) is included within the § 1231 hodgepodge. Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-
l(d) (1957). This may present a planning opportunity, since an election to report § 1231
gains on the installment method may allow § 1231 losses to exceed gains and thus to be
treated as ordinary rather than capital losses.
110 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1232.
111 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1240. This example is interesting because it reflects
the conversion of compensatory payments (presumably not eligible for return under § 453)
into a property-type transaction that may come within the statute. The reasons behind
the enactment of § 1240 are explored in Cary, Pressure Groups and the Revenue Code:
A Requiem in Honor of the Departing Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 HARV. L. Rv.
745, 747-49 (1955).
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timber as a sale or exchange of such timber; therefore, the taxpayer
must recognize gain equal to the difference between the basis of the
timber and its fair market value at the time of cutting, whether or
not there has been an actual sale. Because of the instant recognition
provided by the statute, the installment method seems irrelevant.11 2
Similarly, the transfer of a patent in a transaction qualifying under
section 1235 and in which the consideration to be paid is contingent
upon productivity appears not to be within section 453. Although
section 1235 grants capital gain treatment, the transaction posed
remains "open"; thus, the amount realized and the "selling price," for
the purposes of section 453, are not known, and the taxpayer may
recover his basis prior to recognition of gain." 3
Certain transactions that fail to qualify as "sale or exchange"
may still fall within the larger group described by the phrase "sale or
other disposition." In such situations section 453 remains applicable.
But where the transferor has not disposed of a sufficient interest in the
asset, the transaction is not a "sale or other disposition" within section
1001(a). In this case the taxpayer will be denied the right to offset his
property basis against the amounts received, and the installment method
will be unavailable.
Congressional action to change capital gain into ordinary income
(usually to prevent tax avoidance) should not affect the availability of
the installment method any more than legislation changing ordinary
income into capital gain. Thus, application of the installment method
112 A further example is the conclusion that income generated by the disposition
of an installment obligation is ineligible for return under § 453. Although the disposition
transaction seems to qualify under § 453(b), § 453(d) compels immediate recognition of
the deferred gain. Further deferral under § 453(b), therefore, seems to be at odds with
the statutory machinery in § 453(d). See Krist v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 548, 550 (9th
Cir. 1956).
113 Of course, the Commissioner takes the position that "patent rights, dependent
upon estimated prospective earnings or sales," together with other "contracts and claims
to receive indefinite amounts of income," will be subject to valuation "except in rare
and extraordinary cases," Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 GuM. BULL. 15, 17-18. If the Commis-
sioner is successful in so valuing the transferor's right to receive payments, the install-
ment method should become available. Amounts received in excess of the year-of-"sale"
valuation on such rights presumably will be income to the transferor when received.
The nature of amounts received in excess of the ascertained value, however, might be
treated not as capital gain, but rather as ordinary income, since such payments would
not be treated as part of the ersatz "sale or exchange." Osenbach v. Commissioner, 198
F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1952), aff'g 17 T.C. 797 (1951). The transferring taxpayer may thus
agree to a high valuation on the amount realized to protect himself against ordinary
income treatment with respect to the potential profits from use of the patent. The tax-
payer could then obtain his deferral via § 453 rather than the less even Burnet v. Logan
route.
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is not directly affected by sections 1245 and 1250, which were enacted
to prevent taxpayers from obtaining depreciation deductions against
ordinary income while the gain from the sale of the property was taxed
at capital gain rates.114 Administrative embroidery, 115 questioned by
some,116 has the effect of first taxing the recaptured depreciation to the
seller. Thus, the income portion of each installment, as determined in
the normal manner under section 453, will be treated as ordinary in-
come until the amount of the gain that is treated as ordinary income
under section 1245 or section 1250 has been received by the selling tax-
payer. Following recapture of the depreciation, the gain portion of
each installment will be treated according to normal principles.
This obligatory compartmentalization of the capital gain and
income portions of the realized gain constitutes a departure from the
general theory of section 453. For example, if a business is sold, the na-
ture of the gain generated is determined by the underlying assets of
the business. 17 Thus, the income portion of each installment will con-
sist both of capital and ordinary income. Since the forced allocation
of the regulation strikes at the heart of the concept of installment
method reporting, its appropriateness is questionable.""
In another area, also the product of recent legislative activity,
Congress provided for the potential conversion of what might have
been capital gain into ordinary income. The imputed interest provi-
sion 19 is designed to treat as interest a specific portion of the amount
realized by the seller when the agreement between the parties makes
no provision for interest.120 Under prior law the mere failure to pro-
vide for interest in installment sales could result in the entire amount
realized being treated as capital gain, even though there existed, due
to the delayed payment aspect, a silent interest factor which, if desig-
nated as such, would have been ordinary income. The statutory remedy
takes effect if no interest is specified or if that specified is too low, and
114 See Horowitz, Sections 1250 and 1245: The Puddle and the Lake, 20 TAx L.
REv. 285 (1965).
315 Treas. Reg. § 1.1245-6(d) (1965); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1250-1(b)(6), 31 Fed.
Reg. 6968, 6971 (1966).
116 E.g., Branda, Problems in Recapture of Depreciation, N.Y.U. 23D INST. ON FED.
TAx. 449, 478 (1965).
117 See Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945). See pp. 254-58 infra, for
discussion relating to the use of the installment method in the sale of a business.
118 See Levy, Installment Sales of Real Estate, N.Y.U. 25TH INST. ON FED. TAX 29,
38-39 (1967).
119 INT. REV. ConE of 1954, § 483.
120 S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 101-04 (1964).
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the statute -treats a: portion of each payment as interest. The por-
-tion thus treated cannot be considered as part of the sales price. Thie
-interest portion of the amount to be paid under the contract- is,. in
effect, carved out and treated outside the provisions of section 453.121
Thus, since the so-called "unstated interest" is not considered part of
the "selling price" or the "total contract price" as those terms are used
in section 453, the income portion of each payment, and perhaps even
the availability of section 453, are affected. Suppose, for example, that
property is sold for $20,000 (no interest being specified with a down
payment of thirty percent of the selling price, or $6,000. The imputed
interest provision takes hold, and the total unstated interest is shaved
off the selling price. The transaction is thereby disqualified, the seller
having received more than thirty percent of the selling price in the
year of sale. When the imputed interest provision has potential appli-
cation, it is hazardous to provide an initial payment that is close to the
ceiling on eligible installment sales.
In one instance where ordinary income is transformed into capital
gain, the installment method may limit the effect of the change. Section
1239 provides that gain recognized upon the transfer of depreciable
property to a corporation shall be treated as productive of ordinary
income if more than eighty percent of the stock of such corporation
is owned by the transferor or those within his family group.122 An
eligible installment transfer to the corporation'23 can be employed to
soften the effect of section 1239 by preventing contemporaneous recog-
nition of the full amount of the gain realized on the transfer. The de-
preciation deductions available to the corporation are at least avail-
able to offset the ordinary income generated to the transferor by receipt
of the installment payments. This balance may be desirable if the
payments are to be made over a period of time longer than that during
which the depreciation deductions will be available to the corporation,
or if the shareholder's tax rate is less than that of the corporation. To
resolve any doubts about whether the transferring shareholder is bene-
fiting via the depreciation deductions at the corporate level, one writer
suggests that the corporation not pay its installment obligation.1 24 The
transferring shareholder receives no taxable income and the deprecia-
121 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-1(b)(2) (1966).
122 IH. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 26, 120-21 (1951); S. REP. No. 781, 82nd Cong.,
Ist Sess. 69-70 (1951).
123 It is unnecessary to classify the transaction as a "sale," since it is clearly a "dis-
position."
124 Goldstein, suPra note 83, at 57.
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tion deductions of the corporation can be computed on its new "cost"
basis. The difficulty with such an approach is obvious: the "sale" trans-
action to the controlled corporation is subject to attack as lacking sub-
stance. Thus, the transfer becomes a contribution to the corporation's
capital, drastically reducing its depreciation deduction. 25 If any
amounts are subsequently paid on the "notes," dividend income might
well result.
This discussion points up an obvious truth. As with any trans-
action facing analysis under the Code, a sale potentially eligible under
section 443 must actually be what it purports to be. On occasion
taxpayers resort to the stratagem of an intermediate transaction, which
they hope will be classified as a sale, in an effort to obtain the deferral
offered by section 453. If the purchaser pays or desires to pay the entire
purchase price in the year of sale, the selling taxpayer has at times been
advised to effect an intermediate installment sale of the property to a
corporation (newly formed for this specific purpose) and contempora-
neously direct the purchaser to pay the consideration to the corpora-
tion.1 26 The amounts so received by the corporation are then used
to fund the installment payments to the transferor, who claims shelter
under section 453. This unsophisticated attempt at tax avoidance has
been slapped down, with the assistance of some of the "old chestnuts"
of the lore of substance over form.127
125 The property will retain the transferor's basis in the hands of the corporation.
INT. RFv. CoDE of 1954, § 362(a)(2). There may, however, be an upward adjustment to
the basis of the transferor's stock equal to the basis of the transferred property. Treas.
Reg. § 1.118-1 (1956); Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr., 38 B.T.A. 960, 969 (1938).
126 See Commissioner v. Griffiths, 103 F.2d 110 (7th Cir.), aff'd, 308 U.S. 355 (1939);
Belle G. Loewenberg, 39 B.T.A. 844 (1939).
127 In Commissioner v. Griffiths, 103 F.2d 110 (7th Cir.), aff'd 308 U.S. 355 (1939),
the taxpayer relied on Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), but the corporation
was regarded by the court as having no business or corporate purpose; accord, Belle G.
Loewenberg, 39 B.T.A. 844 (1939). In a fairly recent use of this same device, the Fifth
Circuit, citing Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), concluded that
the sale was made directly by the selling individual to the eventual purchaser, thus
rendering § 453 inapplicable. Hindes v. United States, 326 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 337 U.S. 908 (1964), rev'g on other grounds 214 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Tex. 1963).
See also Blueberry Land Co. v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1966). On appeal from
remand in Hindes the taxpayer found that defeat was double edged. The "sale" to the
newly-formed corporation was at a price $35,000 less than that paid by the eventual pur-
chaser, presumably to allow retention of some amount by the corporation for the pay-
ment of a real estate commission and, perhaps, to make the transaction appear more
realistic. The taxpayer was unable to recover, or receive credit for, the income tax paid
by the corporation as a result of the "sale" by it to the eventual purchaser, even though
it was found that the sale was made by the taxpayer in his individual capacity. The
result was a partial double tax. Hindes v. United States, 371 F.2d 650 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 992 (1967).
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IV
THE ELECTION-ITs BINDING NATURE-HOW MADE
Questions about what constitutes a proper election of the install-
ment method have been at the storm center in the development of
authority under section 453. A litigious Commissioner has questioned
the use of the method many times, alleging that a timely or proper
election of the method was not made. His success has not been startling;
recently, he was compelled to reconsider his position on the question.128
The Supreme Court early concluded that to allow a taxpayer to
change from one elective method to another "would require recompu-
tation and readjustment of tax liability for subsequent years and im-
pose burdensome uncertainties upon the administration of the revenue
laws."' 29 The one settled principle in this confused area is that an elec-
tion, once made, is binding upon the taxpayer. Of course, this state-
ment has only a superficial simplicity, since it is often doubtful whether
the taxpayer has in fact made any election, especially when he has
made no decision that can be considered inconsistent with election of
the installment method.
A. Effect of Subsequent Events
An initial problem has been whether the taxpayer can effectively
adopt the installment method when the previously elected alternative
turns out not to bring with it all that it had promised when chosen.
Since this problem concerns the effect of subsequent events upon the
binding nature of an election, it is different from cases in which the
taxpayer attempts to alter his choice upon a showing that he did not
know all the relevant facts at the time the selection was made.10
When use of the first method chosen increases the tax impact
128 The result of this reconsideration was Rev. Rul. 65-297, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 152.
Discussion here will be limited to elections under § 453(b), under which each sale
constitutes a separate elective opportunity.
129 Pacific Nat'l Co. v. Welch, 304 U.S. 191, 194 (1938).
130 E.g., Lucas v. Sterling Oil & Gas Co., 62 F.2d 951 (6th Cir. 1933), involving an
option other than the installment method. See Note, The Election Concept in Tax Law,
47 VA. L. Rlv. 72, 74 (1961). Many of the cases cited hereinafter are quite close to Sterling
Oil, but the liberality of that decision has never affected the decisions under § 453,
where a "hard-line" has been taken on the issue of change after an inconsistent election.
There is some authority for allowing the taxpayer to effect a change when the circum-
stances existing at the time the election was made were such that it was not likely that
an intelligent election could have been made (e.g., very recent change of administrative
position by Commissioner or change in statute). See Morrow, Becker & Ewing, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 57 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1932) (involving the installment method).
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beyond that expected, the taxpayer should not be allowed to change
to what he views as a more beneficial method of reporting. Because of
an error in the computation of basis, the taxpayer in Sylvia S. Strauss'31
reported a gain of less than twenty dollars on the sale of real property.
Soon after filing the return the taxpayer realized that she should have
used the fair market value of the property at her husband's death as its
basis. She thereupon filed an amended return reporting a substantially
larger gain, and sought to elect the installment method. Even though
the overestimation of the basis was "due to a mistaken knowledge of
the law," the Board refused to permit the change.13 2 The same con-
clusion was reached when the taxpayer's mistake resulted from a com-
plete unawareness of the availability or existence of the installment
method.13 3 In Albert Vischia,134 reduction of the available net operating
loss changed the taxpayer's reported net loss into a net gain. Even
though the Commissioner's adjustments in other areas made the install-
ment method a more reasonable choice, change was denied because
"gain was reported and the transaction treated as closed."'13 5
In each of the above cases, the taxpayer had adopted a method
plainly inconsistent with the one later sought. But the manner of
income inclusion effected by the taxpayer does not always represent
an inconsistent choice. For example, the inclusion in income of rental
payments received as a result of a transaction that was subsequently
determined to be a sale has been held not to prohibit the taxpayer from
making a subsequent choice of the installment method. 13 1
The case is quite different, however, if the initial choice of the
131 33 B.T.A. 855 (1935), aff'd, 87 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1937).
132 Id. at 856.
133 Liberty Realty Corp., 26 B.T.A. 1119 (1932).
1'4 26 T.C. 1027 (1956).
135 Id. at 1030. See also Jacobs v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1955). Some
decisions in other areas distinguish between a mistake concerning the tax consequences
and one based on ignorance of the law, being firm with respect to the former and more
liberal in instances of the latter. E.g., Estate of Darby v. Wiseman, 323 F.2d 792 (10th
Cir. 1963); Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 569 (2d Cir. 1942) (supplemental
opinion). This subtlety does not appear in the installment method cases. Also, the cases
do not indicate whether the receipt of bad advice will constitute a basis for later change.
E.g., C.H. Mead Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 106 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1939). Control of this
reason for change would be difficult; manifestly, many taxpayers who want to effect a
change have received less than sage counsel.
136 Scales v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 133 (6th Cir. 1954). Thus, failure to make any
choice is not considered an inconsistent choice. E.g., Paul H. Travis, 47 T.C. 502, 514
(1967). Even though a prior choice is determined to be not inconsistent with later elec-
tion of the installment method, the question still remains whether the taxpayer subse-
quently effects a proper election of that method. This separable issue will be dealt with
at pp. 220-29 infra.
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taxpayer is completely disallowed by the Commissioner rather than
simply made less desirable by the proposal of adjustments that affect
the prior choice. This seems to represent a different situation, because
the taxpayer was not presented, at the time he made the election, with
real alternatives; the one chosen was in actuality unavailable. In
Mamula v. Commissioner,3 7 the taxpayer chose to report the income
from the sale of real property on the deferred payment basis. 38 As a
result of this selection, no income from the sale was reported on the
return for the year in which the sale was made. The taxpayer took the
position that since the buyer's obligations had no fair market value,
the cash payments received were to be first applied against basis. 39 An
audit of the taxpayer's returns prompted the Commissioner to take the
position that the deferred payment method was unavailable, since
the buyer's obligations did have an ascertainable value. Upon notice
of the Commissioner's position, the taxpayer conceded and requested
that he be allowed to report the gain realized under section 453. The
Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's denial of the installment
method on the ground that the method initially chosen "was at least
arguably open" to the taxpayer, who selected from alternatives that he
thought were available. 140
The Court of Appeals disagreed. It reasoned that, since the choice
of the deferred payment method was not allowable, it was not binding
on the Commissioner. Mutuality therefore required that the taxpayer
not be bound by the selection. The prior income calculations must be
set aside and "of necessity"'14 a new computation of income effected. In
such situations, the fear that election change would impose a tremen-
dous burden upon the revenue system by requiring recomputation is
not applicable. The recomputation comes about not as a result of a
change of method instituted by the taxpayer, but rather as a result
of the Commissioner's disallowance of the method chosen.
One can conclude from Mamula that an election will preclude
one from later choosing an alternative method of reporting only when
137 346 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1965).
138 Use of this basis is authorized administratively with respect to sales of real
property by Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6 (1958). Judicial authorization existswith respect to
personalty. E.g., Mainard E. Crosby, 14 B.TA. 980 (1929), acquiesced in, IX-1 Cum. BuLL.
13 (1930).
139 See Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(2) (1958). This feature constitutes the distinctive ele.
ment of the deferred payment method, for if the buyer's obligations have a fair market
value, a cash basis taxpayer must treat the obligations as part of the amount realized.
140 Peter Mamula, 41 T.C. 572, 576 (1964).
141 346 F.2d at 1019 (emphasis in original).
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the initial opportunity to choose between the alternative methods was
real. A more extreme factual situation than that presented in Sylvia
J. Strauss142 would compel a different result than that reached by the
Board. For example, suppose a taxpayer greatly overestimates his basis
in the property sold and reports a loss from its disposition. The Com-
missioner, upon recomputation of the basis, concludes that the tax-
payer realized a gain from the disposition. The taxpayer should not be
barred from adopting the installment method with respect to the newly
determined gain, because this is his first opportunity to choose a
method of reporting the gain. From Mamula the conclusion is drawn
that if the method chosen is not available, the selection process is
colored and the taxpayer is to be allowed a second chance to pick from
available options.
But it must be remembered that the Mamula decision would allow
a subsequent change by the taxpayer only when the method chosen is
substantively unavailable. Thus, if the method chosen becomes unavail-
able because the taxpayer's election is tardy, he gets no second chance at
the selection process. 1 43 Other adjustments by the Commissioner may
drastically alter the setting in which the taxpayer made his initial
choice, but will not be grounds for change of election, if the originally
selected method remains a substantively viable alternative. Thus, in
Samuel Pollack'44 the denial of a corporation's Subchapter S status
resulted in the disallowance of large corporate losses claimed on the
taxpayer's individual return.145 The taxpayer was not allowed to re-
consider his previous selection of the closed contract method with
respect to gain realized on the sale of real property. Distinguishing
Mamula, the Tax Court noted that the taxpayer made an available
election on his return, even though nightmarish consequences were
made to follow from later adjustments made by the Commissioner.
Although the Tax Court at least displayed a willingness to follow
the Mamula reasoning in Pollack, its decision in George E. Freitas 146
is contrary to the result in Mamula. The Tax Court found that the
taxpayer could not use the deferred payment method, selected by him
in a timely return, on the ground that the method is unavailable to an
142 33 B.T.A. 855 (1935), afJ'd, 87 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1937).
143 For example, if gain from the sale of property is not included in the original
return, and the taxpayer files an amended return including the sale (and electing the
installment method) beyond the time allowed by Rev. Rul. 65-297, 1965-2 Cur. Bum
152, he should not be given another turn at the election process.
144 47 T.C. 92 (1966).
145 INT. R v. CoDE of 1954, § 1374.
146 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 611 (1966).
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accrual basis taxpayer.1 47 The taxpayer's attempt to adopt the install-
ment method in the Tax Court was dismissed as untimely and regarded
as ineffective because of the prior inconsistent election. Since the tax-
payer's initial choice was substantively unavailable, the result in Freitas
seems to conflict with that in Mamula,148 to which no reference was
made.
The notion of substantive unavailability apparently encompasses
all corners of the administrative or legislative authorization of the
initial election made by the taxpayer. While the concept may be of
some use in other areas where the revenue laws afford an election, it
may have only narrow application to the installment method election.
Suppose, for example, the taxpayer initially elects the installment
method, and later analysis renders it substantively unavailable because
the taxpayer is shown to have received more than thirty percent of the
selling price in the year of sale. Though Mamula apparently would
allow the taxpayer a further opportunity to select from available alter-
natives, the circumstances are such that only one method remains via-
ble: to return the gain realized in the year of sale on a closed-contract
method. Theoretically, the taxpayer could then argue that the buyer's
obligations had no fair market value and that therefore he is entitled to
receive payments against his basis before reporting again. But he would
probably have great difficulty showing that the obligations had no
value, especially after having included them at face in his ill-fated
attempt to adopt the installment method149
Related. to the Mamula formulation is the idea that a taxpayer
should not be held to his choice of the installment method if that
method does not accurately reflect income. Arguably, since the Com-
missioner may impose an alternate method when he is convinced that
the one selected does not accurately reflect income, 150 the taxpayer
should not be bound by an election that has the same failing. In the
slender authority on this question, however, it is difficult to discern
when the installment method will be viewed as failing to reflect income.
147 This principle was established in George L. Castner Co., 30 T.C. 1061 (1958).
148 Actually, the substantive unavailability was more complete in Freitas than in
Mamula. Even though the buyer's obligation was found to have a fair market value in
Mamula, the method authorized by Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6 (1958) was nonetheless available.
Of course, it would not have been advantageous, since the taxpayer would have been
required to treat the obligation as the equivalent of cash, thus causing gain to have
been realized in the year of sale. But, since possible recovery of cost is the chief feature
of the deferred payment method authorized by the regulations, the taxpayer in Mamula
may be seen as having been substantively barred from using the method he sought.
149 Cf. Sterling v. Ham, 3 F. Supp. 386 (D. Me. 1933).
150 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 446(b).
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In Key Largo Shores Properties, Inc.,l t the leading case on the issue,
the taxpayer sold Florida land for cash, the assumption of a first mort-
gage, and the execution of a second mortgage. Prior to the end of the
year in which the sale occurred, it became apparent that the purchaser
was financially irresponsible (having defaulted on the first payment),
that the second mortgage was valueless, and that no further payments
would be made by the purchaser on the indebtedness. Concurrently,
land values in Florida began a dizzy decline. Although the taxpayer's
return for the year of sale included as income a large percentage of the
year-of-sale payments pursuant to the installment method, the Board,.
citing the predecessor to section 446(b), indicated that a taxpayer
should not be "irrevocably bound by the election of a method of re-
porting [income] when that method is erroneous."' 52
In Key Largo Shores, adherence to the installment method would
have required including as income in the year of sale almost the entire
amount of the payments received during that period (because of the
large profit "realized" on the sale), even though the taxpayer failed to
recover his basis in the property and the value of the land declined so
as to make it inadequate security for the purchaser's debt. The Board
concluded that "[n]either administrative rules nor the forceful argu-
ments in favor of administrative expediency can create income where
in fact there is none."'-1 This exception to the rule that an election,
once made, is irrevocable apparently is limited to cases in which
circumstances have occurred within the year of sale (or perhaps prior
to the filing of the return for that year) which make it manifest that
the installment method was an inappropriate vehicle to accurately
reflect income. 151 If events subsequent to the year of sale cause the
buyer to default, the taxpayer nonetheless remains tied to the install-
ment method, any relief coming only from satisfaction of the buyer's
obligation at less than face value. 15
B. Manner of Election
Although the statute indicates that use of the installment method
is optional, it is completely silent concerning the manner of election.
Since 1958 the regulations have provided that a taxpayer electing under
section 453(b) "must set forth in his income tax return (or in a state-
151 21 B.T.A. 1008 (1930).
152 Id. at 1012.
153 Id. See also Ives Dairy, Inc., 28 B.T.A. 579 (1931), af'd, 65 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.
1933).
154 See Estate of E.P. Lamberth, 31 T.C. 302 (1958); Biscayne Bay Islands Co., 23
B.T.A. 731 (1931).
155 Lucille L. Morrison, 12 T.C. 1178 (1949); Morgan Rundel, 21 B.T.A. 1019 (1930).
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ment attached thereto) for the year of the sale or other disposition the
computation of the gross profit on the sale or other disposition under
the installment method."' 56 Prior to this provision, even the regula-
tions had been silent on the manner of election. Early bravado induced
the Commissioner to take the position that an election "must be exer-
cised in a timely filed federal income tax return for the taxable year
in which such sale was made." 57 This position was only slightly miti-
gated by a recognition that the installment method could be used, via
an amended return, when a taxpayer, originally claiming nonrecogni-
tion of a sale of a residence under section 1034, failed to meet the re-
quirements of section 1034(a). 58 The Commissioner remained insistent
that a taxpayer who filed a delinquent return could not elect the install-
ment method,159 even though the return was filed prior to his dis-
covery that section 1034 nonrecognition would not be available.
This ruling displays the difficulty in applying a strict rule such
as that contained in the Commissioner's terse statement that an install-
ment method election must be made on a timely return filed in the
year of sale. Although the statute expressly grants to the Commissioner
broad administrative authority in fixing the manner in which the
statute is to function, neither the statute nor the regulations call for
an election upon a timely return. Further, there are separately oper-
ating sanctions within the Code for negligence'60 and for delinquency
in return filing.161 To deny the use of the installment method because
of delinquency imposes an added penalty not contemplated in the
statute. The Commissioner's lack of success in obtaining judicial ap-
proval of his administrative position may be analyzed in terms of deci-
sions falling within four categories.
1. Election upon Delinquent Return
The first category concerns situations in which the taxpayer fails
to file a timely return, but seeks, through a delinquent return for the
year of sale, to claim the installment method. In C'de Baca v. Com-
missioner,16 2 the court of appeals, reversing the Tax Court,163 sounded
the general theme for these cases. Neither the statute nor the regula-
tions require that the taxpayer make the election upon a timely re-
156 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-8(b)(1) (1958).
157 Rev. Rul. 93, 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 82.
158 Rev. Rul. 56-396, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 298.
159 Id. at 300.
160 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6653(a).
161 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6651.
162 326 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1964).
163 Marion C'de Baca, 38 T.C. 609 (1962), rev'd, 326 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1964).
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turn;16 4 to deny the installment method to the late-filing taxpayer would
be to impose a penalty. But the law does not casually inflict punishment,
especially when there are separately operative and specifically devised
sanctions within the statute. The fear expressed by some that the
result reached would extend the filing period and encourage retro-
spective elections0 5 seems to have been dispelled. Nor does it appear
that the taxpayer must show good cause why the return was not filed to
justify his subsequent election of the installment method upon a
delinquent return. In F.E. McGillick Co., 166 there were some grounds
for arguing that there was good cause for the delinquency, since the
taxpayer's president believed in good faith that the corporation was
tax exempt. The Tax Court relied upon the sentiment expressed in
C'de Baca that the potential applicability of the delinquency penalty
made it unnecessary to consider the relevance of the reasons for the
taxpayer's delinquency.
The Commissioner has specifically approved these cases and has
announced that an election made on a delinquent return for the year
of sale will be accepted. 167 Naturally, since a tax may be assessed at
any time in situations where no return has been filed,168 the ruling
does not require the delinquent return to be filed within any specific
time. But what if the years subsequent to the year of sale, for which
returns were filed, are closed for assessment? Whereas the Commissioner
could propose adjustments in the year of sale, he would be prevented
from doing so in subsequent years in which the taxpayer had received
payments related to the prior sale. The Commissioner has ruled that a
delinquent return containing an installment method election will not
be recognized as valid on the election question "if the assessment or
collection of any portion of the tax for any taxable year resulting from
the application of the installment method to such sale is prevented by
the operation of the statute of limitations .... -169
164 Though the requirement that the return be timely existed in Rev. Rul. 93,
1953-1 GuM. BULL. 82, these opinions constitute acceptance of the view that a ruling is
not to be accorded the weight of a regulation.
165 61 MicH. L. REv. 1189, 1192 (1963).
166 42 T.G. 1059 (1964).
167 Rev. Rul. 65-297, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 152. This ruling revoked Rev. Rul. 93, 1953-1
CuM. BULL. 82. It also modified Rev. Rul. 56-396, 1956-2 CuN. BULL. 298, "to eliminate
the conclusion that such an election is not valid when made in an untimely filed return."
The administrative concession renders obsolete the holdings in Cedar Valley Distillery,
Inc., 16 T.C. 870, 881-82 (1951), and Sarah Briarly, 29 B.T.A. 256 (1933).
168 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6501(c)(3).
169 Rev. Rul. 65-297, 1965-2 CuMi. BULL. 152, 153 (emphasis added). There is some
authority for the Commissioner's position. Howbert v. Norris, 72 F.2d 753 (10th Cir. 1934).
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Thus, if the taxpayer has not reported any of the installments
received from the sale, a delinquent return electing the installment
method must be filed while the Commissioner is still able to make
assessments with respect to those years in which installment payments
were received. For example, if the taxpayer received no payment in
1967, the year of sale, and received installment payments in each of
the three subsequent years, which were not included as income on
returns filed for those years (or, if included, not properly so), the
installment method election would be valid only if the delinquent
return for the year of sale were filed early enough to allow the Com-
missioner to make assessments with respect to 1968, 1969, and 1970.
If, however, the selling taxpayer properly reported the installments
received from 1968 through 1970, no tax would be due in those years
with respect to the sale, and the taxpayer could make a valid install-
ment method election in a delinquent return for 1967 filed at any time.
2. Omission of Sale from Timely Return
The second category includes situations in which the taxpayer has
filed a timely return but has failed to make any mention of the sale,
or to include any proceeds therefrom, and seeks to elect the installment
method via an amended return for that year. Here again the Com-
missioner's litigation record has not been outstanding. In Hornberger
v. Commissioner,70 the taxpayer's accounting firm mistakenly failed
to report any portion of a sale of realty. In allowing the installment
method election on an amended return, the court of appeals not only
referred to the penalties for negligence and fraud and the failure of
the statute to require the kind of election required by the Commis-
sioner, but also noted that the evidence showed the original omission
was "honest error."1 71 In Estate of Lipman,172 the court excused an omis-
sion resulting from the oversight of an accountant, and, in Stouffer v.
United States,173 the court expressly concluded that the "failure to
report was without any negligence"' 1 4 on the part of the taxpayer.
This thread was picked up in the Commissioner's recent ruling
wherein it is stated that an amended return filed for the year of sale,
not barred by the statute of limitations, may be a proper vehicle for
election of the installment method if, "in good faith, the taxpayer failed
to exercise the installment method election . . . on a timely filed
170 289 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1961).
171 Id. at 604.
172 245 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Tenn. 1965), aft'd, 376 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1967).
173 225 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Ohio 1962).
174 Id. at 969.
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original return for the year of sale. .... -75 To what extent is the Com-
missioner on sound ground in requiring that the failure to include
the item in the original return be a "good-faith" omission? Aside from
the troublesome semantic question involved-e.g., if the taxpayer is
negligent in failing to include the sale in the original return can he
be said to be lacking in good faith?-there still remains the point, to
which the judiciary has made allusion, that there are separately oper-
ating sanctions within the Code dealing with careless and intentional
violations of the revenue laws. Thus, for example, if an audit by the
Commissioner reveals the omission, the taxpayer should be able to
file an amended return electing the installment method with respect
to the omitted sale even if the Commissioner asserts the five-percent
negligence penalty. While a showing of "due care" on the part of the
taxpayer will overcome the penalty,1'7 6 a finding of negligence should
not have the radiative effect of denying to the taxpayer the use of the
installment method. Perhaps the Commissioner would not so contend,
being of the view that the taxpayer may still have "good faith" even
though he was negligent in not including the item in his original
return. This seems reasonable. But what if the item is excluded from
the original return as a result of a fraudulent motive? The taxpayer
then becomes subject to a penalty "equal to 50 percent of the under-
payment." 177 The Commissioner apparently would take the position
that the failure to claim the installment method election on the original
return was not the result of good faith, and therefore would deny the
taxpayer the right to claim its benefit on an amended return.
It is true that some of the cases in which the taxpayer was allowed
to claim the method via an amended return referred to the "excusable"
failure of the taxpayer to effect the proper inclusion in the original
return. By far the most significant theme of these cases, however, is
the notion that Congress has provided separately operating penalties
for these malefactions and to add a sanction that denies to the taxpayer
a right to report income in a manner otherwise available would expand
the penalty in a manner not contemplated. It seems, therefore, that
the Commissioner may be in a tenuous position by requiring that
"good faith" be a prerequisite to proper election of the installment
method via an amended return. Of course, if the taxpayer is allowed
to use the installment method, the underpayment, and thus the fraud
penalty, will be reduced. This is not shocking; the underpayment for
175 Rev. Rul. 65-297, 1965-2 GuM. BULL. 152.
176 H. BALTER, TAx FRAUD AND EVASION § 8.2-3 (3d ed. 1963).
177 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 6653(b).
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the purpose of determining the penalty should be computed in the
same manner, and with the same entitlements, as though the taxpayer
had filed a proper return. To compute income any differently, as
would be the case if the installment method were denied, would be
to expand the penalty in a manner apparently not considered by Con-
gress. The taxpayer should be entitled to use the installment method
when the omission of the sale was not fraudulent, even though other
evidence of fraud justifies imposition of a penalty on the entire under-
payment. But even when the taxpayer's fraud concerned the installment
sale itself, no real justification exists for denying use of the installment
method on an amended return. In all cases, the penalty operates inde-
pendently, and it should not be made larger simply because the omitted
item was a sale potentially eligible for return under section 453.
The same reasoning seems to apply to situations in which the
taxpayer intentionally fails to file a return. There are penalties specifi-
cally designed to meet this abuse, and denial of an otherwise available
accounting method is not one of them. One may argue, of course, that
the Commissioner has broad rule-making powers and that in regula-
tions, which he has indicated will be forthcoming, 178 he can properly
take the position that a taxpayer subject to the fifty percent fraud
penalty cannot utilize the installment method. If he takes this position,
however, he will remain subject to "the attack that it [is] unauthorized
as adding limitations beyond that authorized in the statute itself." 179
The requirement that the election must be made on an amended
return filed for the year of sale "not barred by the statute of limita-
tions"18 0 seems entirely within the Commissioner's authority. Accep-
tance or rejection of amended returns is properly a matter of discretion.
It is natural for the Commisioner to require that the return be filed
within a period during which an assessment can be made. One can
only assume, however, that the period of limitations referred to includes
that limitation made applicable by the circumstances. Thus, if the
period of limitation is six years, as the result of a twenty-five percent
understatement, 181 or the circumstances are such that an assessment
may be made at any time,'8 2 the taxpayer seemingly may submit an
amended return bearing an installment method election at any time
within the "open" period. Here again, however, the ruling adds that
178 See Rev. Rul. 65-297, 1965-2 Cua. BULL. 152, 153.
179 C'de Baca v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 189, 190 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964).
180 Rev. Rul. 65-297, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 152.
181 INT. RIv. CODE of 1954, § 6501(e)(1)(A).
182 E.g., in the case of a false return. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6501(c)(1).
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the Commissioner must not be prevented, by reason of the statute of
limitations, from collecting any of the tax generated by the receipt of
payments subsequent to the year of sale.
3. Transaction Erroneously Reflected on Original Return
Related to the categories referred to above is the third type of
situation in which the sale or its proceeds were included in a timely
filed original return in a manner consistent with the subsequent elec-
tion of the installment method but not reflecting the true nature of
the transaction. These situations present a strong case for allowing the
taxpayer to elect the installment method through an amended return;
after losing several decisions,' s3 the Commissioner announced that he
would permit such an election.8 4
Although the ruling speaks only of an amended return as the
proper vehicle for making a subsequent installment method election,
the Commisioner has been forced on several occasions to accept an
election made in a different manner. In one situation the Commissioner
held that, when a revenue agent had determined upon examination
that a taxpayer was not entitled to the nonrecognition claimed pursuant
to section 1034 (sale of residence) on his timely return, the taxpayer
could obtain the benefit of the installment method if he filed a written
statement with the Commissioner stating his nonqualification under
section 1034 and accompanied the statement with an amended return
for the year of sale.'8 5 But suppose the taxpayer wished to litigate the
section 1034 question? Surely this should not prejudice his right to
use the installment method with respect to any gain that is held to
have been recognized as a result of the failure to obtain complete non-
recognition under section 1034. Alternative positions in pleading have
long been a hallmark of modern practice. Thus, in John F. Bayley, 8s
the Tax Court had little difficulty concluding that an amended petition
in that proceeding was a proper elective vehicle in the event that the
taxpayer lost on the nonrecognition question.1 s7
183 Glidden Co. v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 195 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (transaction
originally reported as a lease, but held taxable as a sale as claimed on amended return);
John P. Reaver, 42 T.C. 72 (1964) (amounts received in year of sale originally treated as
gross business receipts, but held taxable as long-term capital gain as claimed on amended
return). See also Scales v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 133 (6th Cir. 1954). Before the subse-
quent installment election is allowed it must be shown, as it was in these cases, that the
prior inclusion was not inconsistent with a later choice of the installment method.
184 Rev. Rul. 65-297, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 152.
185 See Rev. Rul. 56-396, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 298.
186 35 T.C. 288 (1960).
187 The Commissioner's acquiescence in Bayley and his apparent acceptance of the
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The subsequent elective opportunity, however, should be exercised
when the taxpayer is first presented with the opportunity to choose the
installment method. In Bayley this moment came when the nonrecog-
nition claimed on the original return was challenged before the Tax
Court. The taxpayer would have difficulty claiming the installment
method by an amended return submitted after failing to prevail on the
nonrecognition issue before the Tax Court. Since the year would no
longer be "open," the Commissioner probably would not accept the
election. If a taxpayer wishes to litigate his dispute with the govern-
ment in a forum other than the Tax Court, the first elective opportu-
nity presumably occurs when the taxpayer files a claim for refund after
the payment of a deficiency assessment. 88
4. Election Made in the Year, Subsequent to Sale, When the First
Payment Is Received
The last category concerns situations in which the selling tax-
payer receives no payment (other than evidences of indebtedness) in
the year of sale, makes no reference to the sale in the return filed for
the year of sale, and elects the installment method in a subsequent
year when he receives his first payment. The Commissioner, hewing to
his hard line that the election must be made on a timely return filed for
the year of sale, has lost two cases on the issue. In Jack Farber,18 9 the
court noted that the present regulations-requiring that a taxpayer
electing the installment method show the computation of gross profit
from such sale in the return for the year of sale-applied only to years
ending after December 17, 1958, and that the applicable administra-
tive matter (the case involved the year 1952) was silent on the time and
manner of election. Noting that the taxpayer's silence in the year of
sale in no way constituted an inconsistent choice and that he received
no part of the selling price in that year, the court concluded that "there
was no occasion for reporting any amount of taxable income" in the
year of sale. Thus, a timely election was made "when payments were
received."'190 Essentially the same result was reached in Nathan C.
Spivey.191 Although new regulations are promised, the Commisioner
view that the installment method can be claimed before the Tax Court with respect to
an omitted sale renders obsolete the holdings in W.A. Ireland, 32 T.C. 994 (1959), John
W. Commons, 20 T.C. 900 (1953), and W.T. Thrift, Sr., 15 T.C. 366 (1950).
188 In Jolley v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 533 (D. Nev. 1965), such an election was
held proper.
189 26 T.C. 1142 (1961), aff'd, 312 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 (1963).
190 Id. at 1153.
101 40 T.C. 1051 (1963).
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has clearly indicated that he will follow Farber and Spivey only for
years ending before December 18, 1958, and that for subsequent years
the election must be made on the return for the year of sale, even
though no payment is received during that year.192
Although some commentators criticize the requirement that the
election must be made in the year of sale even though no taxable pay-
ment is received in that year,193 the Commissioner's view seems sound.
If the taxpayer does not decide to utilize the installment method when
he files the return for the year of sale, he will be obliged to report the
realized gain in that return in accordance with accepted cash receipts
or accrual principles, even though no payments other than evidences of
indebtedness have been received. Since the failure to include any
amount in income as a result of either of these methods indicates the
taxpayer's decision to employ the installment method, it is reasonable
to ask that he declare this decision on the return for the year of sale,
be it a timely, delinquent, or amended return. Also, failure to include
any amount in income with respect to a sale completed in the year
is just as consistent with a decision by the taxpayer to recover his cost
prior to reporting gain; thus, because of the varying tax treatment, it
is reasonable to compel the taxpayer to make the decision in the return
for the year of sale concerning how the income realized is to be reported.
To hold otherwise would be to allow taxpayers not receiving any pay-
ment other than evidences of indebtedness in the year of sale a longer
time in which to reach a decision on this question, which could unfairly
work to their advantage.
The only case on this issue in which the 1958 regulations applied
was decided in favor of the Commissioner. In Ackerman v. United
States,194 the taxpayer sold real property in the closing days of 1958 and
realized a gain, although she received no payment in that year other
than an evidence of indebtedness. The first payment was made Jan-
uary 2, 1959, and the taxpayer elected the installment method in the
return filed for that year. The court of appeals easily concluded that
the present regulations require an election in the year of sale and that
192 Rev. Rul. 65-297, .1965-2 Cum. BuLL. 152. It has been argued that the present
regulations do not dearly require that an express election be made on the return for
the year of sale, and that the taxpayer is only required to show the computation of gross
profit on the sale under the installment method. Hewitt, Installment Method Election
or Lack Thereof, 48 A.BA.J 582, 584 (1962). The computation requirement, however,
serves well enough to show the taxpayer's choice.
193 Hewitt, supra note 192, at 585; Note, The Election Concept in Tax Law, 47 VA.
L. REv. 72, 85-86 (1961).
194 318 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1963).
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the requirement is "reasonable, clear in its terms, within the power
of the Commissioner to promulgate and consistent with the statute."'195
Although the forthcoming regulations might state the rule more clearly,
this result seems proper. The taxpayer should have to declare how the
gain will be reported. The problems then focus upon the year of sale.
Has the taxpayer made a prior inconsistent election for that year?
If not, can he submit a delinquent or amended return for that year
containing a valid election?
C. Identification of the Year of Sale-Electing Party
In certain situations, obviously, identification of the year of sale
will become significant. This is a multi-faceted problem which can only
be touched upon here. The dilemma is also relevant in applying the
ceiling on initial payments, because the statute provides that payments
"in the taxable year of sale" shall not "exceed 30 percent of the
selling price."'19 6 Statements relating to when a sale takes place are
understandably general.197 When both parties become bound by the
agreement, one to buy and the other to sell, the time of sale is usually
fixed. A straight option situation, in which the seller receives an amount
under an agreement giving the optionee the right to purchase the
seller's property during a period of time, seems fairly clear. The amount
received by the optionor hangs in suspension, in seeming violation of
claim-of-right principles, until the option is exercised, in which case
it is treated as part of the amount realized (capital gain or ordinary
income, as the case may be), or until the option lapses, in which event
the previously paid option price becomes ordinary income to the op-
tionor.198 Obviously, in the case of an option lapse, the option price
becomes income to the "seller" at the time of the lapse and is not
subject to deferral. When the option is exercised, however, the time
of sale is fixed, and election of section 453 must be made in that taxable
year. The previously paid option price is considered a year-of-sale pay-
ment, and may presumably create difficulties with regard to the ceiling
on year-of-sale payments.
Some clear thinking has been done about the problem of con-
tingent lease-or-purchase arrangements. In Kitchin v. Commissioner,'99
195 Id. at 404.
196 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 453(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
197 See Chapman, Time of Sale Under the Internal Revenue Code, N.Y.U. 22D INST.
ON FED. TAx. 139 (1964).
198 Commissioner v. Dill Co., 294 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1961).
199 340 F.2d 895, rev'd on rehearing, 353 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1965). For a discussion of
the case and the issues involved, see Note, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Equipment
Lease-or-Purchase Agreements, 52 VA. L. REv. 1336 (1966).
1968]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the court of appeals, on rehearing, withdrew its previous position that
the amounts paid by the "purchaser" during the period prior to the
decision to purchase were to be treated by the seller as in a straight
option situation, i.e., not income until the nature of the transaction
becomes clear. The court concluded that the amounts received consti-
tute rental income to the seller unless and until the right to purchase
is exercised.
While adoption of the "lease-until-purchase" treatment in pref-
erence to the "wait-and-see" approach, which marks the usual option
situation, bears largely upon the type of income generated to the
"seller," the distinction is also relevant under section 453. The "sale"
would not take place until the right to purchase is exercised, and it is
on the return for that period that the election should be made. Unlike
the straight option situation, the selling taxpayer in a "lease-until-
purchase" situation would be less likely to run afoul of the thirty
percent ceiling on year-of-sale payments, since the prior amounts paid
would have been treated as rental income to the seller and thus should
not be considered as part of the "selling price."
In light of the above discussion and the 1958 regulations, the
decision in Nunn v. Gray2 °° seems wrong. In November 1952, the tax-
payer sold real property for $124,800, the purchaser executing a non-
negotiable promissory note for the full payment. The note provided
that the purchaser could reconvey the land to seller at any time and
thereby cancel the indebtedness. The seller received no payment on
the note in the year of sale, but did receive ten dollars, which the court
describes as "an earnest payment since it was in addition to the agreed
sales price."20 1 The taxpayer did not refer to the sale in his return for
1952, but in the return for the following year, during which he received
a sizable payment on the note, he adopted the installment method. In
denying the Commissioner's contention that the taxpayer had not made
a timely election, the court simply noted that 1953 was the year in
which the seller "first received a substantial payment on a sale that
was conditioned so the purchaser could have been relieved of his
bargain at any time. ' 20 2 Obviously, the earnest money or deposit paid
upon the execution of the deed should have been considered part of
the selling price, even though it was additional to the consideration
agreed upon in the note. That it was a very small amount is not im-
portant. As a deposit or earnest money, the amount became income to
200 196 F. Supp. 305 (D. Ky. 1961).
201 Id. at 306.
202 Id. at 307.
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the seller, as part of the amount realized, upon completion of the sale.
This occurred in 1952, even though the terms of the note permitted
the purchaser to be relieved of his obligation. Because of the need for
an annual accounting of income, sales are deemed completed even
though subject to possible contingencies. As the Tax Court has stated,
"[t]here is nothing inharmonious between the conception of an ab-
solute or completed sale and an agreement to repurchase later at the
option of the purchaser. ' 203 Thus, the sale should have been regarded
as complete in 1952, and according to the present regulations, the tax-
payer would have been required to make the election in the return
for that year.
Identifying the party who has the burden to elect should create
few problems. The regulations provide that the obligation falls upon
the "taxpayer who sells or otherwise disposes" of the property.2 0 4 Al-
though a partnership is not a taxpaying entity, it does file a return that
has tax consequences for the partners. Thus, when the partnership is
the selling entity and it fails to elect the installment method, the part-
ners cannot claim its benefit.2 0 5
Presumably, some problems could develop concerning the identity
of the selling party where, pursuant to local law, title to real property
passes directly but is nonetheless subject to administration. Just as an es-
tate in such situations is deemed the new shareholder for the purposes of
determining who must consent when the property involved is Subchap-
ter S stock,20 6 the estate should be regarded as the proper party to elect
the installment method when the property is sold.20 7
V
THE CEILING ON PAYMENTS IN THE YEAR OF SALE
Similar to a proper election, the requirement of section 453(b)(2)
(A) that the taxpayer receive not more than thirty percent of the selling
price in the taxable year of sale is a threshold requirement for qualifica-
203 Metropolitan Commercial Corp., 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 602, 610 (1963). See also
William M. Davey, 30 B.T.A. 837 (1934).
204 Treas. Reg. § 1A53-8(b)(1) (1958).
205 John G. Scherf, Jr., 20 T.C. 346 (1953); George Rothenberg, P-H TAx CT. REP.
8: MEM. DEC. 48.38 (1967). See Wolfman, Level for Determining Character of Partner-
ship Income-"Entity v. Conduit" Principle in Partnership Taxation, N.Y.U. 19TH INST.
ON FED. TAx. 287, 295-96 (1961) (urging the conduit principle of election by the individual
partners).
206 Rev. Rul. 62-116, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 207.
207 This rule, of course, allows the fiduciary to elect the installment method when,
because of other recognized losses, one or more beneficiaries prefer to realize the income
within the year of sale. Cf. Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 1967).
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tion. The- statute provides, of course, that evidences of indebtedness of
the purchaser shall not be deemed a payment in- the year of sale. The
goal of the thirty percent requirement is to assure that a contract is of an
installment nature. But the requirement possesses a deceptive simplicity
and has generated many problems.
The central questions are whether a given transfer is a payment
within the statute and, if so, when it was made. Of course, implicit in
the process is the determination of the "selling price" of the property,
the measuring rod against which "payments" are set.
Obviously, cash and the fair market value of other property re-
ceived by the taxpayer in the taxable year of sale must be viewed as pay-
ments within the thirty percent rule208 and as part of the selling price.
208 The same valuation of property (fair market value at time of sale) that is utilized
in determining the amount realized should similarly be used in determining the amount
of "payment." E.g., Charles W. Yeager, 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 169 (1959). Note that, if
the Commissioner places a higher value on the property received than the seller, the
added value will not "wash" itself out in a computation of the 30% requirement. For
example, if the seller values the tangible property received at $30 and the total considera-
tion to be received at $100, the sale would qualify under § 453. If, however, the Com-
missioner values the property at $35, the selling price would be raised to $105, and the
sale would not qualify.
An apparent distinction exists with regard to valuation of rights to receive money.
In Tombari v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1962), the taxpayer sold a pharmacy
and received, as part of the consideration in the year of sale, a contract right to receive
roughly $75,000 that the purchasers possessed as a result of their prior sale of other
property to a third party. In computing his eligibility to return the profit under § 453,
the seller valued the contract right received at face value ($75,000) with respect to the
selling price, thereby ballooning that figure, and the year-of-sale payment was included
at the agreed fair market value ($50,000). In rejecting this strategem the court viewed
the 30% rule as a measuring rod to be applied in the year of sale to determine whether
the taxpayer would sustain a hardship if the realized gain were taxed fully in that year.
Valuation of the indebtedness of third persons must be made on the basis of fair market
value, since it offers the most realistic test of whether the taxpayer is entitled to use the
relief authorized by § 453. Consequently, the court in Tombari held that the taxpayer
was unable to use the installment method, because a determination of the selling price
involves the "best possible evaluation of the consideration at the time of the sale" and
this must be based upon the fair market value of the third party obligation.
Although the purchaser's own obligations are clearly excluded from consideration as
payments in the year of sale, they must be used in determining the "selling price," the
gross profit, and the total contract price. The problem is whether the obligations of the
seller can be valued at less than face in making these detdrminations. In computing the
amount realized under § 1001, the note may be valued by a cash basis taxpayer at less
than face. Once the shift to § 453 is made, however, cash and accrual taxpayers are treated
identically, and the obligations of the purchaser are considered at face value. This result
is essential to an initial determination of the income to be included by the seller over
the life of the pay-out. This accounts for the ise of a term other than "amount realized"
when the regulations state that "gross profit means the selling price less the adjusted
basis as defined in section 1011 .... " Treas. Reg. § 1.453-1(b)(1), T.D. 6878, 1966-1
Cum. BULL. 101. Inclusion of the face amount of the purchaser's indebtedness in "the sell-
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Concepts of income, historically relevant in determining whether the
taxpayer has gross income within section 61, may be useful in determin-
ing the selling price. The "selling price" has been defined as the gross
amount of the purchaser's obligation, and this includes amounts that are
not paid directly to the seller but rather constitute income accessions in-
cludible within section 61.209 For example, if a prior indebtedness to
the purchaser is cancelled in the year of sale as part of the bargain, the
amount of such indebtedness is considered a "payment" and part of the
selling price.2 10
ing price" will, of course, cause that amount to be reflected in the gross profit, thus
setting the quantum of income that is to be included over the period of the contract.
This result is confirmed by the statute, which refers to "gross profit, realized or to be
realized when payment is completed .... ." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453(a)(1); see
J.W. McWilliams, 15 B.T.A. 329, 343 (1929).
209 See J.W. McWilliams, 15 B.T.A. 329, 342-43 (1929).
210 W.H. Batcheller, 19 B.T.A. 1050, 1053-54 (1930); I.T. 2351, VI-1 Cum. BuLL. 43
(1927) (extinguishment of mortgage indebtedness by purchaser-mortgagee). The amount
of the cancelled indebtedness, can properly be considered a payment for the application
of the 30% rule even though the seller is not directly given amounts with which to pay
the tax liability. "[B]eing relieved of a personal liability ... the seller's other personal
funds .. . are freed to be used in paying the tax." Ivan Irwin, Jr., 45 T.C. 544, 550
(1966). What effect would an election under § 108 to exclude cancellation of indebtedness
income have upon income determination and qualification under § 453? "[I]t is not nec-
essary for the income to be attributable to the discharge of the indebtedness itself in
order to be eligible for the elective exclusion under section 108(a), but may arise from
a discharge effected in consideration for the transfer of property ... Eustice, Cancel-
lation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion,
14 TAx L. REV. 225, 276 (1959). Suppose a taxpayer sells property for $100,000 (basis
$10,000) for the cancellation of a $50,000 indebtedness and the execution of a note in
the amounts of $50,000, calling for 5 annual payments of $10,000, one of which was paid in
the year of sale. Giving § 108(a) effect in a transaction possibly involving § 453 would
be to treat the taxpayer as having received $10,000 in the year of sale, of which $8,000
would be treated as includible in income ($10,000 X $40,000 -- $50,000). This solution severs
the cancellation of indebtedness income (for which the taxpayer has paid through a
downward basis adjustment in retained property under § 1017) from the sale transaction
in determining its eligibility and treatment under § 453.
What constitutes a cancellation of indebtedness sufficient to give rise to income can
still be pivotal. See Riss v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 965 (10th Cir. 1966), where the selling
taxpayer had been a partner in a partnership whose assets and liabilities had been pre-
viously transferred to a corporation in which he held stock. The corporation listed a
portion of the partnership deficit allocable to the seller as a receivable, which was sub-
sequently cancelled upon the redemption of the taxpayer's stock. Despite the taxpayer's
continuing pro rata responsibility to the partnership creditors for the obligations creat-
ing the partnership deficit, the court found the cancellation of the outstanding receivable
constituted receipt of a payment sufficient to disqualify the redemption transfer from
return under § 453. The seller was charged with the cancellation income even though
the indebtedness prompting the corporate receivable remained very much alive as "re-
sidual contingent personal liability." Id. at 969. Although this result is questionable, -it
reveals the distinction between a cancellation, which the court found with respect to
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A. When the Buyer Assumes or Takes Subject to a Mortgage
When a vendee assumes a mortgage on the property or takes it sub-
ject to a mortgage, is the amount of the mortgage indebtedness to be
considered a "payment" and as part of the "selling price?" Taking the
latter first, if we view the selling price as akin to the amount realized,
the principle enunciated in Crane v. Commissioner21' would clearly in-
clude the mortgage indebtedness in that figure. This thought is picked
up by the Commissioner's regulations, which state that the amount of
the mortgage shall be included in the selling price.2 12
The Commissioner's regulations have long provided that the
amount of the mortgage shall not be considered part of the initial pay-
ment or the "total contract price ' 213 to the extent it does not exceed the
vendor's basis in the property sold. This approach seems reasonable,
since the seller's liability for the indebtedness remains and thus is not
actually received as a payment. Even with regard to payments made
by the purchaser upon the mortgage indebtedness during the taxable
year of sale, the Commissioner's regulations provide that the purchaser
has not received a payment for purposes of section 453. These regula-
tions were challenged and upheld in Burnet v. S. & L. Building Corp.214
The Supreme Court faced two questions: (1) whether the amounts paid
by the purchaser on the mortgage assumed by him should be con-
sidered payments to the vendor, and (2) whether the amount of the
indebtedness assumed by the purchaser should be included in the
total contract price. This seemingly two part problem is actually only
the corporate-shareholder indebtedness, and an assumption and payment, which it did
not find with respect to the partnership liabilities.
211 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
212 Treas. Reg. § 1A53-4(c) (1958). This selling price figure has the twofold relevance
of constituting both the measuring rod against which year-of-sale payments are applied
for the purpose of determining compliance with the 30% rule and the minuend for
determining gross profit. Treas. Reg. § 1A53-l(b)(1), T.D. 6873, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 101.
213 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1958). The original provision (Treas. Reg. 69, art. 44
(1926)), was amended in 1929 to add the provision calling for "payment" treatment if
the mortgage exceeds the vendor's basis. T.D. 4255, VIII-1 Ctu~t. BULL. 165 (1929). No
distinction is made between a first or second mortgage indebtedness. Denco Lumber Co.,
39 T.C. 8 (1962). If a mortgage is placed upon the property in the year of sale by the
vendee (or even by the vendor, if it is keyed into the sale) and the proceeds of the mort-
gage are received by the seller, the amounts so received must be considered as payments
within the year of sale. Shubin v. Commissioner, 67 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
291 U.S. 664 (1934); Stella H. McConnell, 29 B.T.A. 32 (1933). This forces the triumph
of form, since the seller may encumber his property prior to, and independent of, the
sale, with the result that the assumption of the mortgage will not be considered as a
payment (even though the mortgage loan was effected in the year of sale) except to the
extent such loan exceeds basis.
214 288 U.S. 406 (1933).
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one dilemma, for if an amount is to be considered a "payment" in
the year of sale it should be considered part of the total contract price,
lest an aberration be worked.
The issues in S. & L. Building can be illustrated by the following
example. Suppose a taxpayer sells real property with a basis of $500,000
for $1,000,000, thus yielding a realized gain of $500,000. The selling
price consists of $100,000 payable in the year of sale, a note executed by
the seller and secured by a mortgage on the property in the amount of
$700,000, and the assumption of a $200,000 mortgage which calls for the
payment of $20,000 annually. Suppose further that the purchaser makes
a $20,000 payment on the assumed mortgage in the year of sale. Accord-
ing to the government's position in S. & L. Building, the taxpayer
should include $62,500 in income in the year of sale ($100,000 x
$500,000 -- $800,000). Seeing a tax benefit flowing from a greater de-
ferral, the taxpayer argued that only $60,000 ($120,000 x $500,000
$1,000,000) should be included in income for that year. He argued that
the amounts paid on the assumed indebtedness should be treated as
year-of-sale payments and that the entire amount of the indebtedness
should be treated as part of the "total contract price."
Both positions, of course, reach the same result with respect to the
total amount to be included in income. The difference is that the Com-
missioner's position would tax the income to the seller over a shorter pe-
riod of time, i.e., that period during which the seller actually receives di-
rect payments. The taxpayer's position would spread the income over a
longer period of time, and thus, because of the progressivity in the rate
structure, would result in a lesser net tax liability on the entire transac-
tion.2 15 In reversing the court of appeals,2 16 the Supreme Court noted
the circumstances surrounding the origin of the statute and saw an ap-
parent Congressional intent to allow a selling taxpayer to defer the in-
come realized over the period of time during which he received pay-
ments. Accepting the taxpayer's position would allow situations that
encourage postponement of collection of the income tax due from the
sale "far beyond the time when the vendor would receive any direct pay-
ments." 217 Such deferral is not essential to satisfaction of the Congres-
sional goal. The Court concluded that since the Commissioner's regula-
215 Inclusion of the assumed mortgage indebtedness in the "selling price" (which is
clear and accepted) leaves the gross profit figure fixed. Thus, a lower contract price means
a larger portion of each installment is treated as income; the deferral span is thereby
shortened.
216 S. & L. Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1932), rev'd, 288 U.S.
406 (1933).
217 288 U.S. at 414.
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tions were "not contrary to any positive provision of the. statute,"21 8 . it
was an-authorized exercise of administrative power;
In S. & L. Building the Court also approved the requirement of the
regulation that the amount by which the assumed mortgage exceeds the
seller's basis in the property is to be treated as a year-of-sale payment and
included in the "total contract price." Thus, to modify the facts of the
above example, assume that the taxpayer sells the property for $100,000
payable in the year of sale, a $300,000 note executed by the purchaser,
and the assumption of a $600,000 mortgage to which the property is sub-
ject. Since the taxpayer's basis was $500,000, the regulation would tax
$200,000 to the taxpayer in the year of sale ($200,000 x $500,000 --
$500,000). Inclusion of the excess of the assumed mortgage over the
seller's basis as a payment in the year of sale charges the seller with the
entire amount of the excess over basis in that year. Referring to the
problem of assumed mortgages, the Supreme Court noted that real
estate dispositions in which the property is encumbered by liens "give
rise to many complications which Congress could not readily fore-
see." 219 Congress therefore entrusted "to the Commissioner wide dis-
cretion in respect to details."220 Since "[n]o positive provision in the
statute required that [the excess of the assumed mortgage over basis]
... be spread over subsequent years," 221 the regulation "followed the
general purpose to place reasonable limitation upon the spread of
the tax." 222
The regulation is markedly similar to section 357(c) of the Code,
which treats liabilities in excess of basis assumed by the transferee corpo-
ration as gain taxed to the transferor in the year in which the transaction
occurs. In the problem posed the regulation taxes the seller in the year
of sale for the economic gain he receives on account of the mortgage in-
debtedness he incurred, i.e., the receipt of $600,000 borrowed on an in-
vestment of $500,000, but which was not taxed to him at that time be-
cause it gave rise to an off-setting indebtedness in that amount.
Because including the excess of an assumed mortgage over basis as a
year-of-sale payment raised possible problems with qualification under
under the thirty percent rule, taxpayers naturally began to provide in
the agreement of sale that the assumption of the mortgage by the pur-
chaser would not be effected until a specific time after the year of sale.2
3
218 Id. at 415.
219 Id. at 414.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 415.
222 Id. at 414.
223 United Pac. Corp., 39 T.C. 721 (1963); Estate of E.P. Lamberth, 31 T.C. 302, 314-
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Since an assumption of a mortgage is a promise of the buyer to pay off
the mortgage debt, it presumably can be postponed until such time as
the parties desire. Even merely taking property subject to a mortgage in-
volves more, according to the Tax Court, than simply purchasing prop-
erty that the mortgagee can view as security for the amount of the in-
debtedness. Although the buyer assumes no personal liability for the
mortgage indebtedness, it must be satisfied out of the real property if
the seller defaults on the payments. A provision that the seller is to
make the payments on the mortgage debt until conveyance of the prop-
erty indicates that there is no understanding between the parties that
the debt is to be satisfied from the property sold.224 Thus, even though
the mortgage exceeds basis, the seller does not realize his economic gain
(created by the receipt of borrowed funds in excess of basis), because
his obligation has in no way been diluted as it would have been by the
injection of the buyer's promise (vis-a-vis the seller) that the debt was
to be satisfied from the property. The cases that give effect to a post-
ponement of the assumption charge the Commissioner with a strict
interpretation of the language he used in his regulation. An agreement
to assume the mortgage at a subsequent time is not viewed by the Tax
Court as a contemporaneous assumption of the indebtedness. To do
so, states the Tax Court giving full sway to the form of arrangement,
would involve "a distortion of the agreement of the parties."' 25
If in a sale of encumbered property the mortgagee agrees to a nova-
tion substituting the buyer as the debtor personally liable and releasing
the seller from his prior liability, the entire amount of the indebtedness
must be treated as a payment in the year of sale. The novation repre-
sents full extinguishment of the seller's prior liability and is akin to a
straight cancellation of indebtedness.2 6 The same reasoning should ap-
ply when extinction of the indebtedness is only partial, but the Commis-
sioner has discarded cancellation-of-indebtedness principles in this area,
18 (1958), not acquiesced in, 1959-1 Co. BULL. 6; Stonecrest Corp., 24 T.C. 659 (1955),
not acquiesced in, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 6.
224 Stonecrest Corp., 24 T.C. 659, 644-69 (1955), not acquiesced in, 1956-1 CuM. BuLL. 6.
225 United Pac. Corp., 39 T.C. 721, 728 (1965). The technique of postponed cancel-
lation apparently may be employed with success when the seller's indebtedness to the
buyer is cancelled at periodic times following the year of sale. In such instances the
amount of the indebtedness is not treated as a payment in the year of sale. Estate of
Lipman v. United States, 376 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1967).
226 There is dictum to this effect in Ivan Irwin, Jr., 45 T.C. 544, 551 (1966). See also
Stephen A. Cisler, 89 T.C. 458, 465 (1962). Selling taxpayers may now ask whether, upon
analogy to Stonecrest Corp., 24 T.C. 659 (1955), they may effectively postpone the
novation to a subsequent year, thus removing potential qualification problems raised by
the 30% rule.
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because treatment of a pro rata payment of the assumed mortgage in-
debtedness as a payment in the year of sale could postpone collection of
the tax on the income generated by the sale beyond the time during
which the vendor would be directly receiving payments.
Although the Commissioner's revocation of otherwise operative
cancellation-of-indebtedness principles received judicial blessing in S. &
L. Building, it is unsettled to what extent these principles will continue
to operate outside the relatively narrow field occupied by the applicable
regulation.2 27 For example, the regulation refers only to mortgage in-
debtedness. In the recent case of Ivan Irwin, Jr.,22 s the Tax Court con-
cluded that, when liabilities of the seller other than a mortgage are as-
sumed by the buyer as part of the transaction, the mere assumption of
an indebtedness does not rise to the level of a cancellation, because the
seller continues to remain liable. Not being analogous to a cancellation
of indebtedness, mere assumption of third party liabilities is not a "pay-
ment" within section 453.
What, however, if the liability is assumed and paid in the year of
sale, thus making the situation almost completely analogous to a cancel-
lation of indebtedness? Perhaps fairly well accepted principles of indebt-
edness cancellation could be given heed, with the result that the amount
assumed and paid during the year of sale would be treated as a payment
during that year (thus threatening qualification with section 453(b)(2)
(A)(ii)). Alternatively, the spirit of Treasury Regulation section 1.453-
4(c) could be expanded to include situations not precisely within its
terms, thereby reducing the risk with respect to the thirty percent rule.
The split between these two points of view is neatly displayed in the
opposing results reached in Ivan Irwin, Jr., and United States v.
Marshall,220 decided within nine days of each other in 1966. In both of
these cases, the Commissioner argued that the portion of the seller's
liabilities to third parties that was assumed and paid by the buyer in
the year of sale constituted payment in that year.23 0 The Tax Court in
Irwin decided the case solely on the ground that, whereas mere assump-
tion does not result in "payment" to the seller, assumption and pay-
ment does create a payment. Only after finding that the selling tax-
payers thus received more than thirty percent of the selling price in
the year of sale did the court address itself to the possible application of
227 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1958).
228 45 T.C. 544, (1966). See also Rev. Rul. 60-52, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 186 and cases
cited therein.
229 357 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1966); Ivan Irwin, Jr., 45 T.C. 544, 551-52 (1966).
230 The extreme position of the Commissioner in Irwin that assumption alone should
compel treatment of the assumed amount as a payment was given no heed.
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Treasury Regulation section 1.453-4(c). But the court found the
regulation of little assistance, because no mortgage was involved. The
court was "convinced that the regulation should be read to apply only
to liabilities which are assumed but not paid in the year of sale." 231
This statement, of course, is erroneous, since the Supreme Court
specifically held in S. & L. Building that a partial payment on an as-
sumed indebtedness is not a payment in the year of sale.23 2 In spite of
this error, the court recognized that the essential problem was whether
the spirit of the Commissioner's regulation was to be given heed
beyond its specifically articulated scope. The court held that it was not.
United States v. Marshall involved the sale of a sole proprietorship
to a corporation, which assumed (and paid in the year of sale) the ac-
counts payable of the proprietorship. The Ninth Circuit reached a
result contrary to Irwin, relying almost exclusively on the regulation.
Stating that assumption of a mortgage is "analogous" to assumption
of current business obligations, the court, citing S. & L. Building, noted
that the unwanted possibility present there-postponement of the
collection of the tax due beyond the period during which the seller
would be directly receiving payments-was equally present in the
Marshall situation. This similarity afforded a sufficient basis for the
court to find the rationale of the regulation applicable with respect to
transferred debt.23
It is difficult to choose between these two opinions. The symmetry
produced by the Marshall result is appealing. Why should an assumed
mortgage situation be different from an assumption of current business
liabilities, if both produce the same ill? Although the authority cited by
the Tax Court in Irwin is ample to support the view that an indebted-
ness is not a payment unless assumed and paid, the cited material con-
cerned situations in which the entire indebtedness was assumed and
231 45 T.C. at 553 (emphasis in original).
232 In subsequent litigation specifically involving a mortgage situation, the Com-
missioner seems to have taken the position, contrary to the interpretation placed upon
Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1958) in S. & L. Building, that first-year payments on an assumed
mortgage constitute payments within the 30%o rule. See Samuel Pollack, 47 T.C. 92, 113
(1966).
233 In a prior ruling, the Commissioner had little difficulty finding that the seller's
unpaid balance, due a third party on a purchase of stock and assumed by the buyer in
a sale of that stock, was "similar" to the assumption of a mortgage and therefore should
not be treated as a payment in the year of sale. I.T. 2468, VIII-l Cum. BuuL. 159 (1929).
This ruling, although not involving a payment of the assumed indebtedness, exhibits a
proper willingness to expand the scope of Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1958) to situations
within its spirit if not its letter.
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paid in a particular year.2 4 In such situations the ill that the Commis-
sioner's regulation was designed to cure--deferring collection of the
tax beyond the time the seller receives payments-is not present. As-
sume, for example, that the buyer sells assets, with a basis of $500,000,
for $1,000,000. The consideration received is $100,000 paid in the year
of sale, the assumption and payment in the year of sale of $200,000 in
current business liabilities, and the execution of a note to the seller in
the amount of $700,000. The Tax Court would find qualification under
the thirty percent rule, by treating $300,000 as a payment in the year of
sale; $150,000 of the year-of-sale payment would be included in income
in that year ($300,000 x $500,000 --. $1,000,000). Nevertheless, the
problem of postponed collection, noted by the Supreme Court in S. &
L. Building, would not be present.2 5 If only $25,000 of the assumed
business liabilities were paid during the year of sale, the Tax Court's
treatment of $125,000 as a payment that year would likely postpone
collection on the tax beyond the time during which the seller would
be receiving payments. Although the Supreme Court recognized that
such a deferral is more than is necessary to meet the problem that
prompted enactment of section 453, and that such deferral creates
administrative problems, the Tax Court paid little attention to these
ramifications. While this reveals the virtue of the Marshall opinion, it
also demonstrates the inadequacy of the regulation. Since the regula-
tion expressly covers only mortgage indebtedness, the Tax Court could
easily read it literally and discount its importance, without seeing that
the problem it meets is present when any form of third party indebted-
ness is involved.
Even if the Marshall result is correct, both Marshall and Irwin
dealt only with taxpayer qualification under the thirty percent rule. If
that threshold requirement is complied with, the quantum of income in-
clusion in each taxable period must be determined. For example, as-
sume the taxpayer sells property, with a basis of $5,000, for $10,000, con-
sisting of $2,000 paid in the year of sale, assumed liabilities in the
amount of $2,000 ($1,000 of which was paid in the year of sale), and a
$6,000 note calling for the payment of $1,000 annually beginning in the
year following sale. Although Irwin and Marshall would reach different
234 James Hammond, 1 T.C. 198 (1942); Wagegro Corp., 38 B.T.A. 1225 (1938); Rev.
Rul. 60-52, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 186.
235 If the note called for the payment of $100,000 in each of the following years the
taxpayer would include $50,000 in income in each such year ($100,000 X $500,000 +
$1,000,000). thereby causing inclusion of the remaining $350,000 realized gain in income
while he is actually receiving payments.
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results on the question of payments in the year of sale ($3,000 and
$2,000, respectively), both interpretations recognize compliance with
the thirty percent rule. But under the Marshall interpretation the tax-
payer would be charged with $1,250 of the realized gain in the year
of sale ($2,000 x $5,000 $8,000), and with $625 in each of the six
years thereafter ($1,000 x $5,000 - $8,000). This would account for
the inclusion of the entire realized gain over a period during which the
seller is actually receiving payments directly from the buyer.236
If the Irwin approach is followed, the mode of income computation
is not exactly clear. The first of three possibilities237 would permit the
taxpayer to include $1,667 in income in the year of sale ($3,000 x
$5,000 -- $9,000) and $555.50 in each of the following years ($1,000 x
$5,000 $ 9,000), thus catching the entire $5,000 gain realized. Al-
though this approach does not present the problem of postponed col-
lection, it completely ignores the remaining $1,000 of assumed liability
that was not paid in the year of sale. Conceptually, this constitutes a
failure of the approach and, perhaps, of the entire Irwin opinion. If the
$1,000 assumed and paid in the year of sale is a "payment" for the
purpose of the thirty percent rule, as held in Irwin, the later satisfac-
tion of the remaining indebtedness should also be a "payment" and
should be included in the total contract price.
The second possible income computation under Irwin presupposes
that "payment" means something different in section 453(b)(2)(A)(ii)
from what it means in section 453(a). Thus, while the amount assumed
and paid would be treated as a "payment" for purposes of the thirty per-
cent rule, it would not be regarded as a "payment" that must be broken
into its income and return-of-capital components for return under sec-
tion 453(a). This effects the same income inclusion as was reached in
Marshall, i.e., in the year of sale the taxpayer would include $1,250 in
income ($2,000 x $5,000 - $8,000). Although this has the appeal of
corresponding to Marshall, little justification appears in the statute
or its history to permit the imposition of the varying treatment of the
word "payment."
The third possibility, although the most reasonable, clearly por-
236 The noninclusion of the assumed liability in the total contract price seems dic-
tated by Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1958), and has the effect of increasing (over what might
otherwise be the case) the proportionate amount of the gain that must be included in
income each year. See Pacheco Creek Orchard Co., 12 B.T.A. 1358 (1928); Estate of Sam
E. Broadhead, 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 146 (1966). But see G.C.M. 3048, VII-1 CuM. BULL.
60 (1928).
237 None of these possibilities were suggested in Irwin, of course, because the Tax
Court found the sales in that case ineligible for return under § 453.
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trays the difficulty of postponed collection. This view treats the taxpayer
as having received $1,500 income in the year of sale ($3,000 x $5,000 -
$10,000) and $500 in each of the following six years as a result of pay-
ments on the note ($1,000 x $5,000 -- $10,000). This causes an income
inclusion of $4,500, with $500 to be included when the buyer pays the
remaining $1,000 of assumed indebtedness. Not only does this ap-
proach potentially postpone collection until after the seller is directly
receiving payments, but also it adds the difficulty that the seller must
find out when the buyer pays the assumed indebtedness, an act which
he might not be aware of without special and periodic effort.
The first two possibilities suggested have serious conceptual short-
comings, and the third suffers from the same ill that prompted adoption
of the "mortgage rule."ss As long as the Irwin result potentially permits
deferral beyond the time necessary to alleviate the problem resolved by
section 453, it appears wise to extend the spirit of the mortgage rule to
other areas not specifically within its scope. This, of course, is the Mar-
shall result.
It must be apparent that confusion will exist as long as the regula-
tion retains its present narrow scope. Presumably, the seller's continu-
ing liability in an assumed indebtedness or "subject to" situation consti-
tutes sufficient reason for concluding that the amount of the indebted-
ness should not be considered a payment for purposes of the thirty per-
cent rule. Although at least one commentator takes the opposite view,2-
9
there seems to be strong and sufficient reason to conclude that it is
proper to treat an assumption and payment as a "payment" in the year
of sale. 24° A change in the regulations under section 453 would, how-
ever, be necessary to reach this result properly. Absent such a change,
the Marshall court seems perfectly proper in analogizing the situation
existing in that case with the regulation. If a regulation change incorpo-
rates the Irwin result with regard to payments in the year of sale, it
should be accompanied by machinery that would prevent postponement
of the seller's tax liability beyond the payout period. This may, as indi-
238 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1958).
239 See Comment, Assumption and Discharge of Seller's Liabilities as Year of Sale
Payments for Purposes of I.R.C. Section 453, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 758, 764-65 (1967), where
the writer questions whether any payment not flowing directly to the seller should be
treated as affecting his eligibility under § 453. He sees no distinction between situations
involving assumption only and those marked by assumption and payment.
240 Certainly as long as the result reached in Irwin remains unchanged, those seek-
ing use of § 453 should plan for the treatment of transferred debt as payment insofar as
the 30% rule is concerned. See De Castro & Chodorow, Can Buyer's Payment of Assumed
Debt Kill Seller's Installment Election? Courts Disagree, 25 J. TAXATION 130, 131-32
(1966) (discussing planning techniques in light of Irwin).
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cated above, necessitate legislative change, because postponement, of the
seller's tax liability beyond the time during Wfvhich he is receiving pay-
ments is always possible unless the assumed (but not paid) liability is not
to be considered part of the total contract price. Not considering it part
of the contract price would be an alteration of the present statutory
scheme that may require the action of Congress.
B. Payments Taking Other Forms
1. Advance Payments
Identification of the year of sale is important, since that is the year
to which the thirty percent ceiling must be applied.2 41 Once the taxable
year of sale has been determined, the question arises whether amounts
paid by the purchaser prior to the commencement of that period are
swept into it for purposes of the thirty percent rule. The problem has
arisen in two contexts.
Occasionally the purchaser gives the seller a deposit or prepayment
prior to the year of the actual sale. Although the parties clearly intend
that the amount given to the seller prior to the time that they reach a
binding agreement respecting the sale of the property will be applied
toward the purchase price, it is unclear whether this advance payment
(clearly not paid to the seller in the taxable year of sale) should be con-
sidered with respect to the seller's compliance with the ceiling on year-
of-sale payments.2 42
In Waukesha Malleable Iron Co. v. Commissioner, 2 43 the seller re-
ceived an amount from a prospective buyer in return for the grant of an
option to purchase property within a specific time. Because another
party possessed a prior option to purchase the same property, the possi-
bility existed that the option price would have to be returned. More-
over, the mode of taxation of the option price-either as a forfeited
amount or as part of the purchase price-was uncertain until exercise or
241 See pp. 229-31 supra. Although the statute as originally enacted bestowed quali-
fication upon transactions in which the "initial payments" did not exceed the ceiling,
that phrase was interpreted to include not simply the "downpayment" but also all pay-
ments made in the year of sale. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 212(d), 44 Stat. 23. See
Gertrude H. Sweet, 8 B.T.A. 404 (1927). This ambiguity does not exist under present
law, the term "initial" having been dropped with enactment of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code.
242 In 3 cases apparently dealing with this issue, the actual year-of-sale payments
were themselves above the 30% ceiling. Thus, the court did not have to decide whether
the advance deposit should be considered as part of the year-of-sale payments. Warren
Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1932); American Land & Inv. Co. v.
Commissioner, 40 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1930); Newaygo Portland Cement Co., 27 B.T.A. 1097
(1933), aff'd, 77 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
243 67 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1933).
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failure to exercise. Therefore, the court reasoned that the amount must
be considered a payment in the year of sale.244
The policy behind section 453 certainly supports this result. There
is no apparent reason not to include these prepaid amounts in determin-
ing whether the seller has sufficient liquidity to meet the tax liability
generated by the sale. Yet, this result is not perfectly consistent with the
statute, which decrees that " in the taxable year of the sale ... payments
.. . do not exceed 30 percent of the selling price." 245 It is unclear
whether the statute refers to the time of the receipt, regardless of
whether it becomes a taxable item to the seller at that time, or whether
the statute includes all those amounts that generate a tax effect to the
seller in the year of sale. Obviously, the court in Waukesha viewed the
income nature of the payment as crucial. Although the option price was
received prior to the year of sale, its status as income was not determined
until the sale. Thus, that became the proper time of "payment" for pur-
poses of the ceiling on year-of-sale payments.
This reasoning, although not given great support by the statute,
seems sound. Only amounts that are income producing to the seller (i.e.,
includible as part of the amount realized in determining gain) should
be considered in determining whether the taxpayer has received a suffi-
cient amount to warrant a tax on the entire gain realized in the year of
sale. Since the mere receipt of the option price was not income, it be-
came proper to view it as a payment, for purposes of section 453(b)(2)(A)
(ii), when it took on the status of income, i.e., in the year of sale.246
This analysis becomes more difficult when the receipt prior to the
taxable year of sale takes the form of an advance payment for property
that is to be delivered at a later time. If the prepaid portion is received
without restriction and without obligation to refund, then it must be
viewed as income to the seller in the year of receipt.247 The statute,
therefore, is unable to deal with the problem. If the sale is found to oc-
cur in a year subsequent to the year of prepayment, the use of section
244 See p. 229 supra.
245 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453(b)(2)(A).
246 The same result was reached in Oakland & San Francisco Theatre Co., 11 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 74 (1942), where the prior receipt was treated as received in the subsequent
year of sale, its earlier use by the taxpayer being considered a loan. See also Daniel
Rosenthal, 32 T.C. 225 (1959); John F. Westrom, 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1144 (1966)
(the prior payment was viewed as a contingent deposit which did not become income
until the later year of sale).
247 E.g., Fifth & York Co. v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Ky. 1964); Chester
Farrara, 44 T.C. 189 (1965). See generally Abrams, Income Deferral: Problems, Techniques
and Consequences, N.Y.U. 25TH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 577, 599-606 (1967).
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453 seems dependent upon shearing off the previously taxed prepayment
from the subsequent "sale" and payments, a course plainly not contem-
plated by the statute and for which there is no machinery.
2. Loans
Clearly, a loan to the seller by the buyer that is contemporaneous
with the sale and creates an offsetting obligation to repay does not con-
stitute a payment to the seller for section 453 purposes. This result
should not be altered even though the loan is keyed into the contract of
sale. In one case,248 the taxpayer received a loan from the publisher at the
time a contract was executed for the sale (upon completion) of a manu-
script by the seller-author. Since the loan was in fact to be repaid regard-
less of whether the manuscript was delivered, it was treated as a loan and
not as an advance payment. As the ruling indicates, the situation may
well be otherwise where the "loan" is not in reality an obligation that
the seller will be called upon to repay.249
3. Disposition of Installment Obligations in the Year of Sale
Suppose that immediately after selling property for $10,000 in cash
and the buyer's four notes ($10,000 each), the taxpayer sells two of the
notes for slightly less than face. Clearly, within the taxable year of sale
the seller is in a cash position that exceeds the year-of-sale ceiling. De-
spite early Board decisions to the contrary,25° it is now clear that the
year-of-sale disposition of the installment obligations is regarded as inde-
pendent of the transaction between vendor and vendee.2 51 Although the
statute refers only to payments in the year of sale and is silent concern-
ing their source, presumably the legislative intent was to view only
amounts paid by the purchaser (and not by a third party transferee of
the purchaser's note) in applying the year-of-sale ceiling. Of course, sec-
tion 453(d), dealing with the disposition of installment obligations,
would compel inclusion in income of a certain amount of that paid by
the third party.2 5 2 The regulations now provide that the installment
method is still available to the seller with respect to the notes of the
248 Rev. Rul. 234, 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 29.
249 E.g., James Hammond, I T.C. 198 (1942).
250 E.g., Mrs. W.M. Bludworth, 7 B.T.A. 495 (1927).
251 The old line of authority was first overruled by Duram Bldg. Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 66 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1933).
252 The effect of § 453(d) is such that, if all the installment obligations held by the
seller are disposed of at face, the result will be the same as if the taxpayer had not
elected the installment method. This result, of course, squarely raises the problem of
what constitutes a disposition within § 453(d). See Winding River Ranch, Inc., 35 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1494 (1966). The problem is outside the scope of this article.
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buyer not disposed of, even though deferral is lost with respect to the ob-
ligations that were sold.25
C. The Relevance of Mistake .
It is proper to infer that the statute refers to actual payments re-
ceived by the seller, even though the contractual arrangement between
the parties calls for the payment of a greater or lesser amount.2 54 This
raises the question whether compliance with section 453 can be achieved
by returning to the buyer a portion of what the seller received in the
taxable year of sale. If the year-of-sale payment is modified during the
year of sale, only what the seller actually received and kept should be
considered in determining qualifications. Further, if the sale has been
consummated in a manner not qualifying under section 453, the seller,
even with the agreement of the buyer, should not be able to "reform"
the agreement subsequent to the year of sale by returning a portion of
the amount received during the year of sale in an effort to bring the
"net" amount received by the seller below the ceiling. This seems to be
the position of the Commissioner, who has ruled in a remotely analo-
gous situation that the "seller may not alter the form of the sale so as to
permit him to report the gain realized . . . on the installment
method." 2 5
The concept of mistake, however, may deserve consideration. In
Lewis M. Ludlow,256 the seller of stock in a closely held corporation had,
during the negotiations leading to establishment of the purchase price,
clearly communicated his desire to have the transaction eligible for re-
turn under section 453. The purchaser was agreeable to the plan.
Through an error in the computation of the amount to be received in
the year of sale, however, the seller actually received slightly more than
thirty percent of the selling price. The error was discovered the day after
the contract closing (December 29), and the excess over thirty percent
was immediately returned to the buyer, who did not receive it until
253 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1958).
254 E.M. Funsten, 44 B.T.A. 1166 (1941); James D. Boone, 27 B.T.A. 1064 (1933);
First Say. & Trust Co., Ex'r, 20 B.T.A. 272 (1930). Of course, reference is also made to
those amounts constructively received. See note 55 supra. An amount required to be de-
posited by the seller with a lending institution as a guarantee of the buyer's obligation
to the lender is actually an amount withheld by the lender, and is a payment within the
year of sale. Key Homes, Inc., 30 T.C. 109 (1958), aff'd per curiam, 271 F.2d 280 (6th
Cir. 1959).
255 Rev. Rul. 56-20, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 197, 198, which deals with the right of a
seller to alter the form of a cash sale after receipt in order to get the benefits of the
installment method. The Commissioner held that once the full balance of cash was
accepted the nature of the transaction was fixed for income tax purposes.
256 36 T.C. 102 (1961).
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January 1. In finding that the sale qualified for return under section
453, the court reasoned that the taxpayer received the excess "under a
mistake, mutually recognized, and not under a claim of right." 257 The
opinion gives every indication that the same result would have been
reached if the error had been discovered in March and the amounts re-
turned to the buyer at that time. In an area fraught with technical
traps, this result is soothing. The mutuality of the error, however, pre-
sumably is requisite to the result. The purchaser's willingness to pay
more than the ceiling on year-of-sale payments should not prevent the
parties from planning to bestow upon the seller the income deferral
sanctioned by section 453. 258 If, through error that can truly be de-
scribed as mutual, this permissible goal of the parties is not achieved, ju-
dicial recognition of the correction of that mistake is welcome. The
court is on weak ground, however, when it attempts to found its result
on claim-of-right principles. As the dissenting judges point out, there
was no doubt that, as between the parties, the seller had a right to retain
the over-ceiling amount. The judicial doctrine of claim of right would
never absolve the taxpayer from inclusion in income of these mistak-
enly, but rightfully, received amounts. 59
D. Evidences of Indebtedness
Only evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser can be received
outside the thirty percent rule. The indebtedness acknowledged by the
buyer at the time of sale will almost always be expressed in a written
agreement. On the rare occasion that the buyer's promise to pay the re-
maining balance is only orally expressed, the seller's eligibility to return
the profit under section 453 should not be prejudiced.20 Clearly, a situa-
tion in which the taxpayer sells property with a basis of $100 for a $20
down payment and the buyer orally promises to pay the remaining $80
of the purchase price is conceptually within the realm of transactions
that prompted the enactment of section 453. The taxpayer should be
entitled to return the gain therefrom under section 453. Of course,
absent an election under the section, the taxpayer would obtain a form
of deferral as a result of the conclusion that the buyer's "oral promise"
did not have a "cash equivalent. '261
257 Id. at 110.
258 E.g., Charles A. Collins, 48 T.C. 45 (1967), acquiesced in, 1967 INT. REV. BULL.
No. 40, at 6.
259 United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951). See generally Lister, The Use and
Abuse of Pragmatism: The Judicial Doctrine of Claim of Right, 21 TAx L. REv. 263,
275-76 (1966).
260 E.g., Vincent P. Vigilante, 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mere. 957 (1966).'
261 See note 12 supra.
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Defining what is an evidence of indebtedness does not create many
problems. An early Board opinion takes the view that the sale of real es-
tate to a corporation for the sole consideration of two ten-year bonds did
not constitute a qualifying installment sale.262 To the extent that the
opinion is premised upon the idea that there was no provision for the
payment of installments, it is archaic and does not reflect current law. It
must be regarded as erroneous to the extent that it is based on the
idea that the bonds, having a higher degree of marketability and ne-
gotiability than would the purchaser's promissory note, should not be
viewed as evidences of indebtedness. The statute must be read as es-
chewing considerations involving degrees of marketability. For tax
payment purposes the receipt itself of bonds or notes fails to bestow
liquidity upon the selling taxpayer.
Of course, this conclusion does not exclude the possibility that cer-
tain obligations received will be viewed as equity interests and not as ev-
idence of indebtedness. The Commissioner may contend that the nomi-
nal nature of bonds issued by a corporate purchaser should be cast aside
in favor of the true equity nature of the instrument. The line between
debt and equity with regard to senior security interests has become
blurred and may not be of great economic significance. But if the inter-
est received by the selling taxpayer is of a more proprietary character, he
will be charged with the receipt of property other than an evidence of
indebtedness, and therefore will not qualify for the income deferral of
section 453. On the other hand, a selling taxpayer should be able to treat
what is nominally preferred stock as an evidence of indebtedness, if the
circumstances so warrant. In wrestling with the old chestnut of debt-ver-
sus-equity in other contexts, the judiciary has hammered out adequate
criteria.26 There seems to be no reason why such considerations should
not be relevant in determining the applicability of section 453.
The relevance of these considerations to section 453 was touched
upon, albeit tangentially, in Wilson & Fields.264 Because the preferred
stock received by the seller in that case was found to have been received
as security for the payment of the outstanding obligation of the pur-
chaser, the court was not compelled to pass upon the Commissioner's
contention that the preferred stock was not an evidence of indebtedness
within section 453(b)(2)(A)(ii). The opinion, however, plainly indicates
262 Thomas F. Prendergast, Ex'r, 22 B.TA. 1259 (1931).
263 See B. BITrKER & J. EuSIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS §§ 4.02-.07 (2d ed. 1966).
264 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1189 (1962).
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that the court was prepared to enter the well-trod realm of debt-versus-
equity if it had been necessary.
The statute is clear that qualifying evidences of indebtedness must
be "of the purchaser." 265 And yet, receipt of the indebtedness obliga-
tions of one other than the purchaser in the year of sale causes income
tax to be generated to the seller on amounts yet to be received.2 6 6 The
sparse legislative history concerning the words "of the purchaser" indi-
cates that Congress did not contemplate the third party note problem,
but rather was intent upon not allowing income deferral through an in-
stallment method election when the seller receives more marketable evi-
dences of third party indebtedness, such as Liberty Bonds.2 67
The question arises whether the endorsement of the purchaser
upon the note of a third party will transform it into an "indebtedness of
the purchaser." Since the Uniform Commercial Code casts the endors-
er's liability in the form of a surety and does not call for payment until
the instrument is dishonored and necessary notice of dishonor is
given,268 an endorsement by the purchaser apparently would not convert
the instrument into an evidence of the purchaser's indebtedness. This
interpretation presumes that section 453(b)(2)(A)(ii) contemplates a
present indebtedness of the purchaser. While potential liability may be-
fall the endorser, he has not acknowledged a present indebtedness. A
contrary conclusion must be reached when the purchaser is a co-maker
of a note, the other maker not being a purchaser. Although the purchas-
er's indebtedness is joint, it is also several, and therefore must be classi-
fied as his indebtedness.2 69
If an "evidence of indebtedness" includes any written contractual
promise to pay, a check, defined as "an unconditional.., order to pay a
sum certain in money... on demand... ,"270 is within the phraseology
of section 453. Co-existing with this postulate in the commercial sphere,
however, is a set of principles, applicable in the income tax area, to the
effect that checks are usually required to be included in income in the
265 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 453(b)(2)(A)(ii).
266 Walnut Realty Trust, 23 B.T.A. 850 (1931); Georgia-Florida Land Co., 16 B.T.A.
1253 (1929); J.W. Elmore, 15 B.T.A. 1210 (1929); see p. 206 supra.
267 67 CONG. REc. 3282 (1926) (remarks of Senator Smoot).
268 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-414. See also G.C.M. 11846, XII-1 CUM. BULL. 113,
115-16 (1933).
269 The phrase "evidences of indebtedness" in INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1232 (dealing
with the retirement of bonds and other evidences of indebtednss) similarly lacks a
clear definition.
270 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-104(1)(b), 2(b).
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year in which they are received.2 71 Decisions concluding that the time of
the receipt of the check should determine the time of its inclusion in in-
come are premised upon either the doctrine of constructive receipt or
upon the common law doctrine of conditional payment and relation
back. If these principles are to be given sway with respect to section 453,
the technical nature of a check as an evidence of indebtedness in the
commercial realm must be disregarded, and the taxpayer should be con-
sidered as having received payment in a form so proximate to cash that
it must be viewed as such and not as an evidence of indebtedness.2 72 Of
course, if the selling taxpayer receives a partial payment in the form of
an order to pay at a definite time in the future, he is not in constructive
receipt of the promised amount, and the draft should be treated as an
"evidence of indebtedness" for purposes of section 453.
E. More on Identification of the "Taxable Year of Sale"
Identification of the "taxable year of sale" is manifestly important
with regard to both applying the ceiling on payments and determining
the proper time for electing the installment method. Since there is no
federal law of sales, local law, though not conclusive, must play a role
in determining the time of sale.2 7 3 With regard to real property, the
Regulations clearly state that "agreements of purchase and sale which
contemplate that a conveyance is not to be made at the outset, but only
after all or a substantial portion of the selling price has been paid"
qualify as transactions eligible for return under section 453.274 Thus,
title passage is eschewed as the central criteria for determining the time
of sale. Although title may be reserved for purposes of security, the
agreement must create an unconditional obligation to sell and an un-
conditional obligation to buy.
In Commissioner v. Stuart,275 the parties agreed upon a sale of
certain realty in 1954, and payments that year totalled $15,000. The
271 See Note, Checks and Notes as Income When Received by a Cash-Basis Taxpayer,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1200-02 (1960).
272 See Spiegelberger v. United States, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1435 (S.D. Cal. 1958),
where the purchaser prepaid (by check) an installment on the note, and as a result the
seller received amounts in excess of the 30% ceiling.
273 See generally Lucas v. North Texas Co., 281 U.S. 11 (1930); Chapman, Time of
Sale Under the Internal Revenue Code, N.Y.U. 22D INST. ON FED. TAx 139 (1964). The
term "taxable year of sale" must include the period for the computation of taxable in-
come applicable to the particular taxpayer. I.T. 2492, VIII-2 Cums. BULL. 120 (1929). Thus,
if the seller dies during the year of sale, the relevant period for the ceiling on year-of-sale
payments would be the "short period" provided for in § 443(a)(2).
274 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(a)(1) (1958). See Floyd R. Clodfelter, 48 T.C. 694 (1967).
275 300 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1962). See also John F. Westrom, 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
1144 (1966).
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closing and transfer of a warranty deed were to take place in April
1955. In the event the buyer failed to make any of the agreed payments
or failed to close in the manner agreed upon, all prior sums paid by
the buyer were to be forfeited to the seller as liquidated damages. The
Commissioner viewed the sale as taking place in 1955 and, since the
seller received more than thirty percent of the selling price at the time
of closing, denied the taxpayer the use of section 453. This position was
upheld by the court of appeals. 2 76 Since the buyer, upon forfeiture of
the amount paid, could be released from the obligation to purchase,
the court viewed the transaction as akin to an option to buy, which was
exercised at the closing in 1955. Although the 1954 agreement was an
enforceable contract for the sale of real property,277 a result contrary
to that reached by the court would violate the general principles of
taxation of options and would pose significant administrative problems
in the event the buyer chooses not to close the agreement and forfeits
the amounts previously paid.
The result in Stuart is not inconsistent with Wiseman v. Scruggs.' 8
In that case, the parties to a sale of real property entered a written con-
tract in 1954, which called for a selling price of $40,000. The buyer
paid $10,000 at the time of the 1954 agreement and agreed to pay the
balance in annual installments of $8,000 beginning the following year.
The agreement further provided that upon the payment of each install-
ment the seller would convey a portion of the unimproved tract. The
contract was carried out according to its terms, and the buyer's posses-
sion of the entire tract from the date of the 1954 agreement was never
challenged. The problem of pinpointing the time of sale arose because
the sellers, who elected to report the gain from the sale under section
453 on their return for 1954, subsequently filed a claim for refund in
which they urged that the transaction was in reality several sales of
realty consummated in each of the several years subsequent to 1954.
The court of appeals found that the contract obligated the sellers to
execute and deliver deeds in later years, obligated the buyer to make
subsequent payments, and gave untrammeled possession to the buyers.
This was a sufficient basis for the court to conclude that the trans-
action was one sale that occurred in 1954. Therefore, over the taxpayer's
apparent objection, he was charged with his prior choice of the install-
ment method.
In Scruggs the court was concerned with the tax treatment to be
270 300 F.2d at 876.
277 Id. at 875.
278 281 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1960).
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accorded the $10,000 paid at the time the contract was executed. In an
option situation such that as in Stuart, the seller was properly allowed
to treat the amount as a nontaxable receipt at that time; determination
of the type of tax to be imposed on that amount must await the buyer's
action on the option. In a nonoption situation, however, the seller's
receipt of an amount to be applied toward the purchase price must
generate an immediate tax effect. This being the case, every effort
should be made to find that the year of that taxable receipt constitutes
the taxable year of sale, regardless of when formal closing is to be com-
pleted; otherwise, the difficulties previously mentioned,279 occasioned
by the receipt of a taxable amount prior to the year of sale, present
themselves. This usually can be accomplished through the application
of general contractual principles relating to contract formation and the
existence of a firm offer and acceptance. 28 0
F. Split Sales
Immediately related to the above dilemma is the determination of
the subject matter of the sale. As hinted in Wiseman v. Scruggs, the tax-
payer may gain by claiming that the deal was in fact more than one
sale transaction and that each should be applied against section 453 to
determine qualification.281 Of course, the Commissioner may desire to
split the sale so that two or more parts fail to qualify.28 2 The first prob-
lem is the extent to which form will control. For example, when two
groups of assets of the same character are sold to the same vendee at the
same time, but the transaction is cast as two separate contractual arrange-
ments, the regulations seem to indicate that each transaction should
be separately analyzed to determine its eligibility for return under
section 453.283 The seller's effort to cast the transaction into separate
279 See pp. 243-45 supra.
280 The same principles should apply with respect to sales of personalty. The dis-
tinction between executory and executed sales (with the former not constituting a sale
for § 453 purposes) relied upon in Rev. Rul. 234, 1953-2 CuM. BuLL. 29, 31, no doubt has
continuing vitality despite different phrasing in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-106(1).
See Rev. Rul. 67-100, 1967 INT. R.xv. BULL. No. 14, at 9, which indicates that the Com-
missioner regards the closing date as significant in spotting the time of sale, even
though there was a prior contract for sale.
281 E.g., Nathan C. Spivey, 40 T.C. 1051 (1963); Buckeye Engine Co., 11 B.T.A. 318
(1928). If the taxpayer urges separate sales, proper apportionment raises problems of
proof. See Blackstone Realty Co., Inc., 35 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 930 (1966).
282 E.g., Divine v. United States, 10 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5403, 5409-10 (VW.D. Tenn.
1962).
283 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-5(a) (1958), which calls for the separate treatment of each
transaction, gives no hint of a different result if the vendee is identical in two or more
otherwise separate sales.
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sales should be honored. Cases in this area acknowledge that the install-
ment method should be available to those who follow the formal pro-
cedures by which it is defined.28 4 Consequently, if the taxpayer's nego-
tiations with the buyer for the sale of fifty acres for $250,000 reveal
that the buyer desired to pay $100,000 cash together with $150,000 in
evidences of indebtedness, the seller should be allowed to cast the
transaction such that twenty acres are separately sold for $100,000 in
cash and thirty acres are sold for $150,000, with the purchaser giving
his evidences of indebtedness. If the separateness of the sales is honored.
the taxpayer will have preserved his section 453 opportunity with
respect to a significant portion of the aggregate gain involved.
This concession to form should not be troublesome when the trans-
actions are so clearly separate. A recent Tax Court decision indicates,
however, that that tribunal is willing to preserve the seller's installment
method opportunity even when the separate nature of the transactions
is not very distinct. In Charles A. Collins,28 5 the taxpayer sold some
fifty-two acres for approximately $260,000. The entire sale was handled
as one transaction, the buyer receiving the deed in the year of sale.
The consideration for the sale was paid in the form of $20,000 upon
the execution of the agreement, $95,000 at closing, and a $145,000
mortgage on the property. Because the buyer desired to begin devel-
oping the purchased property and presumably because of the substan-
tial down payment, the mortgage covered only thirty-two acres of the
tract sold. Although the seller received amounts in excess of the ceiling
in the year of sale, the Tax Court, using reasoning that can best be
described as surrealistic, found qualification for part of the transaction
by shearing off the part involving the mortgage and classifying it as a
separate sale. This curious result would have been justified if there
had been some indication (other than on the taxpayer's return for the
year of sale) that the seller had intended to cast the transaction as two
sales. But the mere fact that the mortgage indebtedness ran only to a
portion of the property does not seem a sufficient basis for severing
what is otherwise a unitary event. The decision in Collins has cast a
cloud of uncertainty over the entire problem and raises questions con-
cerning what the proper criteria are for splitting the sale.
A multiple-vendor approach to the sale of property by co-owners
has achieved what must be viewed as the correct result. For example,
suppose that co-tenants A and B sell their property for $300,000. If A
desires to receive all cash and B wishes to defer his gain under section
284 E.g., James Hammond, 1 T.C. 198, 205 (1942).
285 48 T.C. 45 (1967), acquiesced in, 1967 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 40, at 6.
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453, an approach that regards A and B as having separately sold their
one-half interest in the property will permit B to obtain the wanted
income deferral. On the other hand, if the sale is regarded as a single
transaction and the buyer pays A $150,000 in the year of sale, then the
total consideration paid by the buyer in the year of sale exceeds thirty
percent of the total selling price paid for both interests. The statute is
not very helpful on this question, simply stating that qualification is
dependent upon payments not exceeding thirty percent of the selling
price.286 Thus, if "payments" refers to the amount paid by the buyer,
qualification would seem prohibited. In Timanus v. Commissioner,287
the court adopted the approach that each co-owner is regarded as
selling his interest, and determined the selling price for that interest
on a pro rata basis. If this approach is applicable to tenancies in com-
mon and to joint tenancies, as it should be, the way is open for a selling
co-owner to obtain deferral under section 453 even though the other
party or parties are not eligible. 28
G. Sale of a Business
Unique problems are presented in the sale of a business. The
teaching of Williams v. McGowan289-that such a transaction is to be
"cominuted into its fragments" and the result applied against the capi-
tal gains provisions to determine the nature of the gain or loss-is now
widely accepted. Does this fragmentation process affect application of
section 453(b)(2)(A)(ii)? One year before Williams, the Tax Court, in
Arkay Drug Co.,290 decided that the sale of assets by a corporation did
not qualify for the installment method, because the seller received more
than thirty percent of the selling price in the year of sale. Refusing to
notice that the contract allocated the total consideration to the various
items being sold by the corporation (e.g., $10,000 for inventory, $2,000
for fixtures), the court no doubt was influenced by the idea of "uni-
versitas facti" extant prior to Williams.
286 As originally enacted, the statute described the ceiling upon year-of-sale payments
as a specified percentage of the "purchase price." Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 212(d),
44 Stat. 23. Although the change to "selling price" in 1928 was made because it was
"less confusing," it supports a more rational result when property held by co-owners is
sold to a single vendee. H.R. EP. No. 2, 70th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1927).
287 278 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1960).
288 The contract between the selling co-owners and the purchaser should reflect the
allocation of the year-of-sale payment between the sellers, because an independent agree-
ment between the sellers will not be binding with regard to eligibility under § 453.
Walter E. Kramer, Ex'r, 27 B.T.A. 1043, 1053 (1933), appeal dismissed, 80 F.2d 1014 (7th
Cir. 1935).
289 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945).
290 13 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1301 (1944).
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-If the fragmentation of the sale compelled by the Williams deci-
sion applies for purposes of determining eligibility under section 453(b),
then the payment in the year of sale would presumably be allocated on
a pro rata basis to each class of items, and an independent determina-
tion of eligibility would be made for each class.
The usual obstacle to qualification would be the thirty percent
ceiling on year-of-sale payments. This will probably be the case, how-
ever, only when the initial payment exceeds thirty percent of the ag-
gregate value of the assets, since the allocation of the year-of-sale
payments would most reasonably be effected on the basis of selling price
or value. If the portion of the initial payment so allocated does not
exceed thirty percent of the amount of the total selling price allocated
by the parties to the realty, for example, the gain recognized thereon
would presumably be subject to deferral. However, the nature of the
property itself, and not merely the application of the thirty percent
ceiling, plays a role and conceivably could prevent the gain from the
sale of the inventory portion of the seller's asset package from qualifi-
cation under section 453(b), because the statute specifically renders
inventory property ineligible subject matter for a casual sale of
personalty.291
The threshold question, however, is whether the allocation pro-
cedure fostered by the Williams decision is a proper tool for solving
problems arising under section 453. The dilemma which that deci-
sion met and solved-the determination of the nature of gain or loss
generated by the sale of the business-is quite distinct from eligibility
determination under section 453(b). Although the Commissioner has
ruled that "the selling price must be allocated among all the assets
sold according to the respective relative values thereof," 292 with the
allocation made by the parties themselves being given considerable
heed, the aim of the ruling is to effect the mandate of Williams.
There appears to be no statutory authority for fragmenting a
single sale into separate parts, based upon classes of assets, for the
purpose of determining qualification under section 453(b). That stat-
ute refers to the "year of the sale" and "the selling price" and carries
no hint of a fragmentation process in the event that assets- of different
types, eligible and ineligible, are involved in "the sale." The Com-
missioner recognizes as much when he states:
291 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453(b)(1)(B). Inventory property is seemingly ineligible
even though its dispositon is part of an otherwise "casual" disposition (e.g., the sale of a
sole proprietorship, which is "casual" at least to the extent that it is infrequent).
292 Rev. Rul. 55-79, 1955-1 CuM. BuLL. 370.
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In the case of an installment sale, allocation of the down pay-
ment ordinarily presents no problem, since it usually represents a
fixed percentage of the selling price of all the assets included in
the sale.2 93
Nevertheless, when a bundle of assets is sold for a single price to be
paid in installments and that asset package contains property ineligible
for the installment method, some procedure must be evolved to isolate
the tainted property, lest the entire sale fail to qualify. The allocation
made necessary by Williams seems a likely vehicle.
Although not exactly apposite, there is some administrative au-
thority for the allocation of year-of-sale payments. In one ruling294 the
taxpayer sold a resort business that included a liquor business for the
total price of $500x, $140x being paid in the year of sale. A local regu-
lation of the liquor control commission required the buyer to make a
down payment of at least forty percent in the sale of a liquor business.
To satisfy the requirement, the parties provided in the agreement for
a $460x/$40x allocation of the selling price between the resort business
and the liquor business, respectively. They further provided that the
down payment for the liquor business should be considered forty
percent of $40x, or $16x. The Commissioner stated that allocation of
the down payment is not usually necessary in a sale of an asset package,
but recognized that "the conditions of a particular case may require a
separate allocation of the down payment.1 295 He approved an allocation
that would "conform to the local legal requirements to which the sale
was subject."2 96
Of course, in this case the allocation of the year-of-sale payment
was in accordance with a legal requirement and was not the result of
bona fide negotiation between the parties. Nevertheless, the Commis-
sioner did approve an allocation of the down payment, based upon
Williams principles, when "the conditions of a particular case may
require." Is the inclusion of ineligible property (inventory) in the
asset package a "condition" that warrants rational allocation of the
down payment among the various properties? An affirmative answer is
necessary if section 453(b) is to be of use in the sale of many busi-
nesses. If the initial payment does not exceed thirty percent of the
selling price of all the assets, the sale should not be rendered ineligible
merely because ineligible property is included among the assets sold.
293 Rev. Rul. 57-434, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 300, 301.
294 Rev. Rul. 57-434, 1957-2 GuM. BULL. 300.
295 Id. at 301.
296 Id.
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An allocation-whether made by the parties as part of the agreement
or as a necessary antecedent to the proper return of the income from
the sale--can function also as the basis for the down payment. Despite
the half step taken toward this result in the ruling, the Commissioner's
litigation policy indicates that he will attempt to treat the sale of
business assets as a unitary event, in an effort to disqualify transactions
through noncompliance with the thirty percent rule.
In both Andrew A. Monaghan29 7 and Lubken v. United States, 298
the Commissioner took the position that the sale of a business (which
included inventory property) was ineligible under section 453(b) since
the seller, in the taxable year of sale, received more than thirty percent
of the selling price. By finding that in each instance the inventory was
sold as part of a separate transaction, each court was able to find for
the taxpayer, because in a separate transaction, the amount paid for the
inventory was not considered in determining whether or not the re-
mainder of the property was eligible for return under section 453.
Even if there is no evidence indicating that inventory is separately
bargained for and purchased, as may often be the case, the Commis-
sioner must agree to some allocation as the only reasonable method to'
carve out the ineligible property. In such instances, the Williams
allocation is doing service beyond that intended, but in a manner that
constitutes a reasonable extension of that holding. 99
297 40 T.C. 680 (1963). After noting that an allocation of the down payment is not
required in the usual installment sale, the court stated:
An allocation is material, however, when there is a sale of a going proprietor-
ship with an explicit amount received for property excluded by the terms in
parentheticals of section 453(b)(1)(B), such as in the instant case since only the
payment for the business was to be made in installments, while the separate
agreement for the remaining inventory provided for payment in cash. In such
cases it is our conclusion that the sale of inventory for a separate price will not
be included in determining whether the 30-percent limitation will prevent in-
stallment reporting for the sale of the other assets.
Id. at 687-88.
298 8 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5073 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
299 This position draws some support from the statute. The 30% test constitutes
a limitation on the application of (1), which contains the language relative to the
ineligibility of inventory property. Thus, since the 30% ceiling applies only to eligible
property, there is some basis upon which the inventory portion of the transaction
can be sheared off and treated separately for both 30% ceiling and property eligibility
purposes. The results in Monaghan and Lubken, however, indicate the advisability of
casting the sale of inventory as a transaction separate from the disposition of the
other assets. But see Cortland Specialty Co., 22 B.T.A. 808, 816 (1931), aff'd, 60 F.2d 937
(2d Cir. 1932).
Subsequent to the preparation of this article the Commissioner provided more
specific guidance for allocation of year-of-sale payments to inventory and to that portion
of the asset package which is sold at a loss. Rev. Rul. 68-13, 1968 INT. 11Ev. BuLu. No. 2,
at 8.
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Amounts paid by the buyer that are allocated by the parties to
a covenant not to compete create an analogous problem. Amounts re-
ceived pursuant to such an understanding are not eligible for return
under section 453, because they are not received as a result of a "sale
or other disposition of property."300 When the parties allocate an
amount to the covenant and that allocation is upheld for purposes of
the general income tax results which flow from the existence of a
covenant,301 the property disposition and covenant portions of the
transactions must be severed for the purposes of section 453. But a
covenant can have ripple effects in the section 453 area that may result
in disqualification.
In Balthrope v. Commissioner,30 2 the taxpayer agreed to sell the
stock in a corporation operating a radio station for $442,000, an amount
that apparently represented the reasonable value of the stock. On the
eve of execution of the contract, the buyer asked the seller to take
$150,000 of the selling price "as a covenant not to compete, or con-
sulting contract, or any way you want to do it."' 303 Since the seller's
illness had prompted the sale in the first place, he readily agreed to
the covenant not to compete for a period of ten years and to render
consulting services, for which, according to the allocation effected, he
was to receive $15,000 annually for ten years. The stock sale was cast
in terms of $100,000, paid in the year of sale, with the remainder to
be paid in subsequent installments. Hoping to preserve his eligibility
under section 453, the taxpayer argued that the selling price was
$442,000 and that the allocation of $150,000 for consultative, noncom-
petitive purposes was a sham, and actually represented payment for
the stock or goodwill. Using tested criteria,30 4 the court found that the
seller in fact agreed to exchange his services and right to compete for
$150,000, and therefore the selling price for the stock was only
$292,000 and section 453 was unavailable. This decision shows the
necessity for care when an agreement not to compete is part of a trans-
300 Deferral of the amount allocated to the covenant can be obtained by the cove-
nantor through the simple device of having the covenantee pay the amounts annually
over the life of the agreement. Barnet, Covenants Not To Compete: Their Effects upon
the Covenantor and Covenantee, N.Y.U. 18TH INsT. ON FED. TAX. 861, 876 (1960).
301 See Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967), upholding the allo-
cation effected by parties in the absence of a showing of fraud or undue influence.
302 356 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1966).
303 Id. at 29.
304 Id. at 34; see, e.g., Note, Tax Treatment of Covenants Not To Compete: A Prob-
lem of Purchase Price Allocation, 67 YALE L.J. 1261 (1958). If the covenant is found not
to have been separately bargained for, the seller's choice of the installment method
should not be hindered by the presence of a covenant. Rebecca J. Murray, 28 B.T.A.
624 (1933). But see note 305 infra.
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action in which the seller wishes to utilize the installment method of
reporting income.305
VI
OPERATIVE EFFECT OF SECTION 453
The deferral effect of a valid election under section 458 is clear.
As a result of the machinery contained in section 453(a), each install-
ment payment received by the taxpayer consists of a portion of a return
of the seller's basis and a portion of the gain realized on the transaction.
The manner in which repossession of the property sold or disposition
of installment obligations can significantly alter the obtained deferral
is outside the scope of this discussion. 30 6
If subsequent events effect a reduction in the selling price, there
is no change in gross profit previously reported. The amount of income
to be reported in future installments is lessened by the amount of the
price reduction; the adjusted amount is spread over the remaining
installments. 30 7 When the reduction exceeds the income still to be
reported, the loss is taken in the year of the price reduction.308
Naturally, use of section 458 does not alter the seller's right to
obtain preferential treatment under the capital gains provisions. In a
changing statutory context, it may be important to determine whether
the law in effect at the time of sale should control the mode of taxation
or whether the subsequent installment receipt should be subject to the
statutory pattern existing at the time of receipt. This dilemma is best
considered in light of an analogous problem. The effect of section 453
is to defer income to another taxable period. The conclusion is easily
reached that subsequent installment receipts should be taxed at rates
that exist at the time of the later receipt. From this fairly clear result,
the court in Snell v. Commissioner3o9 quickly concluded that the receipt
of installment payments as a result of a sale returned under section 458
305 This problem is still present when the parties make no allocation to a covenant,
since in some circumstances the court makes an independent allocation, or upholds a
unilateral allocation by the covenantee. E.g., Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 222 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1955); Rodney B. Horton, 13 T.C. 143 (1949), appeal
dismissed, 180 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1950).
306 Repossessions, part of the problem dealt with in § 453(d), will be dealt with in
a later article dealing with the disposition of installment obligations.
307 J.P. Jerpe, 45 B.T.A. 199 (1941). Price reduction does not constitute a disposition
of an installment obligation. Rev. Rul. 55-429, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 252. Failure of the
seller to collect the full original selling price when his original intention was to do so
does not reduce the selling price with regard to the 30% rule. Vincent P. Vigilante, 35
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 957, 958 (1966).
308 The loss, however, is not a capital loss..Hale v. Helvering, 85 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir.
1936).
309 97 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1938).
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would similarly be subject to "such provisions of the law as might be
of force at their maturity."3 10 In Snell, what would have been capital
gain entirely had the taxpayer not elected section 453 treatment, was
converted into ordinary income as a result of an intervening change in
the statute. The rationale of Snell is that since the taxpayer "chose to
defer ... installments," the effect of a subsequent change in the law
"was a risk [he] took in deferring the realization of his gains."31'
Although the result reached seems firmly ensconced in the fabric
of the law,312 the decision seems open to question. To the extent that
the court refers to section 453 as deferring realization of income, it is
in error. The taxpayer realizes gain in the year of sale. Since the gain
realized does not fall within one of the several nonrecognition pro-
visions, it must be viewed as recognized gain as well. In Snell the gain
was realized in the year of sale, and its mode of taxation, as capital gain
or ordinary income, should not have been altered because of an inter-
vening change in the statutory framework. Although this appears to be
the proper result, the issue is rarely contested, because of the infre-
quency of legislative changes in the definitional aspects of capital gains
taxation.
An assertion by the Commissioner that the subsequent installment
payments received by the seller are to be treated as ordinary income
rather than capital gain can arise in a context distinct from legislative
change. For example, the taxpayer may begin selling parcels of real
property in 1961 and 1962 in a manner qualifying for return under
section 453. The income returned in those years may be treated by the
taxpayer as capital gain as a result of his belief that the realty was not
held "primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his
trade or business."313 Although the statute of limitations may have ex-
pired for the years of sale, the Commissioner is not barred from urging
that the subsequent installment receipts generated by the earlier sales
should be treated as ordinary income because the sales, in fact, were
of property held primarily for sale to customers.314 This result should
not be surprising. The years to which the later installment receipts
have been deferred are open and subject to any adjustments the Com-
missioner may propose. That the Commissioner is able to support pro-
posed adjustments for later years by going back to the year of sale to
determine the true nature of the disposition supports the conclusion
310 Id. at 893.
311 Id.
312 E.g., Zola Klein, 42 T.C. 1000, 1004-05 (1964).
313 INT. REv. COE of 1954, § 1221(1).
314 Municipal Bond Corp., 41 T.C. 20, 31-32 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 341 F.2d
683 (8th Cir. 1965).
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that the sale actually takes on its character from the circumstances
existing in the year of sale. This further weakens the result in Snell.
When a business is sold in a transaction qualifying for return under
section 453, allocation of the installment receipts between capital and
ordinary income should not create problems. The manner in which
the disposition of assets was handled in Rhombar Co. 15 is instruc-
tive on this point, as well as with regard to the recommended separate
disposition of inventory. In Rhombar the taxpayer, a distributor of
fine furniture, sold its assets to another corporation by an agreement
that grouped the assets in broad classifications. For the goodwill the
seller was to receive $750,000, and for the fixed assets (e.g., decorations,
room settings, show room furniture, etc.) the seller was to receive
$150,000, although the properties falling within this latter group were
valued at $210,000. For the assets falling within these two groups the
purchaser was to make forty quarter-annual installments of $22,500
each. The purchaser was unable to make the payments as provided, and
in the years under consideration by the court the selling taxpayer re-
ceived substantially less than the amount agreed. Since five-sixths of the
purchase price for this group of assets was allocated to goodwill, the
court (and, indeed, the Commissioner) readily found that five-sixths of
what the seller actually received during this period could properly be
treated as capital gain. The Commissioner urged that the remaining
one-sixth of what the taxpayer received was ordinary income, since the
assets sold were not shown to constitute inventory. The court, however,
noting that the inventory "was sold separately,"8' 16 and concluding that
the assets in the group referred to constituted section 1231 property,317
found that the remaining amount should also be treated as capital gain.
VII
SALES BY DEALERS IN PERSONALTY
Although use of the installment method by dealers in personal
property presents many unique problems, most of them involve in-
tricate questions of accounting that are outside the scope of this article.
The Commissioner's regulations on use of the installment method by
dealers in personalty318 constitute a quagmire in which all but the
most persistent lawyer would quickly become lost if, indeed, there
existed sufficient reason for him to enter it at all. Nonetheless, certain
315 47 T.C. 75 (1966).
316 Id. at 88.
317 Id. at 89.
318 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2, T.D. 6682, 1963-2 Cumr. BULL. 197, 198, as amended, T.D.
6804, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 215, 217-20.
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problems in the application of the installment method in this context
are of interest to the lawyer.
A. Qualifying Sales by Dealers-Generally
The statute has provided since its inception in 1926 that a "person
who regularly sells or otherwise disposes of personal property on the
installment plan . . . ." may adopt the installment method.319 This
slender phrase contains questions central to the use of the method.
Except for the long-broiling controversy, now apparently settled, about
whether revolving credit plans constitute a sale on the installment
plan, the regulations are simple and undemanding in their statement
of what constitutes a sale of this character.320 No requirements or limi-
tations exist with respect to the amount of down payment, payments
made during the year of sale, sales price, or period over which the pay-
ments are to be received. An installment sale "contemplates that each
sale under the plan will be paid for in two or more payments," whether
or not it is in fact paid for in more than one installment.321
The revolving credit plan lacks this characteristic; it is not con-
templated that each sale will be paid for in more than one installment.
Not only can the buyer pay the account balance in full at any time
under such a plan, but also there is no way to determine whether a
particular sale is to be, or is in fact, paid for in installments. The regu-
lar payments of the buyer are not specifically attributable to the price
319 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453(a).
320 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(b), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 197, 198.
321 Id. Prior to the expansion of the regulations effected by T.D. 6682, 1963-2 Cum.
BuLL. 197, the regulations contained no definition concerning sales on the "installment
plan." Significantly, the determination of whether a sale is made on the installment plan
is separate from the determination of eligibility to use the method of reporting income.
The regulations make the intention of the parties paramount by indicating that an in-
stallment plan sale is one which "contemplates" that the sale will be paid for in two or
more installments. Thus, the sale may still qualify as an installment plan transaction
as long as the requisite "contemplation" exists, even though the buyer subsequently pays
the entire purchase price in one payment. The classification of such a transaction as an
installment sale would simply entitle the dealer to report the entire gain from the trans-
action at the time of its receipt, which will, if in an accounting period subsequent to
the year of sale, supply deferral. Its classification as an installment plan transaction could
also be significant in determining whether or not the taxpayer is "regularly" engaged
in selling on the installment plan. Of course, if the agreement contemplates that the
entire sales price is to be paid at once, though subsequent to the year of sale, the transac-
tion is not a sale on the installment plan. Thus, the transaction could not be considered
in determining whether the taxpayer "regularly" sells in that manner, nor would it be
eligible for the installment method of reporting income.
The regulations, however, seem to require that sales on a revolving credit plan must
actually be paid for in two or more installments. Since the buyer can liquidate any
portions of the revolving credit balance that he desires, it may frequently be the case
that each sale made under the plan is not, in fact, paid for in two or more installments.
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of a particular item, but merely reduce the total unpaid balance, which
may be the aggregate .of several separate purchases. Thus, revolving
credit plans do not possess the traditional characteristics of a sale on
the installment plan simply because the total obligation of the buyer
is paid in installments. Absent administrative concession, the tax effect
to the merchant would be determined outside section 453, with the
result that a tax would be imposed in the year of sale on the full
amount of the gain.32 2
When the Commissioner sought to challenge the eligibility of
revolving credit plans under section 453, he relied upon the charac-
teristic absence of a retained security interest in the seller and its
usual presence in the more traditional plans. 3 23 Since he argued that
none of the sales made under the revolving credit plan could qualify
as installment plan sales, the Commisioner's position in the case was
somewhat extreme and cannot properly be considered as part of the
rational development of his policy on the matter. Although revolving
credit plans were not in use in 1926, and hence not within the area
in which Congress sought to provide relief, the court concluded that
there was nothing in the statute, in its administrative interpretation,
or in the ordinary meaning of "installment plan," that would deny
this modem credit device shelter under the statute.32 4 The Commis-
322 Under the accrual method, which is usually used by those not employing the
installment method, "income is to be included for the taxable year when all the events
have occurred which fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof can
be determined with reasonable accuracy." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (1957). This will
almost invariably be in the year of sale. Any deferral obtained through the use of the
accrual method will depend upon the valuation of the purchaser's obligations.
The installment method of reporting does not always result in a dear tax saving to
the dealer in personalty. A dealer who consistently sells on the installment plan, and
who thereby receives recurring annual payments on prior installment plan sales, may
at some future time reach a point at which the income to be reported is about the same
as would be reported by the accrual method. But in the early years, prior to this
equalization, the method can have the beneficial effect of freeing amounts for business
growth. Further, in a business marked by regular expansion, the income generated by
the receipt of installments on prior and current installment plan sales will never reach
the income level that employment of the accrual method would yield.
323 Consolidated Dry Goods Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1960).
In very early regulations the Commissioner adopted a policy of not requiring the reten-
tion of a security interest as a feature of a sale on the installment plan. This, along
with the fact that the statute imposes no such requirement, rendered his position in
Consolidated Dry Goods clearly untenable. Recently, however, as a result of amendments
effected by T.D. 6682, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 197, the regulations have adopted a distinction
between traditional installment plan transactions and sales made under a revolving credit
plan, indicating that the former will usually be marked by the dealer's retention of a
security interest.
324 Consolidated Dry Goods Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 878, 882 (D. Mass.
1960).
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sioner's chief disagreement with this judicial result was that it would
allow the taxpayer to report all sales made under revolving credit plans
on the installment method. 25
Subsequently, regulations were designed to provide standards for
determining which portion of the total amount of revolving credit sales
would qualify as sales "on the installment plan."326 In essence, these
regulations provide for determination, from a sample of revolving
credit sales, of the percentage of such sales that, under the plan, will
be, and are in fact, paid for in more than one installment. The resulting
percentage is then applied to the aggregate sales from the revolving
accounts to determine the amount of sales made under the installment
plan.3 27 Because the revolving credit regulations were difficult to apply,
325 Rev. Rul. 60-293, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 163.
326 T.D. 6682, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 197. Proposed regulations issued a year earlier had
been modified significantly as a result of objections from the retail industry. Proposed
Treas. Reg. § 1A53-2, 27 Fed. Reg. 9920 (1962). The Commissioner took time in develop-
ing his stance, having announced in the original regulations promulgated under § 453
that separate rules dealing with revolving credit sales were under consideration. T.D.
6314, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 160.
327 Treas. Reg. § 1A53-2(d), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 Cua. BULL. 197, as amended, T.D.
6804, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 215. The regulations adopt the aggregate monthly sales test,
which is designed to determine whether it was contemplated that the sale be paid for
in two or more installments, and the actual payment test, designed to discover whether
the sale was actually paid for in more than one installment. Pursuant to the former
(Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(d)(3)(i), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 197), the sales made during
the billing month are treated as made on the installment plan "[i]f the aggregate of sales
charged ... exceeds the required monthly payment .... " The latter test (Treas. Reg.
§ 1.453-2(d) (3)(ii), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 197) regards the sale as made on the
installment plan if the "first payment after the billing-month of sale ... is in an amount
which is less than the balance of the account as of the close of the billing-month of
sale." If a sale passes muster with respect to each of these standards, it qualifies as being
made on the installment plan. The goal is to determine what portion of the year-end
revolving credit receivables represent profit that is deferrable under § 453(a). This is
accomplished through an analysis of the year-end balances of the sample accounts, gath-
ered pursuant to approved sampling techniques, to determine what portion thereof is
composed of qualifying sales. For example, assume the total sample year-end balances-
pursuant to a mandatory "first in-first out" principle by which the balance is considered
to be comprised of the most recent charges (Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(d)(6)(v), T.D. 6682,
1963-2 CuM. BULL. 197, as amended, T.D. 6804, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 215)-reveal that
80% of the aggregate balances consist of qualifying sales. This percentage is then
applied to the total revolving credit balance of the taxpayer to determine the amount
that may be treated as sales made on the installment plan. The concluding step is to
apply the appropriate gross profit percentage-determined by reference to total install-
ment plan sales, total credit sales, or all sales of the taxpayer-to the total year-end
balance, which is treated as being composed of sales made on the installment plan.
This reveals the amount of gross profit that may be deferred to succeeding years.
Consistent with the aim of § 453(a), as it applies to dealers, the regulations require
elimination of the portion of the.year-end revolving credit balances that is deemed to
constitute a "nonpersonal property sale." See Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(d)(6)(iv), T.D. 6682,
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Congress in the Revenue Act of 1964 replaced the complex sampling
procedure with a simple definitional provision decreeing that an
"installment plan" included a revol'ving credit plan.3 28 This effort to
broaden the effect of the statute substantially replaced the Commis-
sioner's revolving credit regulations. But it was short lived and is now
only of historical importance. Less than six months later Congress had
a change of heart and concluded that it "would have been better to
have left the Treasury Department with the opportunity to determine
by regulation the extent to which sales under revolving credit type
plans are to be treated as sales under installment plans. '329 The repeal-
ing legislation restored the primacy of the revolving credit regula-
tions.330 According to the accompanying report, the repeal was made
on the Commissioner's assurance that he would continue his effort to
simplify the sampling procedures required by the regulation.33 1
B. Qualifying Taxpayer Must Regularly Sell on the Installment
Plan
The statute defines a dealer as one "who regularly sells . . . on
the installment plan."332 Though the word "regularly" is not defined,
it probably requires a sales pattern of some frequency over a sub-
stantial period of time. 33 Thus, a single sale of inventory cannot
qualify the taxpayer as a dealer entitled to eligibility under section
1963-2 Cum. BULL. 197, citing as examples charges made for services, unless "incidental
to and rendered contemporaneously with the sale of personal property .... ." Thus,
the regulations seem to distinguish between charges for repair, which would not qualify,
and installation charges in connection with a sale, which would qualify. Finance charges,
unlike traditional installment plan sales, will not be treated as part of the sales price
and must be included in income as charged. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(d)(6)(i), T.D. 6682,
1963-2 Cust. BULL., as amended, T.D. 6804, 1965-1 GuM. BULL. 215. See also INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 453(e), requiring that payments received be applied first against finance
and service charges. This substantially diminishes the possibility, which existed under
the regulations applicable for years prior to 1964 (Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(d)(6)(v), T.D.
6682, 1963-2 Cust. BULL. 197, as amended, T.D. 6804, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 215), that the
year-end balances contain a disproportionate amount of nondeferrable finance charges.
328 Act of Feb. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 222, 78 Stat. 75.
329 S. REP. No. 1242, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1964). But Congress supplied significant
legislative history, which clarifies the basic issue of when the method may be used, by
stating that "[in taking this action, your committee intends that the term 'sales on the
installment plan' be interpreted by the regulations as covering 'sales on a revolving
credit type plan' .... Id.
330 Act of Aug. 31, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-539, § 3(b), 78 Stat. 746.
331 Rev. Proc. 65-5, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 720, modifying Rev. Proc. 64-4, 1964-1 (Part I)
Cu . BULL. 644, promulgates further sampling guidelines.
332 INT. RV. CODE of 1954, § 453(a)(1).
333 The provision contemplates a business that is "to continue for a substantial
period of time and to involve numerous transactions." 50 E. 75th St. Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 78 F.2d 158, 160 (2d Cir. 1935) (A. Hand, J.).
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453(a).334 When the seller is not regularly engaged in making such
sales, must eligibility depend upon meeting the election and price
floor requirements that relate to casual sales of personalty? Apparently
Congress intended to draw the familiar distinction between transactions
that take place in a business setting and those that do not. By using
antonyms ("regular" and "casual"), Congress denied eligibility to the
dealer unless he sells on the installment plan with some frequency. If
his installment sale transactions do not rise to that level, he cannot
qualify them as casual property dispositions, because property held for
sale to customers cannot be the subject matter of a casual transaction.335
Therefore, if the taxpayer does not sell on the installment plan with
the frequency required in section 453(a)(1), qualification can only result
from a showing that the sale was not made in the usual course of the
taxpayer's business. 336 Although not expressly stated in the statute, the
inclusion of the word "dealer" in the caption of section 453(a) seems
to indicate that qualification is dependent upon the sale arising from a
"business" of the taxpayer, not in the broad sense of profit seeking,
but rather in the narrow sense in which the term was construed to have
been used in section 162, dealing with business deductions.3 7 Thus,
in E.P. Greenwood,338 the taxpayer successfully qualified, as casual
dispositions of personalty, the installment plan disposition, involving
more than 200 separate sales, of a large stock interest in an insurance
corporation of which he was president. The court stated:
The actual sale of these shares of stock was accomplished by
many transactions, but neither that fact, nor the length of time
such transactions consumed, characterizes them as having been
made by "a person who regularly sells or otherwise disposes of
334 This seems clear by the statute and explains why the taxpayer in G.C.M. 1162,
VI-1, CUM. BULL. 22 (1927), attemped to qualify his lone installment plan sale of inven-
tory property as a casual sale of personalty.
335 "Casual" modifies "sale" and does not refer to the terms and conditions of the
transaction; thus, sales that are a part of the taxpayer's regular course of business seem
to be excluded. The language added by the Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 44(b), 45
Stat. 805 (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453(b)(l)(B)), denying eligibility to "property of
a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand
at the close of the taxable year .... "-which in effect codified the result of G.C.M.
1162, VI-1 CuM. BULL. 22 (1927)-was a clarifying and not a necessary change. Cf. Ann
Edwards Trust, 20 T.C. 615, 618 (1953), aff'd, 217 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 905 (1955).
336 See 50 E. 75th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1935), involving a
builder's sale of stock in a cooperative apartment corporation.
337 See Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941), holding that the taxpayer's
large investment portfolio did not constitute a trade or business within the predecessor
of § 162. This compelled the subsequent enactment of the predecessor to § 212.
338 34 B.T.A. 1209 (1936).
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personal property on the installment plan" or any other plan.
Such transactions were casual sales. A business which is limited
to the disposition of certain specific property of an individual
is not a business regularly carried on under [the applicable
statute] . . . .39
The capital gain cases are very helpful in determining whether the
taxpayer is making the sale as a dealer or nondealer. Of course, whether
the taxpayer is selling in the capacity of a dealer (i.e., disposing of
inventory type property) is a consideration distinct from whether the
taxpayer has sold on the installment plan with sufficient frequency to
qualify under section 453(a)(1). If the taxpayer fails to establish that
sales have occurred with the regularity demanded by that section, he
can presumably argue that the sale is casual and not made as a part
of the regular course of his business. Of course, this invokes the price
floor requirement and the ceiling on year-of-sale payments that relate
to casual sales. Also, the stringent election requirements that the Com-
missioner seeks to apply to casual sales would apply. In such a situation,
the personal property cases arising under section 1221(1) would be
analogous.3 40 The Commissioner has failed to take a strong litigation
position on the question whether the taxpayer sells property on the
installment plan with sufficient frequency to qualify under the statute.
Consequently, while a lone sale of inventory property will not qualify,
a pattern involving only slightly more would likely pass judicial muster.
Some decisions have not considered the proportion between install-
ment and noninstallment sales as controlling. The statute makes
eligible one who "regularly" sells pursuant to this method; no premium
is placed on the relative volume of business done on that basis. 341 Yet,
in one case the proportion of installment plan transactions to total trans-
actions was considered in solving the factual question of "regularity."3 42
The cases have also considered sales frequency (i.e., the number of total
sales made on the installment plan) and whether the taxpayer gener-
339 Id. at 1212.
340 See, e.g., Estate of Jacques Ferber, 22 T.C. 261 (1954), concerning whether a large-
scale disposition of inventory by decedent dealer's estate (which may involve several sepa-
rate transactions) is eligible for treatment as a casual sale. On an installment sale of
"investment securities" by a dealer in securities, the Commissioner could take the position
that the dispositions were casual, thus using the regular-casual dichotomy to seek non-
qualification by invoking the year-of-sale ceiling and minimum price requirements.
341 Marshall Bros. Lumber Co., 13 B.TA. 1111, 1116 (1928), rev'd per curiam, 51 F.2d
1081 (6th Cir. 1931). Though classed as "incidental," the taxpayer's installment plan sales
(6% of total sales) were still of sufficient regularity to warrant qualification. This indi-
cates the minor importance of relative installment plan sales volume. Herman Tillman,
10 B.T.A. 4, 6-7 (1928).
342 Louis Greenspon, 23 T.C. 138, 152 (1954), modified, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956).
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ally held out to the public a willingness to conduct business on that
basis. 3 43 For example, the court is willing to view installment sales that
involve a substantial portion (in dollars) of the total sales volume as a
proper substitute for literal frequency in the number of such sales.34
Though a taxpayer regularly sells on the installment plan, it must
appear that the proceeds that he seeks to report according to the install-
ment method are received as a result of a "sale." This, of course, is an
attribute of the statute applicable to nondealers as well. In most in-
stances this requirement will not create problems. The statutory pro-
visions relating to general principles of gain realization (" sale or other
disposition of property")3 4 and to eligibility for capital gains treatment
("sale or exchange of a capital asset") 346 afford a sufficient basis for
solving most of the problems concerning the word "sale" in section
453(a)(1). Also, the statute provides eligibility for a taxpayer "who reg-
ularly sells or otherwise disposes," of property. Thus, the frame of
reference is broadened to include transfers that technically are not
"sales." Questions relating to these provisions parallel those that might
arise concerning transfers by nondealers, discussion of which is con-
tained elsewhere. 347
C. The Realty-Personalty Distinction
For dealers in personalty to qualify under the statute, they must
be regularly engaged in the sale or disposition of "personal property."3 4
The Commissioner commences consideration of the realty-personalty
dichotomy by asserting that the statutory language should be given its
ordinary effect, and thus a sale or disposition of real property "must
mean a sale or other disposition of land or of rights in or to land."3 49
Administrative pronouncements aimed at the solution of specific
343 Davenport Machine & Foundry Co., 18 T.C. 39, 43 (1952); Marshall Bros. Lumber
Co., 13 B.T.A. 1111, 1116 (1928), rev'd per curiam, 51 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1931).
344 Louis Greenspon, 23 T.C. 138 (1954), modified, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956). In
that case there were only 4 sales, involving 2 customers, but these sales comprised 22%
of total sales made by taxpayers during the year. Further, the size of the markup and
purchase price may be relevant. Thus, a dealer in hard goods may be allowed to qualify
with fewer sales.
345 INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 1001(a).
346 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1222.
347 See pp. 198-202 supra.
348 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 453(a)(1) (emphasis added). If the taxpayer fails to
qualify the property as personalty, he might be able to report the proceeds-assuming he
properly elects to do so in a context in which each sale is an elective event-as gain from
the sale of realty, but only at the expense of becoming subject to the 30% ceiling on
year-of-sale payments.
349 G.C.M. 7871, IX-1 Cum. BuLL. 207, 209 (1930).
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problems in this area have, however, been unwisely abstract. Most dif-
ficulties have arisen with respect to taxpayers engaged in home con-
struction. This business raises questions not only concerning the
realty-personalty distinction, but also whether the taxpayer is involved
in the disposition of property at all, or is simply engaged in rendering
a service. Again, the Commissioner is probably on firm ground when
he states that, in the interest of uniform application of the revenue
system, local law nuances should not be considered in solving problems
touching on the nature of the property transferred. 350 The Commis-
sioner properly determined that the disposition of roofs already con-
structed and of roofing materials and their attachment to buildings is
not the disposition of realty within the predecessor of section 453, the
inference being that the property involved was personalty.3S5 Although
the Commissioner alluded to the material-labor differential (80% and
20%, respectively) involved in the construction and installation of
the roofs, it was in a later ruling that he concluded, albeit tentatively,
that the construction of houses can constitute the rendering of a service
rather than the disposition of property.352 While ruling that the sale of
factory-built houses by the taxpayer for installation on the purchaser's
realty and on foundations not erected by the taxpayer constituted the
sale of personalty, the Commissioner also held that the construction of
"shell" or partially completed homes on land owned by others did not
involve the sale of property but simply constituted the rendition of a
service not entitling the taxpayer to eligibility under section 453.353
This ruling is particularly abstract, since it seems to treat as crucial
the place of the construction activity engaged in by the taxpayer.
Obviously, expenditure of a labor effort is involved in the manufacture
and creation of the finished facility. In the instance ruled on favorably
by the Commissioner, the labor was performed in the taxpayer's factory;
in the instance held not a sale, the construction took place upon the
property of another. The Commissioner has seized this seemingly
irrelevant distinction as the basis on which to promulgate a concept of
"nonsale" which denies eligibility under section 453. This administra-
tive position was hardened in 1959, when the Commissioner ruled that
a taxpayer constructing custom-built houses on land belonging to others
is a "building construction contractor" and not a dealer in personalty
nor involved in making sales of real property or casual sales of per-
350 Rev. Rul. 59-250, 1959-2 CuM. BuLL. 134.
351 G.C.M. 7871, IX-1 Gum. BuLL. 207, 209 (1930).
352 G.C.M. 27169, 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 120.
353 Id. at 121-22.
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sonalty.35 4 Although the taxpayer may properly have been classified as
a.building construction contractor, it is difficult to see how this descrip-
tion of -his endeavor denies him the right to treat his transactions as
property dispositions for the purpose of section 453.
Admittedly, labor as well as material is involved in the home
construction process. But this is a hallmark of the manufacturing
process generally. There is nothing in the language of section 453, or
in the background compelling its enactment, that even vaguely hints
either at noneligibility for those engaged in the manufacturing process
or at the importance of the labor-material differential in the compo-
sition of the manufactured item. Although it failed to cite the 1959
ruling, a subsequent decision of the Tax Court seems in direct contrast.
In W. W. Pope355 the taxpayer was permitted to treat the proceeds from
the disposition of homes constructed on the property of others as
received from the sale of personalty. In sounding a note of reason, the
court concluded that the taxpayer "is no more engaged in the sale of
services than any other dealer in personal property who is also the
fabricator of such property."3 .5 6 Also, the court wisely dismissed the
relevance of the locus of the construction activity, finding that the
manufacture of the product on the customer's property "was dictated
solely by the nature of the product . . . ."57 Arguably, though, this
decision does not conflict with the 1959 ruling; the court in Pope noted
that the homes sold by the taxpayer were selected by the purchaser
from a standard group of model homes, whereas the 1959 ruling con-
templated a situation in which homes were "custom-built" in ac-
cordance with agreed specifications.
The Commissioner's position appears to be that at some point
the contractor is involved in nothing more than using the real property
owner's money to buy material and construct a house according to the
owner's wishes. This may be the seed of a valid distinction, although
it is difficult to see why the purchaser's selection of the ultimate design
converts the transaction into one involving the rendering of services
rather than the disposition of property. Presumably, almost every en-
deavor, including a lawyer's preparation of legal documents, results
in property-creation of some character. The difficulty lies in deter-
mining whether the activity is primarily service-oriented. Except for,
the applicability of the ceiling on year-of-sale payments, the realty-
354 Rev. Rul. 59-250, 1959-2 GuM. BULL. 134, 135-36.
355 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1198 (1965).
356 Id. at 1200 (emphasis in original).
357 Id.
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personalty distinction usually does not determine the taxpayer's eligi-
bility under section 453. Presumably, a timely election to report sales
of personalty under section 453(a)(1) would also constitute a timely
election under section 453(b), in the event the property sold is later
determined to constitute realty.358 The Commissioner's property-ser-
vices distinction has a far more deadly thrust, for if a transaction is
determined to be the rendering of a service, it may not be classified
under either section of the installment sales provision of the code.
While the basis upon which the Commissioner makes the distinction
is not sound, other nooks in the federal tax law may offer a solution
to the dilemma.359
D. Adoption of the Installment Method by Dealers
Most of the controversy concerning whether the taxpayer has made
a timely election of the installment method has arisen with respect
to transactions involving sales of realty and casual sales of personalty.
In such a context, each sale constitutes a basis for election; this creates
a setting in which mishap is likely to occur. Further, the transactions
in which nondealers-or even dealers, in the case of real property-
become involved are more varied in form. Their true nature, for
purposes of the income tax, may be uncertain at the time of filing,
whereas the retail transaction in which the dealer in personalty is
involved is far more likely to be routine. The elective process by the
dealer is much less likely to be a potential trap. The decision to employ
the installment method, however, can take two forms. Adoption of the
method by a dealer for the first taxable year in which he makes sales
on the installment plan is not complex. Greater difficulty is likely to
result when a dealer changes to the installment method from another
method of tax accounting.
The regulations provide that the decision to adopt the method
for the first year of installment sales must be indicated on the "income
tax return for that taxable year." 360 The regulations further admonish
that the decision must be made on a return "filed on or before the
358 The timeliness of the election should not be affected by the taxpayer's failure
to properly classify the transaction, since income computation is not thereby affected.
Treas. Reg. § 1A53-8(a), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 197; Treas. Reg. § 1.453-8(b) (1958).
359 The revolving credit plan regulations provide that, when the "services are inci-
dental to and rendered contemporaneously with the sale of personal property ... such
charges [for the services] shall be considered as constituting part of the selling price .... "
Thus, the regulations recognize that an amalgam of services and property can be treated
entirely as a sale of personal property. Treas. Reg. 4 1A53-2(d)(6)(iv), T.D. 6682, 1963-2
Cutr. BULL. 197.
360 Treas. Reg. § lA53-8(a)(2), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 197.
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time specified (including extensions thereof) for filing such return."36'
Thus, the Commissioner requires for an election by dealers what he
does not require of those selling realty or involved in a casual sale
of personalty, namely a decision upon a timely return.362 This, of course,
was a central issue in the controversy that raged concerning dispositions
of realty and casual sales of personalty. The taxpayer-dealer who files
a return on which he reports the income from installment sales pursuant
to an accounting method other than the installment method should
not be permitted to adopt the installment method via either an
amended return for that year or a claim for refund.36, Since, in most
situations, the taxpayer-dealer will have reported the income received
from installment sales according to one method or another, he will be
pinned with a binding election, and the question whether the taxpayer
made any election at all should not be present. Nevertheless, some
questions concerning the timeliness of an election in the case of a sale of
realty or a casual sale of personalty can also apply in situations involving
dealers of personalty. For example, where no inconsistent election has
been made, the Commissioner apparently will not accept an election
made on a late return or on an amended return filed before the expira-
tion of the statute of limitations.3 64
Although the statute transfers to the Secretary or his delegate the
power to promulgate legislative regulations concerning use of the in-
stallment method by dealers, it is still relevant to ask whether the
requirement of the regulation may be considered "unauthorized as add-
ing limitations beyond that authorized in the statute itself."36 5 This is
not an easy road to pursue, however, especially in an area where Con-
gress has delegated broad authority to the administrator of the statute.
Nevertheless, no reason appears why the Commissioner's policy about
the timeliness of an election to use the installment method should not
be identical with respect to all types of sales potentially eligible under
the statute. Thus, he should permit dealers in personalty to adopt the in-
stallment method on delinquent returns or on an amended return for an
361 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-8(a)(1), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 197.
362 Rev. Rul. 65-297, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 152; see detailed discussion of election at
pp. 215-31 supra.
:363 Pacific Nat'l Co. v. Welch, 304 U.S. 191 (1938); Kay-Jones Furniture Co., 24 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 789 (1955). Conversely, the choice of the installment method is also bind-
ing, and the taxpayer may not file an amended return using a different accounting
method.
364 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-8(a)(1), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 197; cf. Rev. Rul. 65-
297, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 152.
365 C'de Baca v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 189, 190 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964).
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open year, if an inconsistent election has not been made. Of course, this
situation is not likely to arise.
E. Change from the Accrual to the Installment Method
Similarly, a change to the installment method from another method
used by the taxpayer-dealer to report income from installment plan
sales must be made on a statement filed with a timely return.366 The dif-
ficulty has been not in effecting the change 67 but rather in determining
whether installment receipts received after the change to the installment
method, but related to sales occurring prior to the change, shall be in-
cluded in computing the gross profit reported as installment income.
Prior to the 1954 Code, subsequent installment receipts were included
in income when the taxpayer changed from the accrual to the install-
ment method.368 Somewhat oddly, the Congressional concern motivat-
ing the 1928 enactment,369 which codified the double-tax administrative
position,370 was limited to the "seriously subnormal amount of income"
resulting when taxpayers changed from the accrual to the installment
method. Since the cash method, through the doctrine of cash equiva-
lence, compels inclusion in income of an amount equal to the fair mar-
ket value of the buyer's obligation, the change from the cash to the in-
stallment method causes a similar drop in income in the years following
the change. The administrative action and Congressional response,
however, have been limited to changes from the accrual to the install-
ment method.371
In 1954 Congress stated that it desired to eliminate the double tax
effect occurring in changes from the accrual to the installment method.
This desire, however, did not manifest itself in any tampering with sec-
tion 44(c) of the 1939 Code, which was recodified as section 453(c)(1) of
the 1954 Code. Rather, Congress used the familiar tactic of adding a tax
credit for the year in which the installment plan receipt is included in
366 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-8(a)(1), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 CuM. BuLL 197.
367 Contrary to the principle normally applicable to changes in accounting method,
consent is not required to change to the installment method. Treas. Reg. § 1A53-7(a),
T.D. 6682, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 197. See also INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 446(e).
368 ITN. REV. CODE of 1939, ch. 1, § 44(c), 53 Stat. 25.
369 Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 44(c), 45 Stat. 805.
370 See pp. 189-90 supra. The uncertainty of the Commissioner's administrative
position on this question prior to the Congressional enactment of 1928 is fully chronicled
in Hoover-Bond Co. v. Denman, 59 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1932), and Willcuts v. Gradwohl,
58 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1932).
3 71 Infrequently, a question may arise concerning whether the taxpayer effected a
change in accounting at all. E.g., J.C. Nichols Land Co. v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 437
(8th Cir. 1933); S. Davidson & Bros., 21 B.T.A. 638 (1930).
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income for the second time3 72 The adjustment allowed is equal either
to (a) the tax which is attributable to installment plan sales made prior
to the change and which are subject to forced inclusion by reason of sec-
tion 453(c)(1), or (b) the tax attributable to the installment receipts in-
cludible in income by section 453(c)(1) in the adjustment year on ac-
count of sales made prior to the change, whichever is less 373 Although
the Congressional intent was to eliminate the double tax caused by the
subsequent forced inclusion of installment receipts on pre-change
sales,374 the formula does not, as is often the case with such creations, op-
erate in such a utopian fashion. The "whichever is lesser" aspect of the
formula fails to insulate the taxpayer against a rising tax rate structure.
Thus, for example, the tax for the adjustment year will be reduced only
by the tax attributable to the inclusion of such amount in the prior year,
when the rates were lower.31 5
The continuing presence of the double tax potential prompts ef-
forts to avoid its impact. Thus, the stratagem relied on in City Stores Co.
v. Smith,376 though the case arose under the 1939 Code, is still applica-
ble. In that case the taxpayer sold its installment obligations to a bank,
and the Commissioner sought to include, in taxable years subsequent to
the change to the installment method, amounts collected by the tax-
payer on the installment obligations. In finding against the Commis-
sioner, the court held that the taxpayer had not "actually received"3 77
any amounts on the installment obligations in the post-change years un-
372 Analogous provisions are found in INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 691(c), 2012, and
2013. Though cast as a deduction and not as a credit, § 691(c) affords relief to the
recipient of income upon the death of an individual in instances in which the property
right causing such subsequent income generated a prior estate tax liability. Sections 2012
and 2013 provide for credits against the estate tax where there has been a prior tax on
essentially the same item.
373 INT. RaV. CODE of 1954, § 453(c)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.453-7(b), T.D. 6682, 1963-2
Cum. BULL. 197. For example, suppose the taxpayer in the year prior to change had re-
ported on the accrual method gross profit of $50,000 on installment plan sales. The
subsequent receipt of $10,000 gross profit from such sales in the year of change, although
includible in income under § 453(c)(1), would entitle the taxpayer to a credit or "adjust-
ment," equal to the lesser of (1) the portion of the tax for the prior year attributable
to the $10,000 gross profit included in gross income in such prior year, or (2) the portion
of the tax attributable to the inclusion of the $10,000 gross profit amount in gross
income (by reason of § 453(c)(1)) in the year of its receipt. .
374 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 65, 303-04 (1954).
375 Also, a change in the tax bracket of the taxpayer in the year he receives the
installment may result in failure of the adjustment to compensate completely for the
prior inclusion. Even absent this factor, the adjustment may not be fully compensating
if the'expenses relating to the sale have been claimed in the prior year.
376 154 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
377 See INT. RaV. CODE of 1954, § 453(c)(1)(A).
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der review by the court, thus rendering the statute inapplicable. The
amounts received by the taxpayer in years subsequent to the change
were viewed simply as payments attributable to the previous, bona fide
disposition and received on behalf of the buying bank. Although the
Commissioner has stated that he will follow City Stores,37 8 the case can-
not be viewed as a universal remedy to the problem of the partial second
tax. The City Stores court found, and the Commissioner's ruling re-
quires, that the disposition of the installment obligations constitutes a
sale in substance and not simply a loan or advance. It may not be possi-
ble for the taxpayer to effect a sale of receivables. The "buyer" may in-
sist on some degree of continuing involvement and obligation on the
part of the "seller" that will cause the transaction to fall short of "sale"
classification. Even effecting an agreement may be difficult, either be-
cause of the buyer's dissatisfaction with receivables as an item upon
which its "credit" should be extended or because of the seller's unwil-
lingness to countenance the discount demanded.31 9
It might be asked whether a corporation formed in a tax-free organiza-
tion transfer, or a partnership formed through similar tax-free transfers,
by previously unrelated individuals must, in adopting the installment
method upon formation, be subject to the second tax bite imposed by
section 453(c)(1) with respect to installment plan sales reported on the
accrual method in pre-formation years. The Commissioner has ruled
that the second tax principle does not apply when receivables are ac-
quired by a corporation in a tax-free organization transfer. He reasons
that the newly created corporation is a new taxpaying entity, and thus
there is no "change" in accounting method by the corporation.3 0 Al-
though the Commissioner reaches the same conclusion for newly created
partnerships,31 the same reasoning does not apply, since the tax law
does not treat a partnership as a tax-paying entity. Nonetheless, among
the elections made by the partnership as an entity are those affecting the
computation of income. 3 Thus, the Commissioner's ruling is sound.
These principles should continue to apply in all situations in which in-
stallment plan receivables previously reported on the accrual method
are transferred to a new entity which chooses to adopt the installment
378 Rev. Rul. 59-343, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 136-37.
379 See Tovey, How To Sell Receivables and Switch to Installment Accounting With-
out Double Tax, 16 J. TAXATION 354, 355 (1962). See also Wiese, Techniques of Install-
ment Sales and Revolving Credit: Methods of Election; Bulk Sales of Receivables and
Notes, N.Y.U. 23D INST. ON FED. TAX. 905, 908-09 (1965).
380 I.T. 2521, IX-1 CUM. BULL. 123 (1930).
381 I.T. 3293, 1939-1 (Part 1) Cu8!. BULL. 183.
382 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 703(b).
1968]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
method. For example, a trust or estate receiving such property should
be able to adopt the installment method without potential, second tax
impact on receipt of payments for prior installment plan sales reported
on the accrual method. This result seems less dear, however, if the trust
income is taxed to the grantor under the Clifford provisions of the
Code.3 8 3 In that situation, it is difficult to conclude that a separate tax-
paying entity is created, since the income is treated as owned by the
grantor.3s4 Adoption of the installment method by the Clifford trust
may be treated as a "change" in method by the grantor, which would
subject him to a second tax.
The acquiring corporation in a Type A or Type C reorganization
probably cannot adopt the installment method for acquired receivables
without fear of a second tax impact on sales reported on the accrual
method by the transferring corporation. Although this is not codified in
the statutory material dealing with the carryover of corporate attri-
butes,8 5 the "continuity of business enterprise" doctrine, which perme-
ates the reorganization area, seems to distinguish this type of situation
from a transfer of installment receivables to a newly formed corporation
by an individual. Thus, adoption of the installment method by the ac-
quiring corporation would be a "change" within section 453(c)(1). The
opposite view, of course, stresses the entity aspect, urging that the ac-
quiring corporation is not the same taxpayer as the one that previously
reported income on the accrual basis.&3 6
An organization's change from a tax exempt status to a taxable sta-
tus would not compel the same results with respect to unrealized install-
ment receivables. The treatment to be accorded payments received on
previous installment plan sales depends upon which accounting method
the organization selects. If it adopts the accrual method, the subsequent
receipts should have no tax effect, since the items did not accrue during
the taxable year. Adoption of the installment method, however, will
compel inclusion in the later years of receipt of the unrealized income as
"installment payments actually received" under section 453(a)(1).3sr In
this context, therefore, a "change" to the installment method, if it can
be viewed as such, would probably be unwise. Further, the adjustment
383 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 671-78.
384 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 671.
385 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 381(c)(8), provides for the carryover of the installment
method to the acquiring corporation, but is not applicable here.
386 See B. BITrER & J. EusTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS, 602-10 (2d ed. 1966).
387 Rev. Rul. 55-437, 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 548. Adoption of the cash method by the
newly taxable entity would also compel the inclusion in income of the subsequently
received installment payments.
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in tax for years after adoption of the installment method would not be
applicable, since no amounts attributable to such sales were included in
income in the pre-adoption years.
The potential second tax bite of section 453(c)(1) brings up, in an-
other context, the problem of defining an installment sale. The statute
provides that the second inclusion shall result when the taxpayer re-
ceives "installment payments . . . on account of sales or other disposi-
tions of property made.., before the year of change .... ,"388 Failure of
the statute and regulations to provide an adequate definition of an in-
stallment sale produced a curious result in Louis C-reenspon.389 After
finding that the taxpayer was regularly engaged in selling on the install-
ment plan during 1949, the court addressed itself to the receipt in that
year of amounts in satisfaction of a sales contract entered into in 1948.
The court properly concluded that section 453(c)(1) would not apply if
the 1948 transaction could not be regarded as a sale on the installment
plan.390 Although the sale in question was originally finalized on a cash
basis, the agreement was subsequently modified, with payment to be
made in five equal installments, the last four of which were paid in 1949.
In deciding for the taxpayer-i.e., that section 453(c)(1) did not
apply because the prior sale was not made on the installment plan
-the court stated that it could not countenance a contrary result,
which would cause every sale made on the credit of the purchaser and
evidenced by obligations payable periodically to be classified as an
installment plan sale. And yet, what more is an installment sale? The
current regulations ask for no other qualities.391
By relying on the assertion that the taxpayer was not regularly sel-
ling on the installment plan in 1948, the court mistakenly considered el-
igibility to use the installment method of reporting as a hallmark of an
installment sale. Whether the taxpayer was eligible to adopt the install-
ment method with respect to the 1948 sale is a consideration entirely in-
dependent of whether the sale itself was on the installment plan.
Thus, the court should have treated the 1949 receipts generated by the
1948 sale as subject to the machinery of section 453(c)(1).
F. Operation of the Statute as It Relates to Dealers
Although the manner in which the installment income of dealers in
personalty is computed is the same as with the installment method gen-
388 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 453(c)(1)(A).
3S89 23 T.C. 138, 152-55 (1954), modified, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956).
390 Rev. Rul. 54-111, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 76, 77, remedies a minor ambiguity in the
statute by indicating that § 453(c)(1) refers "only to amounts received on account of
installment sales made in prior years ... ."
391 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(b), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 197.
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erally, certain problems apply particularly to the dealer. Here, as with
installment method reporting generally, the taxpayer reports as income
that proportion of the total amounts received on the installment plan
which the gross profit realized or to be realized on the total sales on the
installment plan during the year bears to-the total contract price of all
such installment sales. The amount treated as income is thus determined
by a fraction, the numerator of which is the gross profit on total install-
ment plan sales and the denominator of which is the total contract price
of all such sales.392 Defining the components of the relevant fraction,
however, presents some problems.
Gross profit should be determined according to generally accepted
principles. Though "cost of goods sold" is utilized in determining gross
profit, there remains the question concerning what further items may be
considered in making the determination. Early in the history of the stat-
ute, it was ruled that a taxpayer regularly selling on the installment plan
may not allocate the expenses incident to producing the income to
the year in which the profits on the sale of goods are realized, but
should deduct such expenses in his income-tax return as for the
year in which incurred and paid or accrued.393
The deferral of expense items to subsequent years could reduce gross
profits and the amount of installment income for that year. Such items
as administrative expenses, therefore, must be deducted in the year in
which paid or accrued (depending on the taxpayer's accounting method)
and cannot be deferred to later years in which installment income inci-
dent to such expenses is generated.
The denominator of the fraction to be applied to installment plan
sales receipts, i.e., total contract price, was recently given statutory em-
bellishment. Although the statute's use of "total contract price" appar-
ently refers to the total amount to be paid by the buyer, the regulations
also refer, in the same context, to total selling price. 94 To assure the
dealer's right to defer income received in the form of interest or carry-
ing charges, Congress amended the statute in 1964 to provide for inclu-
sion of such amounts in the total contract price.395 The Commissioner
had ruled earlier that carrying charges or so-called time-price differen-
392 Concerning the allocation of installment sale receipts subsequent to the year of
sale, see Treas. Reg. § 1A53-2(c), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 197, as amended, T.D.
6804, 1965-1 Com. BULL. 215.
393 OJD. 844, 4 CuM. BULL. 123 (1921). See also Blum's, Inc., 7 B.T.A. 737 (1927);
Treas. Reg. § 1.453-1(b), T.D. 6873, 1966-1 Cuar. BULL. 101.
394 Treas. Reg. § 1.453-2(c)(2), T.D. 6682, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 197, as amended, T.D.
6804, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 215.
395 INT. R.V. CODE of 1954, § 453(a)(2), added by Act of Aug. 31, 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-539, § 3a, 78 Stat. 746.
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tials determined at the time of each sale and added to the established sel-
ling price were part of the "total contract price" and hence deferrable
over the period of the contract.396 Pursuant to unpublished policy, how-
ever, the Commissioner attempted to distinguish between an amount
paid as a result of a flat charge added to the price at the time of the con-
tract and an amount yielded as a result of the imposition of a charge on
the monthly unpaid balance of the buyer, the latter being denied inclu-
sion in the total contract price. Concluding that any distinction pre-
mised on the manner in which the customer is billed for the carrying
charge is "superficial," Congress provided that any carrying charge or
interest that is added to the selling price on the books of account of the
seller may be included in the "total contract price." 97 The legislative
change, therefore, allows any form of time-price differential to be re-
ported ratably as the installment payments are received rather than on
an accrual basis as the carrying charge, or interest, is earned.
VIII
CONCLUSION
The rules surrounding the accounting of income for tax purposes
rely heavily, as indeed they should, on the taxpayer's own method of ac-
counting. The installment method of reporting income, however, cuts
across traditional accounting approaches. Although the statutory
method of deferral is available only for income generated by property
dispositions, such dispositions represent a significant portion of the my-
riad revenue-producing activities in which taxpayers engage. Also, since
property dispositions are the only income-producing activity in which
taxpayers regularly receive payment in the form of evidences of indebt-
edness and thus may be unable to pay the tax generated, no great need
appears for extending income deferral to other areas, except possibly
with respect to prepaid income.
The manner in which section 458 is cast, together with the Com-
missioner's rigid litigation position concerning various aspects of the
section's effect, has created difficulties for taxpayers seeking qualifica-
tion. Although the seemingly familiar language has been part of the
statute for more than forty years, its ambiguities are not yet completely
resolved. If nothing else, this indicates that ease of interpretation and
administration do not necessarily flow from longevity. If we expect
greater simplicity in reporting installment income, we must recognize
the need for affirmative statutory modification.
596 Rev. Rul. 64-126, 1964-1 (Part 1) Cur. BULL. 170, modified, Rev. Rul. 67-316,
1967 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 39, at 7.
397 S. REP. No. 1242, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1964).
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